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Abstract
Have Metropolitan Planning Organizations Improved Regional Policy Making?
The Cases of Kansas City and St. Louis
Historically, municipalities and regions continually competed for a share
of transportation funds. The process was dominated by state Departments of
Transportation where cooperation, equity and participation were limited.
Eighteen years ago the federal government provided metropolitan areas with
the opportunity to play a larger role in the regional transportation process. On
December 18, 1991 President George H.W. Bush signed the Intermodal Surface
Transportation Equity Act (ISTEA). The legislation ushered in a new era of
cooperation between state and local leaders by empowering regional
Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs). The federal legislation’s intention
was to allow a region, through their MPO, to address participation, economic
development, social equity and quality of life issues through their
transportation policy. The significance and effectiveness of these increased
functions has not been determined. The work of other scholars is insufficient to
determine whether MPOs are making a difference and led to calls for further
research. There was a need for an in-depth examination of MPOs through a
comparative case study.
This study examines whether Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs)
make a difference in regional transportation policy-making. It investigates
whether MPOs increase public saliency, increase the consideration of social
factors (e.g. employment, quality of life and equity) and improve elected
official participation in the regional transportation planning process. The study
examines six major regional transportation projects: Three projects at the
Kansas City MPO; Mid-America Regional Council (MARC), and three projects at
the St. Louis MPO; East-West Gateway Council of Governments (EWGCOG).
Study results were determined through comparative analysis of the case
studies.
The evidence suggests MPOs make a difference in four of the five areas
examined. They make a difference in public saliency, quality of life,
employment factors, and elected official involvement. The means by which an
MPO makes a difference include: employing expert consultants, advisory
groups, and numerous internal committees brokering political agreements, and
managing funds. The cases illustrate that the MPOs powers to coalesce regional
cooperation are informal and that MPOs make a reasonable difference in
regional transportation policy. The study points toward the need to provide
more resources to MPOs.
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
This chapter describes the significance of Metropolitan Planning
Organizations (MPOs), the development of regional planning, and outlines the
study of the difference an MPO makes in the regional transportation process.
The Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA), introduced in
1991, shifted the focus of transportation policy from the state to regional
level. This shift made MPOs the focal point for regional transportation
decisions. Regional planning began to take shape in the mid-sixties through the
formation of Council of Governments (COGs) whose numbers grew rapidly due
to federal support. Despite this federal government assistance, COGs suffered
from poor participation by the public and elected officials, and limited
monetary resources. These COGs are the institutions, in most cases, that house
MPOs. The chapter sets up the study of MPOs through a seven chapter
comparative case study (Kansas City and St. Louis) to determine if MPOs, and
their increased role in transportation policy due to ISTEA, are making a
difference.
The Significance of MPOs
Transportation policy is a regional issue because commuters travel
across and between various political jurisdictions. A transportation system
shapes any region’s quality of life and economic wellbeing. A region’s
transportation system has “…a profound impact on the living conditions and life
chances of Americans” (Weir et al., 2009). It dictates growth and economic
activity through land use and provides the capacity to move goods and people
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throughout a region. A region is an urbanized geographic area with a central
city and suburbs tied together economically and socially. The performance of
this geographic area’s transportation system affects air quality, traffic
congestion, social equity, economic development, job access and other
important regional features. On air quality, for example, the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) identified 474 counties and thirty-one cities as out of
compliance with the Clean Air Act in April of 2004 (EPA, 2004). The Texas
Transportation Institute’s 2002 Urban Mobility Report illustrates that traffic
congestion in the United States results in nearly six billion gallons of wasted
motor fuel annually (American Road & Transportation Builders Association,
2006). Nationwide traffic volume has continued to increase, especially in the
metropolitan regions. The vehicle distance traveled has been increasing and
road infrastructure has failed to keep pace. According to the Federal Highway
Administration (FHWA), the annual vehicle distance traveled tripled from 1967
(1.14 billion lane miles) to 2005 (2.9 billion lane miles) (FHWA, 2007).
Meanwhile, road infrastructure has not increased in pace with demand. The
total lane miles in the US has increased from 8.1 million miles in 1992 to 8.3
million miles in 2005 (Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2008).
In an effort to better address these policy concerns the federal
government shifted the focus of transportation policy to the regional level. In
1991, Congress adopted the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act
(ISTEA) which mandated the enhancement of MPOs. By increasing the focus on
metropolitan regions and transferring greater responsibility for transportation
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planning to MPOs, ISTEA represents the most significant transportation reform
in recent decades (Katz, Puentes & Bernstein, 2005).
By giving MPOs a more significant role in regional transportation, ISTEA
provided more flexibility in developing transportation policy, planning and
investment, and sought to improve transportation initiatives and services in
metropolitan regions. Since 1991, the Transportation Equity Act for the
Twenty-First Century (TEA-21) in 1998, and the Safe, Accountable, Flexible,
Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA_LU) in 2005
have built on ISTEA.
Recent transportation policy changes and a greater role for MPOs offer
metropolitan regions the opportunity to more effectively address their regions’
transportation issues. Prior to ISTEA, federal transportation policy was
dominated by state Departments of Transportation. ISTEA was supposed to
make transportation policy a regionally cooperative effort. MPOs hold
significant policymaking responsibilities and offer a form of regional
governance intended to coordinate regional transportation policy by garnering
horizontal cooperation between two or more local governments (Gerber &
Gibson, 2009). This shift in policy through the ISTEA initiative was significant
because it allowed for transportation policy to address the fragmented nature
of American government and various transportation issues.
According to the US Census Bureau there were approximately 87,500
local governments in 2002. These included about 3,000 county governments;
19,400 municipal governments; 16,500 townships; 13,500 school districts; and
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35,100 special districts (US Department of Labor, 2005). In an effort to ease
the effect of fragmentation and garner greater regional cooperation, new
federal transportation policy (ISTEA, TEA-21, & SAFETEA_LU) is being
implemented through a state and local partnership which is mandated to be
comprehensive and inclusive (Katz and Puentes, 2005). This legislation requires
transportation plans to be developed with input from local governments, area
transit providers and state Departments of Transportation.
As regions develop transportation plans it is crucial that they are aware
of the critical link between transportation and societal goals. Federal law
explicitly encourages MPOs to address traffic congestion, air pollution, and the
spatial mismatch between jobs and workers. MPO programs emphasize the
importance of reinvesting in existing transportation systems and provide for
their preservation.
MPOs offer several other potential benefits for metropolitan regions: (1)
They provide information to policy makers by making planning and technical
assistance available. (2) They coordinate regional progress by developing
regional plans. (3) They conduct research and analysis of regional issues and
provide technical support to the regional decision making process. (4) They
help local leaders and private citizens develop plans for public transit, trails
and greenways, and traffic management which are important to the future
development of metropolitan regions. These efforts enable local communities
to make more efficient use of resources and to cooperatively invest in
common, strategic regional objectives.

Campbell, Joseph, 2010, UMSL, p.5
Federal legislation is supposed to allow MPOs to facilitate regional
cooperation and create a transportation policy that addresses more than just
traffic flow within a region. The federal government viewed MPOs as the forum
to plan regional transportation projects, and to improve regional transportation
policy making. Despite these potential benefits there is little evidence as to
what, if any, difference MPOs have made in transportation policy over the past
eighteen years.
This raises several pertinent questions regarding the effectiveness of this
federal legislation. Have MPOs actually improved the regional transportation
policy process? Have they made a difference in the way regions make
transportation policy? Have ISTEA and its successors caused MPOs to improve
regional information about regional transportation problems, regional solutions
for transportation and regional cooperation? MPOs offer potential but do these
regional governance entities make a substantial, significant or minimal
difference? If so, how can we be sure?
Regional Planning
The aim of the federal government was to increase regional planning and
coordination by creating regional oversight in fragmented metropolitan regions.
The theory was that this would force municipalities to combine and coordinate
their development plans through regional governance (Hamilton,1999). The
committee on Improving the Future of US Cities through Improved Metropolitan
Government defines regional governance as, “…governmental institutions
within metropolitan regions, processes (the way in which groups participate,

Campbell, Joseph, 2010, UMSL, p.6
decisions are made, resources allocated, and activities undertaken in
metropolitan regions), and policies that influence the metropolitan area”
(Altshuler et al.,1999). Regional governance involves collaboration between
government, business and community leaders (Hamilton, 1999). The underlying
political dilemma associated with regional governance is that local officials
must relinquish a degree of control to achieve regional coordination (Gerber &
Gibson, 2009). Regional planning is important because political development
rarely exceeds a region’s social and economic development and the fragmented
nature of metropolitan regions often serves as an obstacle to cooperation and
coordination of regional policy.
The Development of Regional Planning
The development of regional planning has been both aided and
undermined by the federal government over the past forty years.
In the middle of the twentieth century institutions intended to aid
planning and build regional cooperation in metropolitan areas emerged in the
form of Councils of Governments (COGs). Their development began slowly in
the mid-fifties and took off in the mid-sixties. According to the National
Association of Regional Councils (NARC) there were forty-nine regional COGs in
1966, a number that grew to 223 by 1970 (NARC, 2006).
The growth of these regionally specific institutions was stimulated by
federal aid for the discussion of problems, facilitation of planning and
promotion of horizontal intergovernmental relations. The federal government
played a significant role between 1954 and 1971 by passing legislation which
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encouraged the formation of COGs. The Housing Act of 1954 made planning
assistance funding available to COGs for professional staffing, data collection,
and regional planning studies for land use, economic development,
transportation, and housing (Hamilton, 1999). In 1965, federal legislation went
a step further, when the Federal Highway Act mandated a regional approach to
highway planning. This law required local governments to come together to
develop highway plans cooperatively in order receive federal financial
assistance (Wikstrom, 1977). In a similar fashion, the Housing and Urban
Development Act of 1965 made grants to regional councils to cover two-thirds
of the costs of studies, the collection of data and the preparation of regional
plans and programs. As the number of federal grant-in-aid programs increased,
their coordination became a concern for the federal government and resulted
in legislation requiring comprehensive planning and review by a regional
“clearinghouse” as designated by the Office of Budget Management. The
Demonstration Cities of Metropolitan Development Act of 1966 increased the
council of government’s role by requiring that all local government requests for
federal aid be reviewed by a regional review agency.
The emphasis of early legislation was to stimulate the growth of
Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs) to serve as regional review
agencies to improve coordination between local governments. Regions that
housed Councils of Governments (COGs) were often designated the MPO in
order for regions to vet transportation plans and receive federal funding for
projects. In areas where there was no MPO, they were often created and
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designated as the COG for the area. By requiring metropolitan areas to
establish and maintain regional review agencies consisting of elected officials
from various counties and municipalities, the federal government spurred a
dramatic increase in the number of COGs housing MPOs which serve as policy
making institutions.
These acts of legislation stimulated the growth of regional review
agencies and resulted in numerous projects including highways, airports,
sewage facilities, transportation facilities and waste-treatment plants
(Wikstrom, 1977:41). COGs facilitated the increase in projects by improving
coordination and serving as the regional review agency as mandated by federal
legislation. In 1954, the Detroit area welcomed the establishment of the
Supervisor’s Inter-County Committee (SICC), the first council of governments in
the US. In 1968 the Southeast Michigan Council of Governments (SEMCOG), a
council including counties, municipalities and special districts, replaced the
SICC (Wikstrom, 1977:25). Since 1954 similar councils developed in nearly every
region of the country. Examples include the Puget Sound Governmental
Conference (Seattle-Tacoma, 1957); the Association of Bay Area Governments
(San Francisco, 1961); the North-Central Texas Council of Governments (Dallas,
1966); the Capital Region Council of Elected Officials (Hartford, Connecticut,
1966); the East-West Gateway Coordinating Council (St. Louis, 1966) and the
Mid-America Regional Council (Kansas City, 1972) (Wikstrom, 1977:26).
Scholars from various disciplines soon published positive evaluations of
these COGs. These scholars included experts in urban politics,
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intergovernmental relations and public policy. Their findings suggested that
COGs helped promote communication, cooperation and a regional community,
and suggested that more could be accomplished in regional associations. In
1963, Cassella analyzed the cooperation between local governments, observing
that COGs build consensus between governments and officials to promote
solutions to common problems. He suggested that, “They are means by which
strong units of local government may work together cooperatively to determine
region-wide comprehensive policies and to accomplish the programs
implementing these policies” (Cassella, 1963: 214). In 1971, Mogulof observed
that COGs facilitated a sense of regional community; “Interdependencies have
been sharpened and an institution has been created which continuously poses
expectations for regional action” (Mogulof, 1971:74). In 1977, Wikstrom
suggested that COGs have engendered horizontal cooperation and promoted
vertical channels of access and communication between the local, state and
national levels of governments (Wikstrom, 1977:105). These studies offered
evidence that there is an important role for metropolitan planning associations
in the policy process. Despite these positive evaluations there was evidence
that COGs faced several limitations which mitigated their effectiveness in
regional planning. COGs were plagued by three problems: (1) limited
participation among members, (2) limited revenue, and (3) low public saliency.
Evidence of these problems is illustrated by Hanson (1966), Mogulof (1971), and
Harris (1970).
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First, a commonly perceived limitation of COGs since their inception is
the half-hearted participation among their members. The participants, most of
whom are elected officials, have limited interest, power, and time. COG
members’ time and dedication competes with the duties of their office and
numerous other organizations. For example, an elected official may have to
prepare for an upcoming town budget meeting or attend a local Chamber of
Commerce meeting instead of attending a meeting at their regional COG
(Hanson, 1966:34, also see Graves, 1972; Chatman and Jackson 1972; Hamilton,
1999).
Second, a COG’s development often was impeded by its limited ability to
finance operations and generate revenue. COGs received their funding from
three basic sources: federal grants, state grants and support, and membership
dues. Only a small portion of a typical COG’s budget was generated through
state support and membership dues, with the majority derived from federal
grants such as the Housing Act of 1965 and Federal Highway Act of 1965. About
fifty to sixty percent of a COG’s budget came from federal grants. During this
period, COGs had difficulties making long-term budgets because they were
uncertain of the amount federal money they were to receive in the future. This
hindered their ability to develop, plan, and implement long-term programs and
activities (Mogulof, 1971:13; Krueckeberg, 1974; Norris, 1994).
Third, COGs were commonly plagued by limited public participation and
low saliency among local citizens. As Graves illustrated, citizens of
metropolitan areas are busy with work, personal interests and their families,
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and feel that the regional council is not relevant to their problems (Graves,
1972; Oliver, 2000). For instance, many people are busy taking kids to sporting
events, grocery shopping, worrying about projects at work, and planning family
vacations, and feel that regional councils have little or nothing to do with
these activities. This public ignorance and indifference toward COGs may be
partly attributed to several additional factors. Studies have found that many
Americans are politically apathetic and exhibit very little real continuous
interest in politics (Deluca, 1995). Furthermore, the indirect nature of
representation within COGs, where representatives serve in an advisory
capacity, results in narrow and limited functional concerns which facilitate low
public saliency (Harris, 1970:19). This evidence suggests that the enormous
potential of COGs to make a positive contribution to metropolitan regions was
often unfulfilled.
In the 1960s, the roles of regional review agencies in regional planning
were limited to bringing together local governments for the exchange of ideas
and information. Wikstrom suggests that COGs have to be judged on their
ability to facilitate what Charles Lindblom calls, “coordination through mutual
adjustment” (Lindblom, 1965:3). In the 1970s, this type of coordination where
there is a flow of information between independent actors became more
common in response to federal legislation. COGs housing MPOs became
important players in several regional policy arenas due to federal government
mandates for regional cooperation as a requirement to receive federal
assistance. In 1971, the regional review mandate covered nearly 100 grant-in-

Campbell, Joseph, 2010, UMSL, p.12
aid programs. In 1973, there were 238 regional clearinghouses and 212
metropolitan clearinghouses. In the 1980s, President Reagan and his “New
Federalism” resulted in the federal government cutting many of the grant
programs that allowed MPOs to play a significant role in the regional policy
process. The number of grants dropped from 540 in 1981 to 435 by 1987. The
intergovernmental affairs division of the Office of Budget Management (OBM)
had a staff of 21 in 1981 but no longer existed in 1984 (Hamilton, 1999:158).
Despite these set backs in the 1980s, the benefit of COGs and their designation
as MPOs continued to demonstrate an ability to serve as a central authority for
local governments to discuss regional policies.
These councils have persisted, facilitating information exchange,
coordination and cooperation among local municipalities within metropolitan
areas. This cooperation has taken the form of contractual agreements for
services, such as water treatment, police protection, and library services.
Evidence of this type of cooperation was revealed by Ostrom et al. in the late
fifties in the Los Angeles area. For instance, the League of California Cities, an
organization which consisted of the city of Los Angeles and others in the
metropolitan area, negotiated a new metropolitan water district (Ostrom et al,
1961). Paul Freisema found this cooperation was present in the “Quad Cities”
(Davenport, IA; Moline, IL; Rock Island, IL; East Moline, IL) in the early
seventies through the League of Iowa Municipalities and Illinois Municipal
League (Freisema, 1971).
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Dissertation Outline
My dissertation addresses the puzzle of MPOs in the following steps.
First, I review the development of regional planning and the role created for
MPOs by federal legislation. Chapter 2 illustrates the significance of regional
policymaking institutions in the transportation policy process. The discussion of
the significance of MPOs uncovers what is currently known about these
institutions and more importantly provides some significant information about
what else we need to know. The chapter provides a clearer picture of how to
design the study and determine if MPOs have led to an improvement in regional
transportation policy.
Next I describe the design of the study, which includes the process for
conducting interviews and compiling the necessary quantitative data. The third
chapter provides a roadmap to guide my research, and a discussion of the focal
points of the study. It outlines the theoretical connection between the known
and unknown by illustrating how I will answer my research questions, collect
data and analyze results. It explains why I designed the study in this manner,
why certain data was included or omitted and how the analysis of my results
will contribute to the existing literature on MPOs and regional transportation
policy. The chapter details the development of the research questions and the
rationale behind the collection of various types of data to best answer the
propositions in this dissertation. The intent is to elicit an inside perspective of
the regional transportation policy process in Kansas City and St. Louis.
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Chapter 4 discusses the transportation policy process in the Kansas City
region. I summarize regional transportation planning in Kansas City and analyze
the project selection process. Through the discussion of three regional projects
these observations will illustrate the different roles that the regional MPO
(MARC) plays, the input of the Missouri and Kansas Departments of
Transportation, and the ability of the region to work together to take
transportation policies in broader areas than congestion alone. This chapter
will uncover the difference the MPO (MARC) is making in the Kansas City region.
In Chapter 5, I discuss the transportation policy process in the St. Louis
region. I summarize regional transportation planning and analyze the project
selection process. Through the discussion of three regional projects and transit
these observations will illustrate the different roles that the regional MPO
(EWGCOG) plays, the influence of the states’ Department of Transportation on
projects, and the ability of the region to work together to take transportation
policies in broader areas than congestion alone. This chapter will uncover the
difference the MPO (EWGCOG) is making in the St. Louis region.
Finally, I will offer a critical analysis of the regional planning process
and illustrate the difference each MPO is making as it relates to my
propositions. This chapter will offer a comparison of the transportation policy
process across cases in an effort to identify whether MPOs have improved
regional transportation policy and if so, how?
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Chapter 2 - MPOs: What we know and what we need to know
This chapter discusses why a study of MPOs is important. It offers
evidence of why MPOs are significant, the current evaluations of MPOs, why
regional transportation planning is important, how MPOs could make a
difference, and the obstacles facing MPOs. MPOs are the central mechanism to
facilitate cooperation in, and coordination of, regional transportation planning.
MPOs pursue national objectives through the development of key planning
documents; in return a percentage of federal transportation money goes
directly to the MPO and its region. ISTEA and subsequent legislation created
this heightened role for MPOs, but the current evaluations of MPOs provide no
hard evidence of whether MPOs are making a difference in regional
transportation policy. This is significant because regions are facing increasingly
large and more complex problems (e.g. traffic congestion and the spatial
mismatch between jobs and workers) that can be more effectively managed at
the regional level. This allows MPOs to make a difference in many ways, such
as brokering political agreements, facilitating cooperation, and improving
public participation. However, their ability to make a difference can be
hindered by several obstacles which include local political culture and fiscal
constraints.
Why ISTEA and MPOs?
To further improve regional cooperation, the federal government passed
legislation making far-reaching changes in regional transportation planning.
Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs) were the central tool for improving
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transportation planning and for broadening its scope. In 1991, the passage of
the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) ushered in a new
era in transportation policy at the federal, state and local levels. ISTEA was
viewed as a revolutionary development for transportation policy and provided
the promise of institutional reform and new levels of participation (Weir et al,
2009). After years of MPOs playing a limited role in transportation policy
dictated by the states, metropolitan areas were offered a greater role in
transportation decisions through their regional MPO. Subsequently, over the
last eighteen years, the role for a regional MPO has changed with increased
responsibilities for air quality, transportation planning and funding allocation.
What we do not know is how MPOs adapted to these changes and whether
states have been able to adjust and loosen their grip on a policy process that
was once purely theirs. Once states and metropolitan areas are able to work
together and fully embrace an MPO’s role in transportation decisions they will
realize the potential of federal transportation legislation.
ISTEA mandated the creation and enhancement of MPOs, many of which
were housed within the existing COGs of each region. For example, the EastWest Gateway Coordinating Council (EWGCC), now called East-West Gateway
Council of Governments (EWGCOG), was incorporated in 1965 to provide a
forum for cooperative problem-solving and the coordinated development of
regional policy, and was later designated as the St. Louis region’s MPO.
This landmark legislation revealed a new type of federalism, in which for
the first time, a significantly new federal transportation policy was being
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implemented through a state and local partnership which is mandated, by law,
to be comprehensive and inclusive (Katz and Puentes, 2005). This mandate
required transportation plans to be developed with input from local
governments, area transit providers and state Departments of Transportation.
For there to be a true partnership between state and local governments, there
must be a role for local governments in developing the regional transportation
agenda. ISTEA requires that six percent of Surface Transportation Program
funds be made available for expenditure in metropolitan areas with populations
over 200,000. This apportionment of funds in combination with project
selection through the metropolitan planning process, has brought about shared
responsibility for highway and transit investment decisions in metropolitan
regions (Katz and Puentes, 2005). ISTEA’s intention was for MPOs to serve as
the focal point in regional transportation planning in order to facilitate
cooperation and coordination.
In 2006, the Association of Metropolitan Planning Organizations (AMPO)
listed 380 MPOs (AMPO, 2006). Each MPO covers a core geographic area of
adjacent communities with a high degree of economic and social integration
and a minimum population of 50,000. Each community identified plays a role
and has an interest in the region’s economic success and metropolitan identity.
Smaller MPOs, in areas with a population less than 200,000 are commonly a
state responsibility, and typically under the control of the state department of
transportation. The passage of ISTEA and subsequent legislation meant that
regions of varying sizes were able to play a more significant role in project
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selection and the allocation of federal funds. This initiative has continued with
a significant increase in authorized funds and responsibilities.
In 1998, Congress reauthorized and extended ISTEA through the
Transportation Equity Act for the Twenty-First Century (TEA-21), which was
followed by the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity
Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA_LU) of 2005. These reforms further
established a voice for metropolitan areas by devolving greater responsibility
for planning and implementation to MPOs through Long Range Transportation
Plans (LRTP) and Transportation Improvement Plans (TIP). TEA-21 authorized a
40 percent spending increase over ISTEA ($155 billion to $218 billion), though it
did little to improve the accountability and performance measures for MPOs
(Katz, 1995). SAFETEA_LU further increased funding to $284 billion,
representing the largest surface transportation funding in the nation’s history.
It also provided more flexibility than previous legislation for MPOs to solve
transportation problems within their communities (Federal Highway
Administration, 2005).
ISTEA was supposed to offer states more flexibility by allowing them to
transfer funds earmarked for the Congestion Mitigation and Air Quality
Improvement Program (CMAQ) to its Surface Transportation, National Highway
System, Interstate Maintenance, Bridge, Highway Safety Improvement, and/or
Recreational Trails apportionment. The amount that may be transferred can
not exceed 50 percent of the amount by which the state's CMAQ apportionment
for the year exceeds the amount the state would have been apportioned if the
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program had been funded at 1.35 billion dollars annually (US Code Title 23).
However, according to the Executive Director of East-West Gateway, in the last
decade, “…the state has not taken advantage of the law by choice, they are
not going to transfer money to mass transit, they are going to build roads.
ISTEA created some new programs but didn’t really change the authority
because many MPOs don’t embrace it” (Sterman, 2005). For example, between
1992 and 1999, 4.2 billion of the 33.8 billion dollars (12.5 percent) in flexible
funds available for transfer to transit was used. During this time period,
Missouri transferred only 10.48 percent (62.7 million dollars) of its eligible
funds (598.9 million dollars) to transit. Illinois transferred 13.53 percent (199.2
million dollars) of its eligible funds (1.4 billion dollars) and Kansas transferred
no money. The median state was New Mexico with 3.85 percent (12.3 million
dollars) of eligible funds (320 million dollars) transferred (Puentes, 2000).
ISTEA’s intention was to create more flexibility by allowing CMAQ funds to be
transferred to transit and a more balanced relationship between metropolitan
areas and states’ Department of Transportation through regional MPOs.
However, these figures suggest that the impact of this change has been
relatively small.
States and MPOs are encouraged to consult with state and local air
quality agencies in non-attainment and maintenance areas on the estimated
emission reductions from proposed congestion mitigation and air quality
improvement programs and projects. An evaluation and assessment of CMAQ
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projects and programs to determine the direct and indirect impact of the
projects on air quality and congestion is required. The MPO must maintain and
disseminate a cumulative database describing these impacts. The potential for
MPOs in facilitating better air quality is evident in their responsibilities and the
regulations listed in Section 174 and 107(c) and (d) of the Clean Air Act.
Section 174 mandates that MPOs report pollutants in non-attainment areas of a
state and make a plan for attainment of federal air quality standards by the
state, local governments and regional agencies. Planning for air quality
attainment is one of many MPO responsibilities designated by the federal
government.
A requirement for receiving federal money is that MPOs must pursue a
series of programs to carry out national objectives. Included in these programs
are the Transportation and Community System Preservation (TCSP) and Job
Access and Reverse Commute (JARC) programs. The TCSP program is a
comprehensive program of research and grants designed to investigate the
relationships between a region’s transportation infrastructure, the community,
and system preservation plans and practices. This creates the necessity for all
MPOs to focus on these issues within their community in an effort to qualify for
funds. The JARC program sets aside a portion of transportation funds for
activities that mitigate metropolitan traffic congestion and improve air quality.
In 2002, Mid-America Regional Council (MARC) began a program titled “Smart
Moves” which is being phased in over a ten year period. Its intention is to
improve the transit system throughout the Kansas City region by integrating
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services. Some of the services offered in the program include transit centers,
more weekend and evening routes, a bus system that includes Freeway Flyers
for long commutes, Airport Arrows serving the KCI airport and buses with low,
walk-on entries for senior citizens and people with disabilities (MARC, 2005).
Funding for JARC grants was authorized at 150 million dollars annually
beginning in 1999, including up to 10 million dollars for Reverse Commute
Grants. A 50/50 federal/local match is required, and other federal funds can
be used as part of the local match. In 2000, Congress appropriated 75 million
dollars for the program (Federal Transit Administration, 2006).
JARC’s purpose is to strengthen the relationship between transportation
spending and air quality by developing transportation services for the transport
of welfare recipients and low income individuals to and from jobs and develop
transportation services for residents of urban, rural and suburban areas to
suburban employment opportunities. Emphasis is placed on projects that use
mass transportation services (Katz, 2005 & FTA, 2005). In urbanized areas with
a population of 200,000 or more, MPOs select the applicant(s). In small
urbanized areas with a population under 200,000 and in non-urbanized/rural
areas, states select the applicant(s). Tribal governments must go through the
state process but once selected can choose to be sub-recipients of the state or
apply directly to the FTA. A brief look at some of these programs illustrates
that MPOs are required to take transportation planning beyond mobility
concerns and consider social, economic and environmental outcomes. For
example, during the 2006 fiscal year MARC performed Bus Rapid Transit
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Studies, Paseo Bridge Environmental Impact Statement, I-70 Environmental
Impact Statements, South Metro Connection Study, and Regional High
Occupancy Vehicle (HOV) Study. Many of these studies were part of the Kansas
City regional transportation policy process due to federal mandates.
Federal law emphasizes that the regional planning process address
societal goals, and consist of more than a list of capital investments, transit
projects and highway projects. The passage of ISTEA was supposed to
empower MPOs to develop strategies for operating, managing, maintaining, and
financing the region’s transportation system in such a way as to advance long
term goals. As David Warm, the Executive Director at MARC, states,
“Increasingly in the last decade our (MARC) allocation decisions are being made
through a policy lens and before then the process was bargaining and dictated
by public works” (Warm, 2005). Prior to ISTEA, MARC was not playing any kind
of active role in the state’s department of transportation in terms of setting
their policy for how they allocate funds. Currently, MARC plays a limited role in
Kansas and a very active role in Missouri. According to Warm, “…that has a
huge impact in our being a collective voice for community interests around
transportation” (Warm, 2006). For instance, MARC did a lot of work in the mid
to late nineties based around growth concepts associated with urban design
and form. These studies were very influential in helping local governments
develop new subdivision ordinances and address traffic flow, land use and
environmental concerns (Warm, 2006).
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According to the Federal Highway Administration, when a region
develops a transportation plan it should incorporate its vision for the future
and include: a detailed and in-depth discussion of all alternatives; an
evaluation process that encompasses diverse viewpoints; participation of all
relevant transportation agencies and organizations; and an open, timely and
meaningful involvement of the public (FHWA, 2006). Despite this clearly
specified process, in Missouri, there is “No national transportation strategy, no
economic strategy or land use strategy at the state level or the regional level.
At the local level there are statements but they want to grow as big and as fast
as they can” (Warm, 2005). At MARC the plan is a statement of what they are
likely to become, but there is no clearly articulated strategy of how they want
to grow (Warm, 2005). This shows that local involvement can lead to a shortsighted and sometimes self-centered perspective in regard to transportation
which can impose costs on other jurisdictions or groups of citizens.
Throughout the transportation planning process it is crucial to provide an
opportunity for the participation of people who have typically been
underserved by past transportation plans. The federal legislation was intended
to mitigate the tendency of previous systems to define “clear winners and
losers” and the “haves” and “have-nots” (Sanchez, 2006). David Warm
suggests, “…what people expect is a big driver in the current policy process
and politically people expect huge, larger, wider highways” (Warm, 2005). This
type of singular focus is what led to community fragmentation and racial
segregation in many suburban and urban communities (Sanchez, 2006). The
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role of the MPO is to mitigate these effects by incorporating a diverse
constituency. At MARC, they assert that their constituency is the general
public, local governments, developers and planners - people who have a role in
the process and did not have a voice before ISTEA. These formerly underserved
participants have created increased expectations through heightened
awareness and feedback. The heightened awareness and feedback is a result of
these groups becoming more educated and informed on the parameters of the
legislation, the role of the MPO, their role in the process and a familiarity with
the rules that govern project selection and fund disbursement. In some cases
this results in, “…regional and local interests closely align(ing) and regional
decision makers face little conflict. In other cases, however, regional and local
interests may diverge dramatically, making compromise far more difficult”
(Gerber & Gibson, 2009). Increasing public participation may be beneficial for
actors that were previously underserved by the local decision making process
but it may increase the scope of conflict within a region by providing additional
means to advance the interests of those who were previously underserved
(Schattschneider, 1961).
Public participation, in the form of feedback, is a key component of the
regional transportation process since the passage of ISTEA. Other feedback
consists of a formal discussion among MPO staff, local government officials,
transportation officials and relevant agencies of how transportation policies
influence economic development, and address equity and social issues. It is
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pertinent for these forms of feedback to be present in the policy making
process for MPOs to make a difference.
The importance of feedback is illustrated by the Federal Highway
Administration (FHWA) in Figure 2.1. It suggests that feedback should be a part
of each stage of the metropolitan planning process. Increased participation
offers familiarity and a level of trust among the actors in the process.
According to Les Sterman this is the situation at East-West Gateway. He
suggests that at the St. Louis MPO, “Most decision making is dependent on the
level of trust between the public, committees, board and staff” (Sterman,
2005).
Figure 2.1: The metropolitan transportation planning process
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MPOs have been given the opportunity to play a greater role in the
transportation planning process by establishing a forum for a fair and impartial
discussion. This allows for the evaluation of alternatives, maintenance of a
Long Range Transportation Plan (LRTP), development of a Transportation
Improvement Program (TIP), and publication of a Unified Planning Work
Program (UPWP). These key planning documents are shown in Table 2.1.
In an effort to program money and organize transportation priorities
(e.g. air quality, traffic flow, environmental impact and land use), MPOs are
required to develop an annual UPWP in cooperation with the state and
operators of public owned transit. The UPWP must meet the requirements
presented by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) in Title 23 of the
Code of Federal Regulations Part 420, subpart A. It must discuss in detail the
planning priorities of the metropolitan area and describe all metropolitan and
transportation related air quality planning activities within the area during the
next one or two year period, regardless of funding sources or the agencies
conducting activities, indicating who will perform the work, the schedule for
completing it and the products that will be produced.
Table 2.1: Key Metropolitan Planning Organization planning documents

Time Frame

Contents

UPWP

1-2 years

LRTP

25 years

TIP

5 years

Planning Studies
and Tasks
Future Goals,
Strategies and
Projects
Transportation
Investments

Update
Requirements
Annually
Every 5 years
Every 4 years
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The purpose of the UPWP is three-fold: (1) to describe the activities the
MPO and other agencies plan to undertake within the next year; (2) to
document the proposed expenditures of federal, state and local funds in
support of applications for various planning grants; and (3) to provide a
management tool for MPOs and the funding agencies in scheduling
transportation planning activities, milestones and products.
The Long Range Transportation Plan (LRTP) is a 25 year transportation
plan which serves as the centerpiece of the metropolitan transportation
planning process. The plan identifies transportation improvements over the
next 25 years and specifies the region’s transportation strategies, goals, and
policies. Regional transportation planning is a problem-solving exercise. For
instance, East-West Gateway’s LRTP offers a framework for regional
transportation solutions through a multi-step decision making process based on
past and current trends, future possibilities and the following seven regional
goals: (1) a strong position in the national and global marketplace, ensured
through strategic economic development, competitive employment
opportunities, a well-trained workforce, and responsible asset management;
(2) a sustainable and growing economy grounded in the wise and coordinated
use of physical, environmental, social, and agricultural resources; (3) a clean
and healthy environment; (4) safe neighborhoods, communities, and
thoroughfares; (5) resources for learning and personal development, accessible
at every point of the life cycle; (6) a growing, diversified population, with
equity, choice, and opportunity for all citizens; and (7) efficient and balanced
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patterns of growth and development that respect the land, the citizenry, the
history, and the strategic location of the St. Louis region (EWGCC, 2005).
The LRTP is a comprehensive, intermodal plan that responds to both
community goals and federal policy direction. The plan is limited by federal
funding, reflecting only funding that is currently available or can reasonably be
expected to be available during the plan’s time frame.
The LRTP provides the basis for development of the Transportation
Improvement Program (TIP) which is a financially restricted list of prioritized
projects to be funded and implemented over the next five years. These
priorities are established by a separate list of regional goals which are more
narrowly focused on transportation. According to East-West Gateway, projects
are prioritized based upon six regional goals for transportation: (1) preservation
of existing infrastructure by maintaining the current road, bridge, transit and
intermodal assets in good condition; (2) safety and security in travel, by
decreasing the risk of personal injury and property damage on, in, and around
transportation facilities; (3) ensuring that congestion on the region’s roadways
does not reach levels that compromise productivity and quality of life; (4)
access to opportunity, by addressing the complex mobility needs of persons
living in low-income communities and persons with disabilities; (5) sustainable
development, through coordinating land use, transportation, economic
development, environmental quality, energy conservation, and community
aesthetics; and (6) efficient movement of goods, by improving the movement
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of freight within and through the region by road, rail, water, and by air
(EWGCC, 2005).
The TIP must be consistent with the LRTP. It provides a schedule for
implementation of regional projects over a five year period to ensure that
public resources are being spent efficiently. The projects included in the TIP
are submitted for consideration by local governments, the state Department of
Transportation, local transit operators or the MPO staff. Prior to approval of
the TIP, the MPO provides an opportunity for public review and comment. After
approval by the MPO, the TIP is approved by the Governor(s) and incorporated
in the statewide transportation improvement program (STIP). MPOs potentially
have far-reaching influence over transportation development and regional
development because no regionally significant project, regardless of funding
source may be implemented unless it is included in the TIP (MARC, 2006).
Evaluation of MPOs
Many evaluations of MPOs are based upon increased mandates for
coordination, planning protocol and funding criteria. After forty years of top
down transportation policy, the enhancement of MPOs created a regional policy
framework for transportation decisions (Sanchez, 2006). Over the past two
decades the regional governance literature that has supported the
enhancement of regional agencies suggests that horizontal collaboration alone
can empower regional decision making venues (Weir et al., 2009). In
Metropolitan Government and Governance, G. Ross Stephens and Nelson
Wikstrom suggest there is a need for a governing body to address large scale
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problems. These governance arrangements often include “non-legislative” and
“non-governmental” actors in public decision making which incorporate
structures that require shared policy making responsibility (Gerber & Gibson,
2009). MPOs offer this type of arrangement, in which a region can address large
scale problems without the formation of a formal regional government. This
process is referred to as “mutual adjustment” (Savitch & Vogel, 1996), or
“coordination through mutual adjustment” (Lindblom, 1965:3). The premise is
that the lack of a governing body, whether formal or informal, results in
piecemeal, haphazard decisions on every issue from air quality to
transportation (Stephens and Wikstrom, 2000). In this light, scholars have
offered an optimistic perspective, by suggesting that the enhancement of MPOs
could help alleviate several regional problems, such as traffic congestion, air
quality and the spatial mismatch between jobs and workers.
The majority of scholars have focused on the significance of the
legislation and the difference that an MPO should make from a policy
perspective. According to these observations, ISTEA and its successors should
spur cooperation and coordination among local municipalities. But there are
few studies that offer any direct observation of the effect that ISTEA and its
successors on MPO policies. Furthermore, there is little in-depth analysis of
MPOs and even less hard evidence that MPOs are making a difference in policymaking or that the legislation has resulted in policies that benefit regions.
In his book “The Metropolitan Chase,” political scientist E. Terrence
Jones presents MPOs as the central point for transportation decisions while
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discussing their role in regional policies since the passage of ISTEA. MPOs
benefited from mandates for increased public participation, coordination of all
modes of transportation within their region, increased flexibility in funding
allowing money to be moved between modes (e.g. highways to mass transit)
and the ability for elected officials to meet regularly at board meetings to
determine regional transportation projects and funding (Jones, 2003:102).
Meanwhile, prior to the passage of ISTEA, MPOs had smaller staffs due to
federal budget cuts in the 1980s. This led to reduced policy expertise, and
counties and municipalities searching for project funding could bypass the MPO
and go directly to the state since the review authority was shifted from the
federal government to the states under Reagan’s “New Federalism” (Jones,
2003).
Judith Innes, Professor of City and Regional Planning, and political
scientist Judith Gruber, conducted a case study examining transportation
decisions in the San Francisco Bay area. The purpose of their study was to
identify the conditions under which transportation decisions were made that
focused on the interests of the region through their MPO, the Metropolitan
Transportation Commission (MTC). After analysis over an eight year period they
found mixed results. They concluded that no one is clearly in charge and no
organization feels empowered to solve transportation problems that interest
the people in the local community most, such as congestion and the use of
transit. Congestion and public dissatisfaction with the transportation system
increased due to policies being implemented without concern for how they
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affect the region as a whole. This is the result of a pork barrel culture where
earmarking money for special projects allows for the regional decision making
process to be bypassed. Under these conditions the regional review agency is
not given an opportunity to discuss the project because once earmarked by the
federal government the project must be included in the region’s Transportation
Improvement Plan (TIP). The regional transportation process has not been
made completely irrelevant by this pork barreling. Some of the promise has
been realized as the region has come together to support a number of projects
in order to guarantee maximum funding to the region. New partnerships were
developed, agreements were made on some difficult questions, and new ideas
and programs were developed (Innes & Gruber, 2001). While there has been
some success, the limitations identified have prevented recent federal
transportation legislation to be fully embraced by the region.
Robert Puentes, a fellow at Brookings Institution, and Linda Bailey, a
transportation policy analyst with ICF International, wrote a paper on
metropolitan funding illustrating the limitations and potential of MPOs (Puentes
& Bailey, 2005). MPOs are limited in the difference they can make by a state’s
use of its political leverage, which exceeds that of MPOs. The state receives
and manages all federal transportation money as well as large amounts of state
transportation money, and often ignores an MPO’s decisions and needs. Puentes
and Bailey conclude that state opposition to greater MPO power is starting to
dissipate. Nonetheless, the difference an MPO can make is limited because the
capacities of MPOs and the state remain uneven. MPOs are allocated a small
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amount of money through ISTEA for regional projects that have been created
through the metropolitan planning process. However, this change was not
significant because states have always allocated money to metropolitan areas.
The purpose of ISTEA was to provide metropolitan areas the ability to design,
plan and implement transportation projects; in other words, to decide how the
money should be spent. Many of the disputes between metropolitan areas and
states are a result of projects that states want to implement and the local
community opposes. Prior to ISTEA, metropolitan areas had little say in
transportation projects in their region. According to Bailey and Puentes, while
the states still wield a disproportionate amount of power, ISTEA has offered
more flexibility and an increased role for MPOs. This provides them with the
ability to make a difference by bringing together a wide range of stakeholders
to ensure that projects are representative of the region and not purely the
product of the highway department (Puentes & Bailey, 2005).
Other observations and analyses contained within larger volumes of work
dealing with Metropolitan Politics support this premise that MPOs can and do
make some difference. For instance, Dreier et al. in their chapter on
regionalism, discuss the rejection and approval process for transportation
projects through the provisions in the ISTEA legislation. They identify the
difference an MPO can potentially make but do not discuss whether MPOs have
any impact (Dreier et al, 2004:233). The discussion related to MPOs specifically
consisted of a few paragraphs addressing ISTEA and TEA-21. The rest of this
discussion primarily focuses on the functions of COGs.
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Bruce Katz, Vice President and Director of The Metropolitan Policy
Program at Brookings Institution, and Robert Puentes illustrate the significance
of the regional transportation policy process and the possible implications for
the future of metropolitan areas. Their vision offers a prescription to alleviate
several common transportation problems: (1) traffic congestion; (2) poor air
quality; (3) spatial mismatch between jobs and low income workers; (4)
metropolitan sprawl; and (5) the aging of the transportation network (Katz and
Puentes, 2006). They focus on a potential policy prescription for the future of
regional transportation and do not offer an in-depth analysis of what MPOs
accomplish and what, if any, progress has been made since ISTEA. An
examination of their policy recommendations suggests that metropolitan areas
have not been able to fully embrace the legislation. The current transportation
policy is failing in certain areas, and in order to succeed it should: (1) promote
the economic efficiency of metropolitan areas; (2) help cities realize their full
economic and fiscal potential; (3) help remake the suburbs to enhance choice
and quality; (4) connect cites and metropolitan areas; and (5) respond to the
major demographic and development changes underway in our society and help
our citizens realize their full potential (Katz & Puentes, 2006). Their analysis
and vision makes an important contribution to the discussion surrounding
regional transportation issues, but it lacks what we need to know about MPOs
and the regional transportation process created by ISTEA and subsequent
legislation. What is working? And how can we build upon that to make a
difference in the future?
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The research described above further illustrates what is lacking in regard
to scholarship on MPOs (Dreier et al., 2004; Katz and Puentes, 2006). Katz
focuses on what an MPO should be able to do but does not offer an in-depth
analysis of what they are accomplishing, while Dreier et al. focus more on
COGs with little discussion of one of their primary roles, which is serving as the
MPO. However, much of their discussion is speculative and lacks the
appropriate evidence to determine how effective MPOs have been in
implementing ISTEA and what, if any, obstacles stand in the way of realizing
the full potential of the legislation.
These authors suggest that MPOs are making a difference and offer
promise through horizontal cooperation, by developing regional relationships
and bringing together a wide range of stakeholders to determine policies and
projects that represent the region’s interests. The authors acknowledge that
these regional governance bodies have a difficult time making a significant
difference due to a lack of operating authority and capacity compared to
states. Each of these authors in their own way suggest, “ISTEA’s central
institutional reform carved out a space for regional decision making by
enhancing the power of Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs), regional
entities that had existed since the 1960s but which exercised little authority”
(Weir et al., 2009). In short, the authors identify the potential of the shared
policy making responsibility that MPOs represent for regional transportation
planning, but do little to properly assess whether this potential has been
realized.
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Why Regional Transportation Planning is Important
Assessing the effectiveness of MPOs is very important; metropolitan
areas have continued to spread geographically, resulting in larger and more
complex problems that affect the entire region. These large scale problems
include traffic congestion, deteriorating air quality and increasing distance
between job seekers and jobs – problems that MPOs are required to deal with.
First, traffic congestion has been a steadily growing problem in
metropolitan areas. For example, the average time that commuters spent stuck
in traffic in metropolitan areas since 1992 has increased by 41 percent, or
eighteen hours per year (Downs, 2004:22). Note that this increase is not
increased aggregate travel time, but only the extra time spent going slow or
going nowhere because of traffic congestion. According to the Texas
Transportation Institute’s 2002 Urban Mobility Report, traffic congestion costs
the US economy 68 billion dollars per year, which is equivalent to 1,160 dollars
per traveler in lost productivity and wasted motor fuel (American Road &
Transportation Builders Association, 2006).
These conditions, accompanied by geographic fragmentation and an
increase in suburban commuters, often result in conflicts over how best to
allocate resources to address this regional issue collectively. Suburban areas
complain that they have experienced the greatest increase in traffic congestion
and are not being allocated the necessary resources to address the problem
through the regional decision making process. Meanwhile, the central city
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argues that they have received a lack of regional resources to upgrade aging
infrastructure such as bridges (Wachs & Dill, 1999:305-306).
A second problem that requires regional cooperation is air pollution. The
Clean Air Act of 1990 established air quality standards for metropolitan areas.
According to the EPA, poor air quality results in premature death, heart attacks
and increased hospital admissions for people with lung and heart disease (EPA,
2006). Long regional commutes and traffic congestion result in poorer air
quality, so regional cooperation is necessary to direct traffic flows and
establish regional fuel standards to mitigate the effects of vehicle emissions
(Downs & Puentes, 2005:182). Clean air plans commonly include the
development of light rail/mass transit systems, special region-wide fuel
standards, bicycle lanes and high occupancy vehicle lanes (Wachs & Dill, 1999:
317). These projects cross jurisdictional boundaries and necessitate significant
public investment. In order for such plans to go forward, a regionally collective
decision is necessary which requires cooperation and also necessitates many
localities to forgo their own local plans and initiatives.
Third, in recent decades, as businesses and economic activity
decentralizes across metropolitan areas a “spatial mismatch” has arisen
between jobs and workers in the nation’s urban regions (Allen & Katz,
1999:31). In suburbs, entry-level jobs abound in manufacturing, and wholesale
and retail trade. These suburban jobs provide opportunities for people with
only basic education and skills (Pugh, 1998). At the same time, central cities
have lost jobs resulting in unemployment in the urban core. It seems obvious
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the urban unemployed could fill many suburban jobs. But the absence of viable
transportation options combined with persistent residential racial segregation
and a lack of affordable suburban housing effectively cuts many inner city
workers off from suburban job opportunities. The need for better
transportation to get workers from the inner city to the more numerous jobs in
suburban areas is a problem in which regional planning and coordination should
make a difference. There are institutions that have the potential to address
this type of collective action problem. These institutions do not require a
powerful government to coerce individuals, but they also do not presume that
local governments naturally cooperate to solve problems (Bickers & Williams,
2001:75).
The emphasis of legislation from the 1950s through the 1970s, then, was
to stimulate the growth of COGs to serve as regional review agencies. This
resulted in numerous regional projects including highways, airports, sewage
facilities, transportation facilities and waste-treatment plants. Despite these
achievements COGs and their service as MPOs were limited by a lack of
participation, low revenues, and little public saliency. These MPOs later lost
support due to the cutting of many grant programs, but not before their ability
to serve as a central authority for the discussion of regional policies was
realized. Recent federal legislation has given MPOs new responsibilities and the
ability to address large transportation policy issues. Along with these new
responsibilities and an exponential increase in funding over the last eighteen
years is the opportunity to address air quality, traffic congestion, and the
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spatial mismatch between jobs and low income workers. This was the intention
of the legislation, to move away from a one size fits all transportation policy
and state control, to a more comprehensive approach tailored to each region’s
needs. Despite their existence since the mid 1960s and empowering legislation
in 1991 there is a lack of sufficient data to answer the question of whether
MPOs have made a difference in the regional policy-making process.
In summary, MPOs have been present in metropolitan areas for nearly
forty years. Their development was spurred by the federal government but
they played a limited role in transportation policy. Most transportation
decisions were made by states’ Department of Transportation with little input
from regional MPOs, which basically served as a rubber stamp for state
decisions. Recently, MPOs have found new responsibilities and a larger voice in
transportation decisions within their region. The significance and effectiveness
of these increased functions is yet to be determined. The early evaluations
suggest that MPOs, metropolitan areas and states have struggled to change and
balance the transportation policy process.
How MPOs could make a difference
MPOs were created to ensure that funding of transportation projects and
programs are based on a continuing, cooperative and comprehensive planning
process. The policy process should include thoughtful deliberation of all
possible strategies, an evaluation process that includes diverse points of view
and collaboration between all relevant agencies and organizations. The policy
process should promote involvement by all interested parties, such as the
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business community, community groups, environmental organizations, elected
officials, public officials and the general public through a hands-on
participation process carried out by the MPO in coordination with state DOTs
and transit operators. Through this process MPOs could make a difference by
brokering political agreements, creating better and more cooperative
relationships with state DOTs, facilitating the responsible disbursement of
funds for important regional projects, creating policies that improve air
quality, land use, asset management, financial management, freight
movement, performance measures, improving public participation, project
development, safety, system management, transportation demand
management and environmental justice.
MPOs have sufficient capabilities to make a difference by brokering
political agreements. They have the unique ability to bring varying factions
within the community together to discuss and determine what is best for the
region. These factions include anyone who resides in the region, interest
groups, state Departments of Transportation, political leaders within the MPO
region or someone who does business in the region potentially affected by
transportation decisions. These capabilities stem from their role as the region’s
center for transportation funding and decision making. Therefore, the MPO
brokering of agreements should be self-governing, since the attendant norms,
power structures, and resource distribution comes mainly from repeated
interactions and a deep history among the members themselves.
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MPOs have a long history of working with state DOTs. Once merely seen
as an informal participant in the state transportation policy, MPOs now serve as
a clearinghouse for all projects within their region. This has heightened their
power and leverage with DOTs. Therefore, creating a better and more
cooperative relationship with state DOTs is a greater priority now than it was
before ISTEA. Transportation planning must be cooperative, because no single
agency has responsibility for the construction, operation or maintenance of the
entire transportation system. For example, some roads that are part of the
Interstate Highway System are subject to certain standards and are usually
maintained by a state DOT. Others are county arterials or city streets designed,
operated, and maintained by counties or local municipalities. Transit systems
are often built, operated and maintained by a separate entity. The MPO is
responsible for actively seeking the participation of all relevant agencies and
stakeholders in the planning process.
MPOs are also responsible for the facilitating the disbursement of funds
for important regional projects. This responsibility means the MPO should be
evaluating and selecting projects for implementation that ensure the funding
requirements of the Transportation Improvement Program (TIP) will not exceed
the amount of funds expected to be available from federal, state and local
sources. The funding must be in place before they can move forward with any
regional policy.
MPOs are also responsible for developing policies that improve air
quality. A region’s label as non-attainment or maintenance region creates
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additional requirements for transportation planning. Most importantly,
transportation plans, programs, and projects must conform to the state air
quality plans, known as the State Implementation Plan (SIP). Air quality
concerns have a major impact on metropolitan planning. MPOs in air quality
non-attainment and maintenance areas are required to ensure that emissions
from transportation investments will not cause new violations or affect an
area’s schedule to attain their air quality standards. Therefore, MPOs need to
have a clear idea of what the requirements are. The challenge for MPOs in nonattainment and maintenance areas is to decide on a mix of transit and highway
investments that, combined with measures such as inspection and maintenance
programs or reformulated gasoline, will keep emissions from motor vehicles
within allowable limits.
A region’s transportation system represents a massive investment in the
facilities and the capital assets used to operate and maintain this system. The
transportation system is one of the largest government-owned assets in any
region. Wear and tear from normal use and from the environment (e.g. heaving
from freezing and thawing), will make transportation infrastructure deteriorate
over time. If roads, bridges, airports, transit facilities, ports, bicycle and
pedestrian paths, etc. are not maintained, people and goods will not move as
easily and safely, resulting in reduced quality of life and diminished economic
activity.
The MPO can support asset management by encouraging the collection of
data and use of the resulting information for establishing priorities for
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improving the area’s transportation assets. TEA-21 states that the
transportation planning process should “…support the economic vitality of the
metropolitan area (or state), especially by enabling global competitiveness,
productivity, and efficiency; increase the accessibility and mobility options
available to people and for freight; and enhance the integration and
connectivity of the transportation system, across and between modes, for
people and freight” (TEA_21, 1998). According to the FHWA:
The movement of freight is an important part of any
regional transportation system. The efficient movement of
freight within and through a region is critically important to
industry, retail, agriculture, international trade, and terminal
operators. Metropolitan regions with their cargo airports,
intermodal freight yards, large trucking terminals and shipyards
are especially affected by freight movement issues. As the forum
for cooperative transportation planning and decision making, the
MPO is responsible for making sure that freight movement is
considered in the transportation planning process. Many MPOs
should systematically incorporate freight movement issues into
their planning activities (FHWA, 2006).
The basic purpose of transportation is to move people and goods from
one place to another, but its effect on economic development goes well
beyond this. An efficient transportation system can improve the economy,
shape development patterns, and influence quality of life and the natural
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environment. According to the FHWA, “Land use and transportation are
symbiotic: how development is spaced can greatly influence regional travel
patterns and, in turn, the degree of access provided by the transportation
system can influence land use distribution” (FHWA, 2006). The role of the MPO
in land use varies according to state and locality. In some areas, MPOs are
responsible for reviewing local land use decisions considered regionally
significant. In others, land use decisions are solely the prerogative of local
officials. Regardless of the MPOs role in decision making, transportation
planners must make every effort to consider the comprehensive land use plans
of the region and local jurisdictions, and create a constructive dialogue with
land use officials. In that way, each group is informed of actions that might
affect the other.
Activities meant to stimulate economic development can affect the
transportation network and adjacent parcels of land in terms of zoning. It is
important to consider the effects of development on the quality of life for
residents (e.g. traffic noise, improved mobility, more jobs, etc.) the
transportation network and the regional economy as a whole. Much of this will
require balancing projected benefits against projected externalities. According
to the FHWA:
Better planning tools are increasingly available to help
MPOs understand the impact of economic development decisions
on the transportation network and the natural environment.
Examples of planning tools include the following Geographic
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Information Systems (GIS) to help illustrate how transportation
facilities can affect specific parts of a region or community and
travel demand and emission model which help show how
transportation can affect air quality (FHWA, 2006).
Model results are only as good as the data that go into the model. MPOs
must use the most current socio-economic and census data available, especially
if the region is growing rapidly. MPOs should make every effort to explain the
information and assumptions that went into creating the model in plain and
understandable terms.
The MPO can take the lead in creating performance measures that
provide information critical to regional and local decision-makers. Performance
measures demonstrate how well the transportation system is doing its job of
meeting public goals and expectations of the transportation network. Some
methods used to measure performance include tracking average speeds and
crash rates. Many metropolitan areas monitor how close they are achieving
specific goals such as the mobility of disadvantaged populations, levels of air
quality, and health of the economy, by using performance measures. These
provide feedback on the decision making process by answering questions such
as whether the performance of the transportation system, economy, air quality
etc. are changing over time and whether transportation investments are
making a difference. Because performance measures strongly influence the
goals and objectives of the planning process, their development and ongoing
support can become part of the activities of the MPO. If performance measures
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are to be developed, they should be subject to the MPO sponsored public
involvement program (FHWA, 2006).
Public involvement is integral to an MPOs transportation mission.
Without meaningful public participation, there is a risk of making less than
optimal decisions. With public involvement, it is possible to make a lasting
contribution to an area’s quality of life. According to the FHWA:
Public involvement is more than an agency requirement
and more than a means of fulfilling a statutory obligation. True
public participation is central to good decision making. The
public includes anyone who resides, has an interest or does
business in a given area potentially affected by transportation
decisions. This includes both individuals and organized groups. As
the

agency

responsible

for

coordinating

the

regional

transportation planning process, the MPO must actively involve
all affected parties in an open, cooperative, and collaborative
process that provides meaningful opportunities to influence
transportation decisions. Transportation has a profound influence
on the lives of people (FHWA, 2006).
Decision-makers must consider fully the social, economic and
environmental consequences of their actions and assure the public that
transportation programs support adopted land use and community
values:
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MPOs must develop, with the public, effective involvement
processes custom tailored to local conditions: Early and
continuous
technical

involvement;
and

other

reasonable

information;

public

availability

collaborative

input

of
on

alternatives, evaluation criteria and mitigation needs; open
public meetings where matters related to transportation policies,
programs, and projects are being considered; open access to the
decision making process prior to closure (FHWA, 2006).
Safety is one of the most important goals in the operation of the
transportation system. Over the past three decades, transportation fatality
rates have declined in relationship to system usage, due in large part to safer
cars, tougher police enforcement, and increasing use of seat belts, air bags and
child safety seats. However, in many categories, the actual number of
accidents has increased because there are more people using the
transportation system. Integrating safety into metropolitan transportation
planning requires MPO coordination with transit, state highway and motor
carrier safety agencies and their safety processes. Transportation planning
takes safety considerations into account by identifying high-accident locations
and giving them high priority for improvements. Many MPOs also participate in
safety campaigns that educate the public on good safety practices. Many state
DOTs and local transportation agencies have developed safety management
systems that monitor accident locations in their jurisdictions over time. The
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MPO can participate in data collection for these systems or coordinate the
development of a regional safety management system (FHWA, 2007).
System management and operations (M&O) analyzes regional
transportation as an interconnected set of services and systems, to improve
system performance through better management and use of the transportation
network. In identifying possible system M&O improvements, it is important to
understand what system users want in terms of performance. Some examples
of user oriented performance measures are average trip travel time, length of
delay, and reliability of trip making. These are important indicators of how
well the transportation system is operating. Successfully implementing M&O
strategies requires close coordination among the many different agencies and
groups with responsibility for transportation system performance. The role of
the MPO in enhancing system management and operation is to identify M&O
strategies and benefits. When developing the transportation plan, the MPO
should consider using M&O strategies as one method of improving mobility for
constituents (FHWA, 2006). Those programs and projects should then be given
high priority in the TIP. The MPO can provide regional leadership in establishing
a decision making framework by bringing parties together, by helping to
determine how M&O decisions will be made in an area and by asking for input
on M&O issues as part of the planning process. This allows agencies to develop
M&O strategies in common. The MPO should develop system performance
measures that take into account the desires and expectations of transportation
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users and can be used to decide how funds should be spent. The MPO can then
work to improve the system through future plans and TIPs (FHWA, 2007).
The goal of Title VI is to ensure that services and benefits are fairly
distributed to all people, regardless of race, national origin, or income and that
they have access to meaningful participation. According to the FHWA:
Title VI/environmental justice in transportation programs
is achieved through: (1) Avoiding, minimizing, or mitigating
disproportionately

high

and

adverse

human

health

and

environmental effects, including social and economic effects on
minority and low-income populations. (2) Ensuring the full and
fair participation in the transportation decision making process
by all potentially affected communities. (3) Preventing the denial
of, reduction in, or significant delay in the receipt of benefits by
minority and low-income populations (FHWA, 2006).
As the agency responsible for coordinating the regional transportation
planning process, the MPO must make sure that all segments of the population
have been involved with the planning process. The impact of proposed
transportation investments on under-served and under-represented population
groups must be part of the evaluation process.
In its broadest sense, Transportation Demand Management (TDM) is any
action or set of actions designed to influence the intensity, timing and
distribution of transportation demand, in order to reduce traffic congestion or
enhance mobility (FHWA, 2006). Such actions can include offering commuters
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alternative transportation modes and or services, providing incentives to travel
on these modes or at non-congested hours, providing opportunities to link or
“chain” trips together, and/or incorporating growth management or traffic
impact policies into local development decisions. TDM strategies are part of
the toolbox of actions available to planners for solving transportation
problems. As such, MPOs should make sure that TDM actions are considered in
the planning process. In areas where congestion management systems are
required (populations greater than 200,000), TDM actions are among the
strategies that can reduce congestion or enhance mobility.
Over the last eighteen years MPOs have been offered a variety of tools
to make a difference in regional transportation planning. However, there are
several obstacles that could potentially limit their effectiveness within a
region. These include the state(s) culture, state(s) fiscal constraints, their
capacity versus state(s) capacity, the entrenchment or siloing of state
transportation policy, political interests of national, state and local players,
the blinders of engineers and the local political culture/network. These all
serve as potential pitfalls and extraneous variables that can act as barriers to
the ability of MPOs to make a difference in regional transportation policy.
MPO Obstacles at the State Level
The pre-conditioned and embedded paradigm of thought in regard to the
state policy process dictates most actions in transportation policy, creating a
serious challenge for MPOs. A regional MPO must deal with advocates who have
been socially pre-conditioned to a particular way of doing things and are
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reluctant to change and embrace the MPO’s more significant role in
transportation planning at the state and regional levels. Actions that diminish
an MPO’s effectiveness include bypassing the MPO process through earmarks,
state transportation plans being completed without thorough consideration by
all MPO members and groups, and the provision of incentives to adopt a
particular member’s plan or project. These actions may significantly limit the
effectiveness of the toolbox of actions available to MPOs for solving
transportation problems.
State fiscal constraints play a major role in metropolitan planning,
creating limitations and additional requirements for MPOs. Transportation
plans, programs, and projects must conform to the state’s budget. This
spending constraint is particularly limiting in a state that is financially
strapped. MPOs must find alternative financing, adopt a policy that is more
cost effective and less optimal for the region or forgo the project completely.
The level of horizontal cooperation versus vertical conflict is an obstacle
for many MPOs. An MPO’s capacity versus the states’ capacity is one of the
most significant indicators for the effectiveness of an MPO in the regional
transportation process. Over the past eighteen years, MPOs have witnessed a
dramatic increase in their role in the transportation process, however, they
have not attained the capabilities or powers vested in state Departments of
Transportation. In some instances, where there is a disagreement between
state priorities and regional planners, this disparity in capacity can limit an
MPO’s ability to make a significant difference in regional transportation policy.
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The siloing of state transportation policy has contributed to the
limitations of MPOs and provides an obstacle for MPOs to overcome as they
work to make a difference. Policies with a high profile and large expenditures
are often entrenched in a political network whose members are reluctant to
relinquish their grasp on the policy area or to embrace change. The same can
be said for transportation policy which has been long dominated by the state
government, large municipal governments and state DOTs. These sub-systems
make it difficult for a new player to become engaged in the process, change
the nature of the process, and embrace their role within the policy process.
MPOs must deal with such obstacles to achieve their mission and at times the
siloing of transportation policy can result in MPOs making little difference at
all.
The involvement of federal, state and local political leaders in the MPO
process is meant to stimulate the regional transportation policy process.
However, the political interest of these players can have a negative impact on
an MPO’s ability to make a difference in the regional transportation policy
process. It is important to consider the effects of politics and personal agendas
on the MPO process. Politicians can have a wide variety of motivations (e.g.
traffic noise, improved mobility, more jobs, etc.) for their portion of the region
to ensure a better chance of re-election and often fail to embrace the regional
concept of a transportation network and a regional economy. This can result in
projects that do not embrace the MPO mission of a regional transportation
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system and slow the progression of the entire community and the difference an
MPO can make.
An MPO is not an implementing agency for projects, but provides overall
coordination in the planning and programming of funding for projects.
Coordination and cooperation through the MPO planning process, in an effort to
address a region’s transportation needs, optimizes the application of the
legislation’s intent. MPOs plan; they do not build. Engineers manage the actual
construction. In most cases, engineers wear conceptual blinders, focusing on
completing the job and rarely look at the policy side of the project. These
members of transportation process are the implementers and focus on
materials, resources and time issues. They can fail to see the impact on a
community. The failure of engineers to be aware of community impacts and
the natural environment can limit the effectiveness and mitigate the intention
of the regional project.
The local community is integral to the MPO’s transportation mission. The
decision making process evolves around the community, however, when the old
(unilateral) way of conducting business meets the new (regional) way there is a
risk of less than optimal decisions due to limited cooperation and coordination.
As the agency responsible for coordinating the regional transportation planning
process, the MPO must actively involve the community members, many of
whom are not onboard with the MPO process. This can lead to a negative or
stagnating effect on MPO transportation decisions and the regional
transportation process.
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The background provided in this chapter provides evidence of the
difficulties faced by MPOs in implementing effective regional transportation
changes. In order to determine if MPOs, due to ISTEA, TEA-21 and SAFETEA_LU,
are actually improving transportation and air quality policy-making in
metropolitan areas there is a need for a direct observation and systematically
gathered evidence.
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Chapter 3 - Research Design
This chapter discusses the best way to examine MPOs, the type of data
necessary to answer the propositions posited in this study, and the selection of
the cases (Kansas City and St. Louis). The best way to examine whether MPOs
are making a difference in regional transportation planning is through a
comparative case study using quantitative and qualitative data. The study
consists of two case studies (Kansas City and St. Louis), which allows for
comparison and generalizablility of the results. The two cases include MPOs
housed in COGs, two bi-state regions, with each MPO district including eight
counties (EWGCOG – seven counties + St. Louis City). In an effort to determine
whether MPOs are making a difference, the chapter presents three
propositions. These propositions measure an MPOs ability to increase public
saliency, address region wide factors (quality of life, employment and equity),
and increase public official involvement.
Research Design Issues
The research design for this study allows for an in-depth examination of
the increased capacity of an MPO and asks what, if any, difference MPOs have
made in regional transportation policy since the passage of ISTEA in 1991. The
results of this study are determined through the use of comparative case study
analysis with longitudinal data and evidence from face to face interviews, MPO
meeting minutes, MPO budget information and newspaper articles.
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Case Studies
The best way to examine the policy-making impact of MPOs is through a
case study analysis and the use of longitudinal data. A case study is an in-depth
examination of a “social system,” which may be an election, a war, a
government or anything else the researcher wants to learn more about (King,
1989:6). Longitudinal data time orders the independent and dependent
variables by recording repeated measures over a period of time, which allows
the research to identify changes to the social system temporally (Meier &
Brudney, 2002:43).
A case study is the most fitting method for this research because the
method offers the ability to study “how” and “why” questions with little or no
control over third variables (Yin, 2003). Compared to a history, a case study
can reduce the uncertainty caused by external factors and variables which the
researcher has little or no control over by selecting cases that ensure some
similar conditions. If two cases without similar conditions are chosen, this
makes it difficult for the researcher to determine whether any causal
relationship or changes in the study were the result of the variables and
conditions being examined or were a result of varying external factors. A case
study is suitable for this research because it can examine past and
contemporary events with little control over third variables, several potential
causes, numerous chains of events and the interdependency of outcomes.
Furthermore, a case study offers two sources of evidence not included in a
history: direct observation of contemporary events and interviews of the
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persons involved in these events. Thus, the ability of a case study to address
contemporary events with little or no control over third variables and collect a
full variety of evidence – documents, archival records, interviews and
observations make it the best method for this study.
This case study of MPOs involved several steps: (1) determining the
design of the study; (2) deciding how to collect the evidence; (3) collecting the
evidence; and (4) analyzing the evidence. Case studies offer three different
designs for the testing of theories: controlled comparison, congruence
procedure, and process tracing (Evera, 1997:56). The design most appropriate
for this study is a controlled comparison because it allows for the comparison
of results across cases without pre-determined characteristics or comparisons
within cases. A controlled comparison case study includes more than one case
for the purposes of illustrating similar or conflicting results. The comparative
design replicates the study in two or more cases which allows for inferences to
be drawn by comparing the outcomes of each study. The comparison of results
across cases allows better generalization of the results of an in-depth analysis
of MPOs and the effects of the legislation in key policy areas. One of the often
cited advantages of conducting a comparative case study is that the evidence is
considered more compelling and the results are viewed as more robust (Yin,
2003:46).
In an effort to make the results more robust the case study incorporates
longitudinal data. Longitudinal data can most effectively identify the patterns
of change and sequence of events that occur within an organization, the family
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unit or some other entity over time. Longitudinal designs can reduce error to
which alternative methods, such as cross-sectional studies, are vulnerable
(Young et al, 1991:2; Phelps and Colby, 1990). Longitudinal data organizes the
data over time using multiple points in time, while cross-sectional data is
recorded at a single point in time. As a consequence, longitudinal studies are
ideal for in-depth studies that inquire about the causal relationship between an
event (passage of ISTEA) and changes in a social system (participation at
MPOs). This does not hold for cross-sectional studies where the causal
inference is weak. For instance, if all variables are measured once, it is
difficult to determine whether the event has caused the change in the social
system or the change is due to a third variable. As a result, in a cross-sectional
study the causal relationship may be a leap of faith or an assumption (Meier &
Brudney, 2002:43).
Why Kansas City and St. Louis?
This study uses a controlled comparison of MPOs over time in Kansas City
and St. Louis. The use of two case studies allows for inferences to be drawn in
a comparative fashion and illustrate common outcomes. These two cases are
likely to differ to some extent and arriving at common conclusions from both
cases, will expand the external generalizability of the findings compared to a
single case alone (Yin, 2003). The grounds for choosing Kansas City and St.
Louis are they offer similar systems, represent average American cities and are
neither huge nor tiny metropolitan areas. They each are represented by MPOs
housed in well established COGs in a bi-state region. These cities have an urban
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core with the majority of the population living in the suburbs. Their
metropolitan areas have a population range between 1.5 and 2.5 million, with
the largest portion of both their populations located within the state of
Missouri. Two metropolitan areas based in a single, representative state
provide a good opportunity to examine the strengths and weaknesses of MPOs.
Missouri, which is economically, politically and demographically average,
contains all the nation’s characteristics and serves as a microcosm (Robertson,
2004). It has two large metropolitan areas, growing suburbs and small towns,
and while it is “highly urban it is also deeply rural” (Brookings, 2002:6).
Regional Planning in the St. Louis and Kansas City Metropolitan Areas
The Kansas City region and St. Louis region offer similarities and
differences that make it the ideal laboratory to study regional transportation
planning. Missouri is the seventeenth largest state in the US, however, it has
seventh largest state-owned highway system; and the eighth largest total of
state and local lane miles in the country. During the 1990s, 3,423 lane miles
were added to the system (Liu, 2004). Missouri has 3,416 local governments,
eighth largest among states, with 114 counties, 962 local governments, over
1400 rural “special districts,” and 308 road districts (largest in the nation)
(Katz, 2004). Kansas City has 182 local governments, meanwhile, St. Louis has
312 local governments (see Table 3.2).
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Table 3.2: Political Fragmentation in US
Metropolitan Area

Counties

Pittsburgh
Minneapolis – St. Paul
St. Louis
Kansas City
Cleveland
Philadelphia
.....
M i a mi
Phoenix
Los Angeles
San Diego

6
13
12
11
8
14
2
2
5
1

Municipalities
Total Local
Local Governments
and townships Governments per 100,000 residents
412
418
17.7
331
344
12.3
300
312
12.2
171
182
10.6
259
267
9.2
428
442
7.4
55
57
1.6
32
34
1.2
177
182
1.2
18
19
0.7

Source: Myron Orfield. “American Metro Politics: The New Suburban Reality.” Brookings, 2002.

The Kansas City regional planning area, represented by the Mid-America
Regional Council (MARC), consists of two states, eight counties and 3,833
square miles with a total population of 1.8 million (MARC, 2005). The St. Louis
regional planning area, represented by the East-West Coordinating Council
(EWGCOG), area consists of two states, seven counties and St. Louis City with a
total population of 2.48 million (EWGCC, 2005).
The MARC area encompasses portions of the states of Missouri with a
population of 5,754,618 (US Census, 2004) and Kansas with a population of
2,735,502 (US Census, 2004). The counties that constitute MARC are Cass
County, MO (91,593), Clay County, MO (197,588), Jackson County, MO
(660,095), Johnson County, KS (496,691) Leavenworth County, KS (72,439),
Platte County, MO (80,967), Ray County, MO (23,937) and Wyandotte County,
KS (156,487).
The EWGCOG area around St. Louis incorporates a segment of the states
of Missouri 5,754,618 and Illinois with a population of 12,713,614 (US Census,
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(2004). This area consists of three Illinois counties: Monroe County (30,491),
Madison County (264,350), St. Clair County (259,132), and four Missouri
counties and one independent city: Franklin County (98,234), Jefferson County
(210,397), St. Charles County (320,734), St. Louis County (1,009,235), and St.
Louis City (332,223).
The selection of EWGCOG and MARC offers somewhat differing
demographics with an important constant, the state of Missouri, for studying
MPOs. EWGCOG represents the St. Louis metropolitan area, whereas, MARC
represents the Kansas City area. St. Louis bears a resemblance to the industrial
communities of the East, meanwhile, Kansas City mirrors Western and Great
Plain communities.
EWGCOG provides a means for planning and problem-solving through a
board of directors and a staff of over 50. The board is comprised of elected
officials from the three Illinois counties, the four Missouri counties, and St.
Louis City. The board consists of twenty-one voting members, which equates to
roughly one vote per 100,000 residents (Sanchez, 2006). This organization
serves as the MPO for the area with the responsibility for preparing a
transportation plan and selecting the appropriate road, bridge and transit
projects for the area.
Similarly, MARC serves as an association of city and county governments
and MPO for a bi-state area. Their organization consists of a board of directors
who prepares transportation plans and the appropriate policies for the area
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along with a staff of over 100. The MARC board consists of twenty-nine voting
members, roughly two votes per 100,000 residents (Sanchez, 2006).
Both areas have undergone major demographic changes in recent years.
During the 1990s, the St. Louis region grew at a rate of 4.5 percent (111,000
new residents), whereas, the Kansas City region grew at a rate 12.2 percent
(193,187 new residents). The St. Louis downtown population grew by 4.2
percent, whereas the Kansas City downtown population decreased by 13.2
percent (Katz, 2004). Both regions saw their growth primarily take place in
western suburbs. In St. Louis, sixty-four percent of the growth took place in St.
Charles County. Kansas City’s growth is attributed to Johnson County, which
grew by twenty-seven percent and represents nearly half of the region’s
growth, adding 96,000 new residents. Job growth in the Kansas City region
outperformed the St. Louis region during this time adding 222,223 jobs, while
St. Louis added 185,000 jobs. Both regions have seen jobs move to the suburbs
(Brookings, 2002). In Kansas City, forty-five percent of employees work at least
ten miles outside the regional center. In St. Louis, this number increases to
fifty-eight percent which is twenty-eight points higher than average of the top
100 metropolitan regions, in which thirty percent of employment is located ten
miles from the central city (Katz, 2004). St. Louis County, the economic core of
the region, contains nearly half the region’s jobs and only thirty-nine percent
of the population (Brookings, 2002). The trend in Kansas City is somewhat
different; population and job growth have taken place in Johnson County.
Jackson County, which was once viewed as the economic core for the Kansas
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City region achieved a job growth of 2.3 percent from 1990 to 2008,
meanwhile, Johnson County’s job growth was 70.7 percent. Jackson County
now holds 304,209 private sector jobs and Johnson County offers 268,991
private sector jobs (Stafford, 2009).
In addition, there is also a large difference in the number of large
corporate headquarters between the two regions. According to the Brookings
Institution, St. Louis has forty-two large corporation headquarters whereas
Kansas City hosts eighteen large corporation headquarters. St. Louis boasts 520
mid-sized corporation headquarters and Kansas City is home to 409 mid-sized
corporation headquarters. A large corporation contains over 5,000 employees,
whereas a mid-sized corporation contains 250 to 5,000 employees (Katz, 2004).
In short, these two regions provide an ideal laboratory for examining the
impact of MPOs because they have experienced similar transportation,
pollution and employment mismatch problems. Both regions are undergoing
decentralization, with the trend greater in the Kansas City area. St. Louis
employment and population is still mainly centralized in St. Louis County; but
ex-urban counties also have been growing rapidly. Kansas City is growing at a
faster rate than St. Louis in terms of new jobs and new residents. St. Louis has
more corporate headquarters and a greater percentage of jobs ten miles
outside the urban core. The process of growth in Kansas City is resulting in a
movement away from the central city and economic center. People and jobs
are moving to Johnson County, yet the amount of sprawl, as determined by
jobs located ten miles outside the central city, is comparably less than in St.
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Louis. One reason for this may be the limited geographic size of St. Louis City
compared to Kansas City. St. Louis City is sixty-one square miles and Kansas
City is 313 square miles (US Census, 2004). This means that areas within the
city limits of Kansas City reach further out into suburban areas while St. Louis
City is truly limited to an urban core. St. Louis is more centralized with a
significant portion of the population and jobs located in St. Louis County and
offers more sprawl based upon the distance of employment from the urban
core. Kansas City is more decentralized due to the amount of jobs moving to
the suburbs, but has less sprawl due to the proximity of the city limits to the
growing jobs and population in the suburban areas.
Propositions
This study examines whether or not MPOs make a difference in regional
transportation policy-making. It investigates whether or not ISTEA promotes:
cooperation between regional governments; policy planning within their
regions; awareness of regional problems (public saliency); and participation
among local governments within the region. Finally, I examine whether MPOs
have taken transportation beyond simple mobility concerns and also take into
account social, economic and environmental outcomes. In theory, ISTEA
empowers MPOs which should improve regional policy making. The
propositions, P1 – P3 are outlined below:
P1: ISTEA and its successors empowered MPOs, resulting in an increase in
public saliency of regional problems.
An increase in public saliency is measured by interviewee comments on
policies and the process by which they inform the public of regional issues.
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Improved information about regional problems will also be evident by the
availability of study results, policy initiatives and program information
available to the public through MPO websites and publications.
P2: ISTEA and its successors empowered MPOs, resulting in more
consideration of area-wide factors in regional-level policy making.
An increase in regional-level policy making is measured by interviewee
comments on how ISTEA has expanded the number and scope of policy arenas
over the years. This is further evaluated by noting the different actors and
topics discussed in MPO meeting minutes. This analysis examines meeting
minutes, memos and articles, commenting on how these projects and proposed
policies affect the region in regard to social, economic and equity factors.
To specify this proposition more carefully, I examine three specific subpropositions.
P2a: ISTEA and its successors resulted in more consideration of quality of
life factors in regional-level policy making.
Quality of life factors ensure that transportation policies and
investments embrace the concerns of as many neighborhoods and communities
as possible, leading to decision making that includes a wider range of impacts
and a greater acceptance of transportation projects. Social factors are
measured through an MPO’s use of population growth forecasts when
developing projects and modes of transportation that improve the quality of
life. Quality of life factors are analyzed through the amount of discussion and
inclusion of multi-modal transportation. This includes light rail, greenways and
bicycle paths in an effort to provide more accessibility, reduce traffic
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congestion and improve air quality. Multi-modal transportation is measured by
interviewee comments, meeting minutes and the number of policies dealing
with light rail, pedestrian trails, greenways and bicycle lanes.
P2b: ISTEA and its successors resulted in more consideration of land use and
employment factors in regional level policy making.
Economic factors coordinate and integrate transportation plans with
land use and the labor market. Land use is analyzed through the discussion of
the impact of transportation projects on development. This is measured
through interviewee comments, meeting minutes, memos and the inclusion of
land use studies conducted by each MPO. The labor market is analyzed through
the amount of discussion on the growth and trends in employment within the
region and the inclusion of the appropriate studies. This is measured through
interviewee comments, meeting minutes, and memos.
P2c: ISTEA and its successors resulted in more consideration of equity
factors in regional-level policy making.
Equity factors ensure that transportation policies and investments are
representative of the region’s needs and demographics in the allocation of
resources. This is measured by opportunities for participation from areas
impacted by regional projects and an evaluation of the representatives in
terms of gender, economic status and ethnic background. This involves using
interviewee comments, meeting minutes, and MPO budgets.
P3: ISTEA and its successors increased the number and quality of elected
official participation in regional transportation planning.
An increase in elected official involvement is evaluated through the
number of regional officials who attend board meetings, the geographical
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inclusiveness of the jurisdictions they represent, and the frequency with which
they participate. Evidence of this involvement is collected through board
meeting minutes, interviewee comments and researcher observation of board
meetings. Attendance at board meetings is measured by the number of
members present at the monthly MPO board meeting. This is accompanied by
the interviewee comments on involvement in the policy process pre- and postISTEA.
Collection of Data
This study consists of a qualitative analysis based on two cases
supplemented by the appropriate longitudinal data. The data was collected for
a specific time frame, before (1978, 1984, 1991) and after (1992, 2000, 2006)
ISTEA. The data was collected through face to face interviews, the analysis of
MPO annual budgets, MPO meeting minutes, the Unified Planning Work Program
(UPWP), Transportation Improvement Plans (TIP), and Long Range
Transportation Plans (LRTP). An emphasis was placed on certain topics of
interest, which were at the forefront throughout the collection of data which
include the working relationship between MPO and relevant state Department
of Transportation, regional road and bridge project selection, multi-modal
efforts, land use, and reverse commute programs.
The interview protocol consisted of a list of questions administered face
to face with individuals who play various roles within the process. The
interviewees include members of each MPOs board and staff, members of the
relevant states’ Department(s) of Transportation and elected officials within
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each region (for the list of interviewees see Appendix A). The questions address
the process for policy determination within MARC and EWGCOG. Topics
discussed include regional problems, regional projects, member cooperation,
and member awareness of regional issues. The interviews consisted of eight
open-ended questions, conducted by the researcher (for questions see
Appendix F).
In an effort to measure changes in participation over time, a data set of
pooled data and ninety-five observations was compiled through the use of
meeting minutes. The data set unit of analysis is the month and year as
dictated by meeting minutes. Unfortunately, in a study of this magnitude,
conducting archival research leads to missing observations. The collection of
the meeting minutes was subject to what each MPO had on record. The MARC
meeting minutes omitted eighteen of seventy-two months on which the
research was conducted, and EWGCOG omitted thirty-one observations
including the entire year of 1978. Each of these omissions were random and
determined by the meeting minutes available at each MPO. Some meetings
were cancelled due to various reasons (e.g. weather, holidays). Therefore, the
data available for the years 1978, 1984, 1991, 1992, 2000 and 2006 has a total
of forty-nine missing observations out of a possible 144, meaning the data set is
best suited to identify the changes in the policy process and the difference
between the cases using the years 1984 through 2006. During this time period
there are thirty-six missing observations out of a possible 120 observations. Ten
of the missing observations from each MPO occur during the same months (Nov.
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1984, Jan.1991, Feb. 1991, Dec. 1991, Aug. 1992, Oct. 1992, Nov. 1992, Dec.
1992, July 2000, Aug. 2006) resulting in twenty missing observations, and
leaving only sixteen observations that are mismatched in the data set for the
years 1984-2006. Despite these missing observations the data set is extensive
enough to offer the ability to support interviewee comments and to document
change in participation and the type of policies discussed. Using the eighty-four
observations from 1984 through 2006, MARC has a total of forty-three and
EWGCOG has forty-one observations.
The quantitative data was derived through meeting minutes based upon
certain criteria. The data compiled to further examine MPO participation
includes Members, Others, Month and Year. “Members” refers to the number of
voting members present at each meeting as listed in the meeting minutes.
“Others” refers to the non-voting members present at each meeting minus the
MPO staff present as listed in the meeting minutes. The MPO staff was not
included because it would inflate the participation numbers when the purpose
of the variable is to determine the number of people outside the MPO that are
participating. “Month” and “Year” refers to the month and year of the meeting
minutes (e.g. April 1984).
The findings are substantiated and led by comments and suggestions
recorded during the interview process. For example, if an interviewee or
numerous interviewees cited a specific study or program to illustrate a point,
this was followed up by investigating these materials to substantiate these
assertions. The analysis of this information allowed further substantiation of
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any causal relationship between ISTEA and changes in MPO policies and
processes.
The compilation of evidence to support or refute propositions also relied
upon LexisNexis searches. The entails searching for articles via the database
using various search terms. The first search consists of using the project’s name
(e.g. new Mississippi River Bridge). The second search involves the project and
the MPO (e.g. East-West Gateway). The evidence obtained was used to
quantitatively measure the amount of public saliency created by the MPO and
the amount of public saliency surrounding the project. The use of two searches
allows for a distinction to be inferred between how much of the coverage is a
result of the MPO, about the MPO or simply the project. At the beginning, I
intended to compile the results of a third search. The third search was going to
be of the MPO alone to measure how often they are in the news. However, the
phrase could not be structured to produce meaningful results due to the
specifics of this study. This study focuses on the role of MPOs in regional
transportation policy, and a broad search will skew the results because of MPOs
involvement in a wide range of issues (e.g. homeland security and the
headstart program). For instance, a search for MARC over a year’s time may
return 700 hits, however, only 200 of these hits will have anything remotely to
do with transportation policy in the Kansas City region. In a similar fashion, the
use of meeting minutes will not be as useful as originally intended. The
meeting minutes from the MPOs offers a list of attendees at the meetings, an
agenda, and bullet points on topics discussed. Unfortunately, the meeting

Campbell, Joseph, 2010, UMSL, p.71
minutes do not contain a transcript of the discussions at these meetings. This
makes it difficult to impart evidence to support the propositions on regional
factors. In order to obtain such information that is not listed in the meeting
minutes, the researcher would have had to attend all or most of the meetings
from 1978 to 2006.
In summary, this research design allows for an in-depth analysis of the
regional transportation policy process at two MPOs, focusing on road and bridge
project selection; the relationship between regional MPOs and relevant states’
Departments of Transportation; multi-modal efforts; and the consideration of
land use in project design and selection. The use of numerous sources of data,
specific regional programs and the selection of the proper study design will
provide results that are more robust and easier to substantiate due to the
increased generalizability offered by using more than one case (Kansas City and
St. Louis) and the increased causal inference offered by the longitudinal data.
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Chapter 4 – Kansas City
This chapter discusses Mid-America Regional Council’s (MARC)
background, project funding, project selection and three regional
transportation projects within their region. MARC, the regional MPO in Kansas
City, has acquired a new role in regional transportation policy since the
passage of ISTEA. The MPO evolved from the regional body responsible for
federal forms to an institution that leads the transportation process in the
Kansas City region. The MPO is involved in planning and programming (funding
and selecting) regional transportation projects. This chapter illustrates this role
through studying the MPO’s involvement in three regionally significant projects:
The Triangle, Paseo Bridge and Red Bridge. The findings suggest that the role
that the MPO plays in each of these projects is as unique as the individual
project itself.
Background on MARC
The role of MARC, the regional MPO for the Kansas City area, has evolved
over the past three decades. MARC directs the transportation decision making
process in ways that help achieve regional goals. MARC provides a framework
intended to identify projects that will support a healthy, strong, regional
economy; maximize access to opportunity for all area residents; support a
quality built and natural environment; and promote the safety and well-being
of the traveling public (MARC, 2005). MARC committees identify the current
and evolving surface transportation needs of the metropolitan area and broadly
categorizes transportation investments, through their annual budget, state
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grants, federal grants and earmarks, ranging from road and transit
improvements to projects that enhance bike, pedestrian and freight movement
(MARC, 2006).
In recent years, MARC has experienced an increase in capacity and a
more substantive role in regional transportation policy. Prior to the passage of
ISTEA, MARC merely filed paper work, moderated meetings, assisted with
federal forms, published study results and consented to projects with little
authority to do otherwise. Since the passage of ISTEA, MARC has provided
leadership and problem solving for area projects by playing technical, financial
and policy roles as well as providing a leadership role depending upon the
project or program.
MARC’s primary role is to program projects, meaning that MARC verifies
the funding is available and adds the project to the three major regional
transportation documents: the Long Range Transportation Plan (LRTP),
Transportation Improvement Plan (TIP) and the Unified Planning Work Program
(UPWP) as described in Chapter 2. The role of MARC is dictated by the way
projects and programs appear on the agenda; through Congressional earmarks,
the regional planning process, community solicitation and broader internal
planning work. A Congressional earmark means MARC must program the
project and allocate the funds. The regional planning process involves a
vigorous engagement of the community at a localized level to determine the
appropriate policy. Under community solicitation, a community will present a
project at MARC for assistance in allocating the money. Regional projects
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arrive on MARC’s agenda through the broader internal planning work, such as
traffic flow studies and Major Transportation Investment Analysis (MTIA). At
MARC, every project is unique and does not follow a set model. Their level of
involvement, beyond programming, differs based upon the project, constituent
needs and parameters set by federal legislation.
ISTEA, TEA-21 and SAFETEA_LU legislation provided MPOs with a number
of eligible uses for Surface Transportation Program (STP) funds. These include
wetlands creation, highway projects, and in the most recent legislation, livable
communities, pilot projects, and transit projects. At MARC, the majority of
funds have remained focused on local street networks and arterial streets in an
effort to improve street maintenance and traffic flow. Many other eligible uses
have not been funded due to limited monetary resources in comparison to the
region’s needs. This results in the region being able to fund a minimal number
of projects each year.
In the 2007 allocation of STP/Bridge funding only a few projects
received funds (see Table 4.1). Only three cities on the Kansas side of the
MARC planning area obtained funding: Olathe, Lenexa, and Overland Park. In
Kansas, there are over twenty eligible municipalities in the two county area
but for any given year only three to five municipalities have any federally
funded programs.
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Table 4.1: Kansas STP/Bridge funding 2007-2008
Fiscal year 2007 obligated projects

STP Funds

349197 Olathe - Dennis Ave. Bridge over Little Cedar Creek

$ 1,119,450.00

350176 Overland Park - Metcalf Ave.: 99th to 103rd

$ 2,880,000.00

350177 Overland Park - Overland Park Traffic Control System Upgrade

$ 840,000.00

st

345106 Lenexa - Monticello: 83rd to 91

$ 3,905,210.00

349190 Olathe - Lone Elm: I-35 Interchange

$ 2,772,098.00

Fiscal year 2008 obligated projects

STP Funds

350184 Overland Park - 119th: Riley to U.S. 69

$ 3,596,000.00

349190 Olathe - Lone Elm: I-35 Interchange

$ 1,104,402.00

970029 MARC Operation Green Light - additional intersections

$ 2,010,400.00

345097 Lenexa - 87th St Parkway: Pflumm to Renner (Ph. 3)

$ 3,876,500.00

TIP 349190, Olathe's Lone Elm Interchange project was previously programmed for $2,700,000 in 2008. As part of adjustments the project is
split between 2007 and 2008 and has a new total funding amount of $3,876,500. Source: Mid-America Regional Council STP

Doug Brown, a member of MARC’s STP/Bridge committee and Overland Park, KS
Public Works Director, suggests that this results in,
“… a fairly modest effect because on any given year there is
about 10 million dollars in STP funds being allocated and there is
about 3 million in Bridge funds, so a total of 13 million a year
maybe 14 million a year which makes a fairly small impact which
is one of the reasons, up to date, about the only projects that
have been approved for federal funding through the MARC
committees have been either major bridge projects or major
arterial improvements” (Brown, 2006).
The case is no different on the Missouri side of the MARC planning area
where the cities of Independence and Liberty, and Jackson County received
funding for projects through the STP/Bridge program in 2007 accounting for
twenty percent of MARC funds, while Kansas projects garnered eighteen
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percent. Collectively the STP/Bridge program accounted for thirty-eight
percent of all MARC spending in 2007 (MARC, 2007) (see Table 4.2).
Table 4.2: Missouri STP/Bridge funding 2007-2008
Fiscal year 2007 obligated projects

STP Funds

628028 Independence – R.D. Mize Road, Phase 1

$ 1,580,000.00

520040 Liberty – US-69 & M-33 Intersection Improvement

$ 1,500,000.00

790032 MoDOT/Pleasant Hill – M-7 Turn Lane Project, Phase 5

$ 1,567,000.00

634028 Jackson County - Woods Chapel Rd, I-470 & Liggett Road

$ 2,756,000.00

Fiscal year 2008 obligated projects

STP Funds

rd

628111 Independence – 23 Street and Noland Rd. Intersection Improvements

$ 440,000.00

611042 Kansas City – 87th Street (Section 2)

$ 1,298,800.00

970029 MARC - Operation Green Light Priority Corridors

$ 2,156,000.00

610003 Kansas City – 22nd-23rd Street Corridor, 1B- Tracy to Brooklyn

$ 5,038,600.00

th

611054 Kansas City – Blue Ridge Blvd. & 107 Street Geometric Improvements

$ 456.000.00

610358 Kansas City – Bannister Rd. & Blue Ridge Blvd.

$ 440,000.00

TIP 628111 Independence and 611042 Kansas City deferred from 2007 t o 2008. Source: Mid-America Regional Council STP

The interviewees, whether from the Missouri or Kansas side of the region, all
stated a similar sentiment to Doug Brown’s and seemed to believe that if there
were ten times as much money then the region would certainly embrace a
wider variety of projects.
Project Funding and Selection at Mid-America Regional Council
At MARC, the Long Range Transportation Plan (LRTP) identifies the goals
for transportation and a policy framework with four priority focus areas to
guide the region’s transportation planning and programming activities. MARC’s
ranking process specifically addresses these goals and policies allowing projects
to be scored and ranked determining how well each fits into MARC’s vision.
The regional funding process creates more work for state and local
public works departments, while increasing MARC’s power in regional
transportation development. A municipality must have their program or project
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listed in the LRTP to receive funds through the MARC funding allocation
process. After a project is listed in the LRTP, MARC solicits a call for projects,
and the interested party must submit an application on-line with MARC. The
project is scored, ranked and discussed by all public works directors in the
region. For instance, Missouri Highways Priorities Committee is where all the
local public works directors meet to discuss projects, as Linda Clark, Missouri
Department of Transport’s (MODOT’s) Assistant District Engineer observes, “we
all come in, look at the scores and then we horse trade and the money gets
programmed at MARC” (Clark, 2006). If approved, it goes into the TIP and other
appropriate planning documents.
Table 4.3: Goals and policies used to rank and score MARC projects
Transportation Goals
Goal 1: Support a healthy, strong, regional economy
Goal 2: Maximize access to opportunity for all area residents
Goal 3: Support a quality built and natural environment
Goal 4: Promote the safety and well-being of the traveling public
Policy
Policy
Policy
Policy
Policy

Framework - four priority focus areas
1: Increase emphasis on maintaining transportation infrastructure
2: Increase modal choice
3: Better integrate projects into the community
4: Better manage roadway capacity

Source: Mid-America Regional Council LRTP

The appropriate planning documents include each municipal, state or
county’s improvement plan. Missouri and Kansas have a State Transportation
Improvement Plan (STIP). If a project receives federal funding through the
MARC Surface Transportation Program (STP) and Bridge allocation process the
Kansas Department of Transportation (KDOT), MODOT must amend their State
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Transportation Improvement Program and MARC must amend their TIP to
include the project before it can proceed. Likewise, Kansas City’s capital
improvement plan must include all city projects. If a project is not listed in the
TIP and it is in a municipal, state or county plan the money cannot be spent
because federal legislation requires all projects to be listed in the MPO’s TIP
prior to fund disbursement. For example, the city of Overland Park, Kansas
began building an overpass at US 69 and 132nd street in 2007. The project came
up several years ago, and at that time MARC programmed the project in the
LRTP. MARC did not list the project in the TIP until funding was verified. Once
it was listed in the TIP the city of Overland Park could list it in their
improvement plan and move forward with the project.
According to MODOT and KDOT officials, the Kansas City area is making
regional decisions and the most out of the money available for the states, cities
and counties. The process allows the region to maintain or improve their
transportation infrastructure despite a lack of revenue and a slow progression
in new and innovative policies. According to the Reason Foundation, Kansas
roads rank third in overall road performance, whereas, Missouri has recently
moved up from the bottom to seventeenth in overall performance (Reasons
Foundation, 2007). There are two reasons why Missouri lags behind Kansas: 1)
In 1952, MODOT took over responsibility for 12,000 miles of county highways
(MODOT, 2006). 2) MODOT is limited by Missouri’s funding formula enacted in
the books in 2003. The formula states, Missouri will take all of the federal
dollars and by formula determine what each of the ten MODOT districts
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receives; these funds then have to go to the designated district. These issues
have prevented progress in the development of roads in Missouri.
ISTEA offers MARC the ability to work around the limited funds going
directly to MODOT’s fourth district. The transportation policy process allows
the region to combine federal highway dollars, federal railroad funds, city
money, state money, local money and private money to fund projects through
the local MPO.
At MARC, it is common to program a project with numerous funding
sources, such as Congestion Mitigation Air Quality (CMAQ) enhancement funds,
railroad money, city money, MODOT money, downtown council money all in
one job (Warm, 2005). For example, the Paseo Bridge project is being funded
by numerous sources, these include, Amendment 3 money, a federal earmark,
federal highway grant, and Port Authority/Highways for Life funds. Whereas
the Triangle project was funded by Interstate Maintenance Funds, National
Highway System Funds, Surface Transportation Funds, Bridge Rehabilitation and
Replacement Funds, Congestion Mitigation and Air Quality Funds,
Transportation Enhancement Funds, Intelligent Transportation System Funds,
State and Local Funds. Currently, local communities are combining resources
and money to create projects addressing the needs of the region, providing
larger rewards for the region as a whole with less noticeable benefits for any
single municipality.
MARC members suggest they have produced efficiency and economies of
scale by combining monetary resources. Linda Clark’s comments express the
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sentiment of committee members, “Yeah, it is better for the region because
we are spending money more efficiently. One of the more important things is
that we are making joint decisions and prioritizing and you don’t have the big
dog on the porch, Kansas City, coming over to MODOT and getting whatever
they want and walking out. So yeah, I think it (cooperation) is better for
everybody, it is painful, though” (Clark, 2006).
Cooperation in the MARC community involves each municipality agreeing
on a larger regional project or study, forgoing their smaller local projects. At
times it is an arduous process to demonstrate the benefits of a regional project
and bring all MPO member communities together. The effort to bring these
communities together consists of several meetings within the numerous MARC
committees and more compromise than MODOT and Kansas City are
accustomed. MARC’s increased role in transportation policy and the passage of
the first transportation legislation (ISTEA) created an opportunity for an
increase in dialogue and cooperation. The combination of resources offers a
more efficient process and a project that addresses the needs of the region.
Case Studies
This study examines three cases in the MARC area. The cases of the
Triangle, Paseo Bridge and Red Bridge offer the ability to determine whether
MARC is making a difference in regional transportation policy. The Triangle
project offers an opportunity to evaluate the work of MARC as they attempt to
garner regional consensus, cooperation between multiple municipalities, access
funds for its completion, community involvement and public input. The Paseo
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Bridge provides the ability to assess MARC’s contribution in the regional
transportation process through regional consensus, cooperation between two
counties, and acquisition of additional federal funding to create a project the
region desires. The Red Bridge project allows for an analysis of MARC on a
project in which they had a limited role and little authority due to a federal
earmark. Red Bridge provides the opportunity to view what happens to the
regional transportation process when a municipality acquires a federal earmark
and regional consensus is lacking. These projects offer the opportunity to
evaluate MARC’s ability to coalesce regional consensus on three federally
funded projects.
As the designated MPO for the Kansas City metropolitan area, MARC
receives federal funds to develop regional transportation plans and programs
(Table 4.4 and Table 4.5). These funds are intended to support the
coordination of technical studies, policy studies and project planning for a wide
range of transportation issues, working in cooperation with KDOT, MODOT,
local governments and transit providers.
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Table: 4.4: MARC transportation programs for 2006
1 Design of Operation Green Light phase I traffic signal improvements $ 5,537,424
2 Regional job access and reverse commute transit services
1,248,559
3 South Metro connection study
485,000
4 Integrated regional planning
400,000
5 External station survey
300,000
6 RTA trolley car restoration
125,800
7 Regional Investment Fund - collaboration study
100,000
8 Develop plans for Kansas City Smart Port ITS elements
100,000
9 Regional Transit Alliance administration
90,000
10 Freight model upgrade
50,000
11 Safety data mapping
40,000
12 Regional HOV study
35,000
13 Transit public outreach consultant assistance
32,400
14 Aerial photo acquisition
30,000
15 Regional Investment Fund - community engagement
25,000
16 Smart Moves - planning/local links
25,000
17 Legal fees for the Operation Green Light program
20,455
18 Model development
20,000
19 Travel model upgrade
20,000
20 Mode choice model development
20,000
21 Leavenworth area planning
20,000
Source: Mid-America Regional Council Budget 2006

Table 4.5: MARC Budget 2004-2007 for transportation related programs and projects
Transportation
Environmental Planning
Citizen Engagement

2004
$6,739,033
$1,979,185
0

2005
$7,081,629
$1,596,594
0

Source: Mid-America Regional Council 2006 & 2008 budgets

2006
$8,414,401
$1,780,193
0

2007
$11,339,250
$2,753,690
$35,000
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In addition to their annual budget, STP/Bridge funds, CMAQ funds and
numerous other federal grants, the region receives a significant amount of
funds in the form of earmarks. For example, Senator Kit Bond secured 21
Table 4.6: Kansas City projects included in 21 million dollars secured by Senator Bond
$750,000 for the Heart of America Bridge in Kansas City. Funds will retrofit the Bridge
to provide a barrier-separated crossing for bicyclist and pedestrians crossing the
Missouri River from the North.
$750,000 for the Paseo Street Corridor in Kansas City. Funds will facilitate the repair,
maintenance and construction of roadways along the corridor.
$1,000,000 for the Kansas City Area Transportation Authority (KCATA) in Kansas City.
Funds will provide for the replacement of transit buses to meet fuel efficiency and
clean air standards.
$2,500,000 for the Kansas City Light Rail Alternative Analysis in Kansas City. Funds
will initiate the planning process for the light rail.
$6,260,000 for the Troost Corridor Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) in Kansas City. Funds will
expand public transit services within the region.
Source: Kansas City Star/Senator Kit Bond Press Release

million dollars in 2007 for transportation projects in the Kansas City area (Table
4.6) as part of the Transportation-Housing Bill. Projects listed in the bill
include: a pedestrian/bicycle access lane on the Heart of America Bridge, the
Paseo Street Corridor, Light Rail Alternative Analysis, the Kansas City Area
Transportation Authority (KCATA) to retrofit buses and the Troost Corridor Bus
Rapid Transit.
ISTEA increased the monetary resources by providing funds for
transportation improvement through numerous categories. These different
categories (Table 4.7) have increased the MPO’s ability to complete studies

Campbell, Joseph, 2010, UMSL, p.84
independently and cooperatively, as well as to move funds from one program
to another.
MARC plays an active leadership role in strengthening the metropolitan
community by providing: A forum for addressing regional objectives and diverse
community issues (as illustrated by TIP funding categories in Table 4.7); LongTable 4.7: MARC Transportation Improvement fund categories
*Urbanized Area Formula Grant Program
*Elderly and Persons with Disabilities Program
*Nonurbanized Area Formula Grant Program
*Accelerating Safety Activities Program (ASAP)
*Statewide Bridge Rehabilitation and Replacement (BR)
*Metropolitan Bridge Rehabilitation and Replacement (BRM)
*Off-System Bridge (BRO)
*Congestion Management Air Quality (CMAQ)
*Congressional High Priority Project (HP)
*Interstate Maintenance (IM)
*Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS)
*Job Access Reverse Commute Program (JARC)
*National Corridor Planning and Development Program (NCPD)
*National Highway System (NHS)
*NHTSA Safety Grant
*Congressional General Provision
*Safety
*STP-Safety Program (SP)
*Safe Routes to School (SRTS)
*Statewide Surface Transportation Program (STP)
*Metropolitan Surface Transportation Program (STPM)
*Transportation and Community and System Preservation Program (TCSP)
*STP-Transportation Enhancement Program (TE)
*Alternative Analysis Program
Source: Mid-America Regional Council LRTP

range planning and public policy coordination; and technical assistance and
services to enhance the effectiveness of local government (MARC, 2005).
For example, during the Triangle project MARC was involved in a joint study
with MODOT widely presumed to call for an expansion of Interstate 435. The
study helped MARC to identify the problem and the solution. After consultation
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with MARC and others, MODOT decided to create a community advisory
committee to address community input and concerns. In a similar effort, the
Paseo Bridge project was developed through a joint study and a strong
community feedback process. Ten years ago MODOT would not have consulted
MARC in regard to these projects. One of the apparent outcomes of ISTEA is
that it compelled MODOT to reach out to MARC, in theory making the regional
transportation process more collaborative. This flexibility offers MARC the
potential to make a difference in regional transportation through their
leadership and planning.
MARC seeks to build a stronger regional community through cooperation,
leadership and planning. Through MARC’s leadership, area jurisdictions and
diverse community interests sit down together to address regional problems
and identify the opportunities for cooperative solutions. These efforts, in turn,
enhance the effectiveness of local government. In an effort to identify the role
ISTEA played in the MPO process and to understand how MARC has changed,
focusing on one project in the MARC region would provide a distorted view. The
case studies in this dissertation provide an opportunity to view MARC’s unique
role in project selection: confirm there is a problem, build awareness for what
the problem is, provide a forum for review, prioritize the project from the
funding perspective and program the project in the region’s major
transportation documents.
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The Triangle Project Case Study
The Triangle project, officially named 3-Trails Crossing Memorial
Highway, is a crossroads in the Kansas City region. It is the intersection of
Interstate 435 (I-435), Interstate 470 (I-470) and US Highway 71 (US-71). The
interchange is built at the historic crossroads of the Santa Fe, Oregon and
California trails. Kansas City began as a crossroads. It is the starting point for
the trails out west, and the home of the first railroad bridge crossing the
Missouri River in 1869 (GoBridges.com, 2007). The railroad bridge offered the
region transformational power by opening railroad transportation in each
direction, allowing the north-south rail line to cross the existing east-west rail
line. The Triangle project provided the region and MARC the opportunity to
make another transformation by opening up traffic east to west and north to
south throughout the region.
In the 1960s, the city of Grandview, located in the southwestern corner
of Jackson County, had unlimited potential but as traffic began to snarl at the
Triangle, the development of the region suffered. Meanwhile, the communities
west on I-435, particularly in Kansas, began to thrive due to better accessibility
for businesses and commuters. The purpose of the Triangle project was to
improve traffic flow and alleviate the choking off of the communities of Kansas
City, MO to the north and Grandview, MO to the south. According to Mell
Henderson, Transportation Director at MARC, MARC never questioned the
project itself in terms of whether it was a good thing or if it had merits. The
project was a basic rebuilding of infrastructure and correcting flaws in the
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original design which included left lane exits and five times as many
movements (exits, entrances and through traffic) as the normal intersection of
two major interstates (Henderson, 2006). Throughout the project, MARC
accounted for all of the necessary planning components including how to keep
traffic open during construction, the connectivity to the existing street
network, and the financial feasibility.
MARC played an important role providing technical assistance, a regional
perspective, community advisement and programming money. MARC also dealt
with prioritization during the ten year project (1997-2007), and analyzed study
results to determine the most appropriate solution for the interchange. Traffic
flow reports were used to determine the best way to keep intersections open
to traffic during construction, improve traffic flow as quickly as possible, avoid
massive detours, lengthy closures and limit the risk of accidents in the
construction zone. MARC helped create an advisory committee to match local
needs with regional concerns, and worked tirelessly throughout the project to
find the funds to complete the 252 million dollar project (MODOT, 2006).
The project’s history
The Triangle project is designed to enhance an interchange in the
southwestern portion of Jackson County, Missouri. In order to fix the problems
associated with the confluence of two interstates (I-470 & I-435), one highway
(US-71) and seven local routes the Triangle project cost over 250 million
dollars. As a state highway, elements of the Triangle’s history go back to 1925,
when Highway 71 was constructed as an eighteen foot-wide, two-lane concrete
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highway on thirty feet of right of way. It was widened to twenty-nine feet in
1934, and then converted to a four-lane, divided highway in the early 1960s. By
the late 1960s, MODOT added the I-435 interchange – and tens of thousands
more vehicles. In the mid 1970s, I-470 was built to join the interchange, and
soon it became known as the Triangle (MODOT, 2007).
At the outset of the Triangle project, there were several projects and
studies taking place. MODOT was attempting to fix some traffic flow problems
on a two mile stretch of US-71, with no planning study, by putting median lanes
in from Truman Corners (Blue Ridge Blvd. & US 71) up to the Triangle. MODOT
also had a job to put median lanes on a 5.9 mile stretch of I-435 from State
Line Road through the Triangle interchange. At this time, MARC was conducting
a study to determine the needs for the I-435 corridor. David Warm of MARC
recounts what happened during this process, “We (MARC) were heavily involved
in a study along I-435 that was widely presumed at the outset to call for an
expansion of I-435. It was through that process that we decided that we didn’t
need that so we looked at other solutions and abandoned the project and as a
result (of the Major Transportation Analysis (MTIA) and Environmental Impact
Statement) (EIS)) we saved billions of dollars or millions of dollars anyway”
(Warm, 2006).
The Triangle project was developed through a MTIA, EIS and community
advisory committee through the MARC MPO. This MTIA illustrated that the
initial projects MARC and MODOT adopted were not the appropriate solution to
their problems at the intersection. An MTIA identifies which alternative is the
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most suitable to solve a transportation problem within a corridor. The MTIA
conducted by MARC analyzed the I-435 loop around Kansas City. As a result of
the MTIA, MARC discovered that very little transit runs around the loop. The
majority of transit in the Kansas City region moves north to south and east to
west along arterial streets and does not use I-435 which serves as a bypass
circling the metropolitan area (KCATA, 2007). The study also eliminated the
need for High Occupancy Vehicle (HOV) lanes and illustrated that median lanes
on I-435 were not necessary. The major problem identified was the
interchanges needed to be redesigned. MODOT in cooperation with MARC
prepared a large traffic model and EIS focusing on the interchange of I-435, US71 and I-470.
The change in direction by MODOT was facilitated by MARC’s suggestion
to form an advisory committee and conduct an EIS. Initially, the EIS was not
necessary because the state granted MODOT a Categorical Exclusion (CE). The
exclusion was possible because the project was deemed as a replacement of
existing infrastructure, meaning there would be little or no change to the
surrounding environment. The exclusion accompanied by MODOT not seeking
public input resulted in MARC stepping forward to encourage MODOT to agree
to an advisory committee. Due to the committee and a new EIS, MARC and
MODOT determined that the correct policy was an interchange modification.
The essential challenge was to transform an intersection that handled
250,000 cars a day poorly to one that can handle 400,000 cars a day with
minimal congestion and a steady pace for traffic. The interchange was not
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made to handle the 250,000 motorists which use the Triangle on a daily basis
and projections suggest that by 2012 nearly 400,000 motorists will use the
interchange daily (Harper, 2004). The complexity of the Triangle is that most
interchanges of two interstate highways (I-470 & I-435) consist of 12
movements. These movements are exits, entrances and through traffic. Prior to
the modifications, the Triangle consisted of 64 movements and performed a
vital function for the area poorly, allowing neighboring Kansas to prosper at
Missouri’s expense.
The Triangle project was constructed in three phases. The first phase,
improving southbound to westbound I-435, was completed in October 2002, 10
months ahead of schedule. Intermediate phases, completed in 2006,
reconstructed eastbound to northbound I-435, eastbound and westbound I-470
and added new ramps connecting US 71 to I-435, I-470, Red Bridge Road,
Longview Road, Hickman Mills Drive and Blue Ridge Blvd. The final phase,
completed in December 2007, replaced US 71 from Bannister Road to Blue
Ridge Boulevard. A new Longview Road and bridge over US 71 was completed in
the summer of 2008, and roundabouts will be built at Longview Road and the
connector ramps flanking US 71 between Red Bridge and Blue Ridge. Over 50
percent of the work on the Triangle project was bridge construction: removing
26 existing bridges, building 22 new bridges, 293 new bridge columns,
2,300,000 cubic yards of embankment, 248,000 square feet of retaining walls
and 99,000 yards of rock that had to be excavated (Cashill, 2004).
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Map 4.1: Triangle project area

Source: RandMcNally.com
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How MARC made a difference
As the regional MPO, MARC’s primary responsibility is the coordination of
regional transportation planning through active involvement of community
groups, local, state and elected officials in a cooperative and collaborative
process. In the case of the Triangle, MARC made a difference through the
formation of an advisory board to consider the social, economic and
environmental consequences of the Triangle project. MARC collaborated with
MODOT to conduct an MTIA and EIS. These studies addressed the needs of the
region, while considering the effect of each alternative on the region,
specifically in terms of land use, performance measures and safety. MARC also
made a difference through their financial management of the Triangle project.
The sum total of MARC’s actions contributed to the economic development of
the region and illustrates the diverse and dynamic role an MPO plays in regional
transportation policy.
MARC made a difference by continually building regional support for the
project. The MPO led a community group of advisors throughout the Triangle
process from conducting the planning studies to the design of the interchange.
Two factors contributed to the creation of the advisory committee: 1) the
community’s dissatisfaction with the original design; and 2) MODOT’s recent
completion of an extensive community involvement process while building the
Bruce-Watkins Freeway.
The original proposal for the Triangle met significant public opposition.
The community, represented by MARC approached MODOT and convinced the
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transportation department to recreate the project in a manner the community
would support. According to Kansas City Councilman Chuck Eddy, “When the
Triangle project began there were a lot of people upset because MODOT was
just doing their own thing, they did not vet any of it, they did not share, they
did not have a community group part of it. We (MARC committee members)
went out and screamed and beat our fist on the desk and said you cannot do it
this way. MODOT stopped everything and said you know you’re right let’s
reformulate how we do these things” (Eddy, 2006).
In the light of community dissatisfaction with the first design, one of the
first actions taken was to form a twenty-five person advisory committee. In
conjunction with MARC, MODOT selected their most vigorous opponents to
serve on the committee. Members included city council members, state
legislative representatives, officials from the City of Kansas City, and Jackson
and Cass Counties. Public works, police, and fire department staff from the
City of Kansas City and public works staff from the City of Grandview were
members of the committee, as were local residents from the numerous
neighborhoods surrounding the Triangle. The advisory committee met
regularly, went out to the project site and talked to MODOT and worked with
them, identified concerns, examined the MTIA, and provided input. The
committee was involved in the preliminary design phase of the project, and the
concerns they voiced helped bring about a new design that maintained access
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to local streets at critical intersections, and kept right-of-way needs to a
minimum. According to Kansas City Assistant City Engineer Sherri McIntyre,
"The Citizens Advisory Committee definitely raised the level of involvement
from the community" (Meyer, 2009).
The Triangle project was not the first time the region embraced
community input. Extensive public involvement was also a feature of the
Bruce-Watkins project which was carried out from 1987-2001. In this project
heavy consideration was given to the benefits to the communities along the
stretch of roadway, and aesthetics that would fit into the neighborhoods.
According to Linda Clark of MODOT, the Bruce-Watkins project had already
demonstrated the benefits of community involvement to MODOT (Clark, 2006).
Bruce-Watkins Drive is a 10.2-mile stretch of US 71 in Kansas City, linking
downtown to the south side of Kansas City. Its completion provided residents
with an alternative route that avoids busy interstates and city streets, thus
facilitating traffic flow throughout the city and the surrounding areas. The
success and use of community advisement by MARC on the Bruce-Watkins
project established a precedent that it is necessary to work with the
community. The actions of MARC committees, most notably the Total
Transportation Policy Committee (TTPC), reminded MODOT of the benefits of
making the extra effort - to step back and redo some of the planning elements
(e.g. connectivity to seven local routes, shopping and industry) – to build an
interchange that the community desired.
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The Triangle project points toward the difference made through
community advisement. KMBC's Jere Gish reported a controversial aspect of the
project, because MODOT planned to cut off access to Red Bridge Road, which
did not sit well with residents. Soon after this a committee of local leaders and
residents was established to advise MODOT about the project. Plans were
changed and the neighbors were happy (KMBC, 2007). The satisfaction in the
process was further conveyed by Grandview Mayor Robert Beckers, "This can do
nothing but build, build, build. You're going to see economic development out
here. It's going to look like south Johnson County (KS) by the time they're done"
(KMBC, 2007). The difference MARC made began with the creation of an
advisory board, consideration of performance measures and the economic
impact of the design. However, the project would not have been completed
without MARC’s tireless efforts to secure funding.
Table 4.8: Triangle project funding
Source of Funds

Funds

Interstate Maintenance

$125.2 million

National Highway System

$46.5 million

Surface Transportation Program

$28.1 million

Bridge Rehabilitation/Replacement

$5.5 million

Congestion Mitigation/Air Quality

$650 thousand

Transportation Enhancement

$396 thousand

Intelligent Transportation System

$850 thousand

St a t e

$41.1 million

Local

$3.9 million
Total by Project

Source: Mid-America Regional Council TIP

$252.7 million
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MARC identified and combined nine sources of revenue to create and
build the Triangle Project (see Table 4.8). MARC continually worked to find the
funding for the much needed interchange modification. In an effort to pay for
the project the region used funding from various sources at the disposal of
MARC. The total funding amount of 252.7 million dollars included: 125.2 million
dollars in Interstate Maintenance funds; 46.5 million dollars in National
Highway System funds; 28.1 million dollars in Surface Transportation Program
funds; 5.5 million dollars in Bridge Rehabilitation and Replacement funds; 650
thousand dollars in Congestion Mitigation and Air Quality funds; 396 thousand
dollars in Transportation Enhancement funds; 850 thousand dollars in
Intelligent Transportation System funds; 41.1 million dollars in State funds; and
3.9 million in Local funds (MARC, 2007).
The considerable investment in time, community involvement, and
monetary resources by MARC opened up the region for better economic growth.
The project improved traffic flow, lowered the accident rate and improved
accessibility to commuters interested in shopping and working in the area. The
accident rate at the Triangle decreased by a little over one accident a day (360
a year) and the average speed through the interchange during peak rush hour
traffic increased from 22.7 miles per hour (mph) to 51.9 mph (MODOT, 2008).
According to the Kansas City Business Journal, the benefits of the Triangle
construction went beyond creating jobs in public agencies and the
construction, design and engineering sectors. In total, 8400 jobs have been
created since work began on the 3-Trails Crossing Memorial Highway (formerly
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called the Grandview Triangle) (Hubbard, 2009). According to the Grandview
Economic Council, since 2007 and the completion of the Triangle project, 44
million dollars in non-residential construction has been invested in Grandview.
Accompanied by that investment, more than 700 jobs have been created within
the new and expanding companies (Grandview Economic Development Council,
2009).
Summary
The Triangle project offers evidence of the leadership role and financial
role that MARC plays in the regional transportation process. It further
illustrates MARC making a difference by increasing public saliency (P1),
consideration of region wide factors, in particular land use and employment
factors (P2: P2b) and an increase in the number and quality of elected officials
(P3) participating in the regional transportation process. There is not enough
evidence to substantiate that MARC made a difference in regard to quality of
life factors (P2a) or equity issues (P2c)
Table 4.9: Propositions supported by Triangle case study

P1
X

P2
X

P2a

P 2b
X

P2c

P3
X

MARC, as the MPO serving as the regional body for shared policymaking
opened the process to community members who were once shut out of the
regional transportation process. The Triangle project was originally conceived
as a basic replacement of an existing piece of infrastructure, which allowed
MODOT to circumvent much of the regional transportation process. MODOT
acquired a Categorical Exclusion (CE) causing concern among MARC members
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because MODOT would not have to consider all the environmental impacts or
get extensive public input on all reasonable alternatives. This led to the
formation of an advisory committee and the conduction of two joint studies
(MTIA & EIS) between MARC and MODOT. These collaborative efforts offer
evidence of how the efforts of an MPO can make a difference by creating
horizontal cooperation and coordination. By creating this level of cooperation
MARC was able to make a difference in regard to several of the propositions in
this study.
MARC’s efforts on the Triangle project did result in an increase in public
saliency. MARC created an advisory committee which included city council
members, state representatives, and officials from Jackson County, Cass
County and Kansas City. The committee, led by MARC, visited the project site
and provided input during preliminary phases. This action is documented by 784
articles over ten years (1997-2007), an average of seventy-eight per year. Each
of these articles referenced the project and the MPO. This evidence suggests
that the MPO’s involvement and actions increased the saliency of the issue.
By listening to the community, MARC’s efforts on the Triangle project
resulted in greater consideration of region wide factors as they relate to land
use and economic factors. The analysis of land use makes a difference because
the way a region develops its land will influence regional travel patterns and
access. The project improved rush hour traffic flow by nearly thirty mph and
also reduced the accident rate. These improved performance measures
resulted in a direct effect on the economy of the surrounding area. The
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Triangle construction created a total of 8400 jobs, 44 million dollars of
investment in non-residential construction and 700 jobs in these new
companies (Grandview Economic Development Council, 2009). The Triangle
gained new prosperity with the increase in employment and non-residential
construction. These results were a product of a project that involved high
public saliency, improved performance measures and heavy involvement by
public officials in the region.
The analysis of the MTIA involved many elected officials from local
governments in the MARC region. These officials were members of MARC and
participated on the advisory committee. This indicates the difference MARC
makes in regard to the number and quality of elected officials participating in
the regional transportation process. Members included city council members,
state legislative representatives, officials from the City of Kansas City,
Missouri, and Jackson and Cass Counties. The influence and direct effect of an
advisory committee working with MODOT during preliminary phases is difficult
to quantify. However, the success of the project and comments by various
public officials offers evidence that MARC and the committee made a
difference. The quantifiable data in regard to this proposition is best
illustrated through the MARC meeting minutes described in Chapter 6. In the
case of the Triangle Project, the formation of the committee, their role in
advising and the general satisfaction throughout the MARC community supports
this proposition.
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The evidence gathered on the Triangle project does not support two of
the propositions. MARC’s efforts on the Triangle did not result in more
consideration of equity factors or quality of life factors. There is no evidence
to suggest that people traditionally underserved by existing transportation
systems such as low-income or minority households and the elderly were
considered in the building of the interchange. Likewise, the evidence is
minimal at best to support the premise that MARC considered quality of life
factors and does not satisfy the burden of proof for this study. The project did
result in reduced congestion through improved traffic flow and fewer
accidents, however, the evidence for the consideration of multi-modal
transportation and air quality was non-existent.
In summary, the Triangle Project study describes an initial vertical
conflict that ultimately resulted in horizontal cooperation, and successful
completion of the project. This allows some optimism of the role that an MPO
plays in transportation policy as the focal point for shared decision making. The
MPO made a difference by garnering regional cooperation after the initial
conflict over MODOT’s methods. This scenario suggests that there is still a level
of top down control exerted by DOTs. In order for an MPO to make a significant
difference then their presence alone should be enough to empower regional
decision making. In this case, it took community leaders and residents
approaching the MPO and expressing their discontent to create the level of
cooperation the initial legislation intended. The creation of a community
advisory committee points toward an MPO’s ability to facilitate horizontal
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cooperation once it is demanded by the community. This level of involvement
from community leaders and MARC’s role in the transportation process
increased public saliency. The creation of the advisory committee further
facilitated the consideration of employment factors and increased elected
official participation. Community members meeting with MODOT officials,
visiting the project site and expressing concerns about accessibility improved
performance measures. The reduction of traffic congestion made the region
more accessible to commuters and shoppers. The final result was more
businesses locating in the Grandview area. The increase in elected official
participation points toward heightened cooperation and coordination. Evidence
of this is the inclusion of state, city and county officials (advisory committee)
during the preliminary design phase. MARC created an atmosphere for regional
decision making to occur.
The Paseo Bridge Case Study
The Paseo Bridge, which carries Interstate 29 (I-29) and Interstate 35 (I35) over the Missouri River is set for replacement by MODOT. The 245 million
dollar project, officially named kcICON, calls for the widening of the Paseo
corridor from Missouri 210 and Armour Road to the northeast corner of the
downtown freeway loop of I-29 and I-35. The Paseo Bridge connects 100,000
vehicles a day with thousands of jobs in North Kansas City and downtown
Kansas City (MARC, 2007). The bridge is noted for a high volume of rush-hour
traffic, causing congestion, a high accident rate and a slow commute.
According to projections available through MARC, the regional MPO, the traffic
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is only expected to become worse with traffic increasing from 100,000 vehicles
a day in 2006 to 120,000 vehicles a day by 2030 (MARC, 2006). The corridor
experiences high congestion due to seven interchanges, a half-mile apart on
average, where through lanes morph into exit lanes and traffic slows as drivers
attempt to squeeze into the flow of traffic. The accident rate is five to six
times the statewide average, and the road consists of narrow shoulders which
are outdated and met the standards of the 1950s (kcICON, 2007). The
antiquated nature of the Paseo corridor limits its ability to perform its role in
the region.
The corridor plays a significant role in the economic vitality of the
region and nation. North Kansas City is home to many of the regions
manufacturing, trade and transportation jobs. The highway cuts through an
industrial area, served by railroads, barges and commercial trucks. This portion
of highway is part of a 1,500 mile trade corridor connecting Mexico and Canada
from Texas through Minnesota.
The Paseo corridor’s role in the regional economy resulted in a huge
community interest in the project. MARC, as well as a dozen civic leaders appointed by elected officials, and community groups have been advising the
state and had a hand in scoring the project. They are leading, supporting and
creating some forums for community dialogue on how it is going to look,
whether it is going to have pedestrian access, and how transit is going to work.
David Warm, Executive Director at MARC, said that MODOT listened to
extensive public comment and incorporated that input into the project
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specifications and the judging criteria. According to the Kansas City Star, the
region’s largest newspaper, “Warm has told the highway commission that the
process has worked ‘exceptionally well,’ adding that highway planners
undertook a project that meets community expectations” (Cooper, 2007).
The project’s history
The current Paseo Bridge was completed in 1954. Over the last thirtyfive years the bridge’s condition has deteriorated. The bridge has been closed
twice for rehabilitation, in 2003 and 2005 (kcICON, 2007). The focus of the
Paseo project is to correct the on and off ramps at various intersections with I35. For example, at 16th Avenue there is a partial interchange in which the
northbound off-ramp forms a loop with a tight turn. The exit at 16th Avenue is
often mistaken for a through lane, leading to sudden lane changes. The result
is highly congested traffic changing lanes while vehicles are attempting to
enter the interstate at Front Street.
The original premise of the Paseo project was to alleviate congestion,
however, new federal funds were viewed as an opportunity to provide a bike
lane across the Missouri River connecting downtown Kansas City and North
Kansas City. The project received 195 million dollars from Amendment 3 (see
below), and Senator Kit Bond (Missouri) acquired an additional 50 million
dollars from the federal government. On November 2004, Missouri voters
approved Amendment 3, a modification in the distribution of state motor
vehicle tax which permitted the diversion of 187 million dollars to Missouri
roads (mobudget.org, 2008). The plan is to provide 2,200 highway miles of
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smoother pavement, accelerate projects listed in the STIP and determine new
projects to be completed (MODOT, 2007). The 50 million dollars earmarked for
the bridge was viewed by several interest groups as a perfect opportunity to
pressure the state to add bike/pedestrian access despite MODOT’s assertion
that the Paseo Bridge was not the best corridor for pedestrian access.
The initial draft of the Paseo Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)
suggested that it was not feasible to include bike/pedestrian access on the new
Paseo Bridge. This resulted in public dissatisfaction and accusations of MODOT
not being multi-modal in its transportation policy. Before the Paseo EIS, MODOT
had spent four years on a MTIA, promoting Broadway as the best corridor for
High Occupancy Vehicle lanes (HOV) and bike/pedestrian access.
Unfortunately, Broadway cannot be widened to accommodate these modes of
transportation. This is due to the fact that the Hannibal Bridge is on one side
and the downtown airport is on the other side of the Broadway Bridge. As a
result, MARC pushed for a bike/pedestrian crossing to be included in the design
criteria for the Paseo Bridge to force architects to find a workable solution for
bicyclists wanting to cross the Missouri River. MARC’s Board of Directors voted
unanimously to ask for a bike lane from Front Street on the south side of the
Missouri River to 16th Avenue in North Kansas City. MARC’s endorsement ran
counter to engineers at MODOT, who claimed a Paseo bike lane would be
unsafe and also connect the downtown riverfront to an industrial area crowded
with big trucks. The issue is that MODOT did not include an EIS to examine the
viability of Paseo bike/pedestrian access, and instead simply stated from the
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beginning that it would not work, and did not look at all potential river
crossings for pedestrians and bicyclists until MARC stepped forward.
The project began construction in the spring of 2008 with bicycle and
pedestrian access provided on the Heart of America Bridge. The Heart of
America Bridge carries Missouri 9 traffic across the river and links the kinds of
neighborhoods that generate walkers and bikers. South of the Missouri River are
the City Market and residential lofts, which the Heart of America Bridge
connects to a shopping and restaurant area north of the Missouri River.
How MARC made a difference
The Paseo Bridge provided MARC with an opportunity to make a difference by
facilitating the project and addressing needs beyond helping transportation
(see Table 4.10). MARC created the River Crossing Task Force (RCTF) and
formed a cooperative relationship with state and local leaders. MARC appealed
to Senator Kit Bond for additional funds. MARC facilitated the responsible
disbursement of funds - KC Port Authority/Highways for Life, SAFETEA_LU
earmark and Missouri Amendment 3. MARC made a lasting contribution to the
region’s quality of life through the creation of a bike and pedestrian bridge
across the Missouri River connecting North Kansas City and downtown Kansas
City. During the preliminary planning of the Paseo Bridge project MODOT
claimed that the Paseo corridor was not the best route for bike/pedestrian
access. MODOT did not plan or account for the possibility of bike/pedestrian
access in the initial EIS. In response to MODOT, the MARC Total Transportation
Policy Committee (TTPC) created a River Crossing Task Force (RCTF) and
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conducted a feasibility study for bike/pedestrian access across the Missouri
River.
The RCTF was created to develop policy recommendations for
bike/pedestrian crossings spanning the Missouri and Kansas Rivers in the MARC
region. The task force includes representatives from local governments, bridge
owners, MARC committees and local user groups. The RCTF members are:
MetroGreen Civic Leadership Board; Kansas City River Trails; MARC
Bicycle/Pedestrian Committee; MARC Transit Committee; MARC Highway
Committee; Kansas DOT; Missouri DOT; Federal Highway Administration; Kansas
City Port Authority; Clay, Jackson, Johnson, Leavenworth, Platte and
Wyandotte counties; Kansas City, Shawnee, Leavenworth, Bonner Springs and
North Kansas City; Greater Kansas City Bicycle Federation; Missouri Bicycle
Federation; Johnson County Bicycle Club; Patti Banks Associates; Downtown
Neighborhood Association; Regional Transit Alliance (MARC, 2005). The RCTF
provided input throughout the feasibility study and report.
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Map 4.2: Paseo Bridge project area

Source: RandMcNally.com
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The findings and recommendations from the feasibility study were
presented at a public meeting on October 10, 2006 and the MARC
Bicycle/Pedestrian Advisory Committee (BPAC) on October 13, 2006. Four
locations were evaluated; (1) a new facility at the Town of Kansas Historical
Site - cost 9 million dollars; (2) the ASB Bridge (BNSF railroad) - cost unknown;
(3) the Heart of American Bridge - cost 2.3 million dollars; and (4) the Paseo
Crossing - cost 6-9 million dollars (MARC, 2006 & KCBike, 2006). This evaluation
included a review of all the locations, connections, adjacent land use, and the
opportunities and challenges of each. The report did not rule out any location,
but identified the Heart of America Bridge as the preferred location while
acknowledging the strengths of the other locations (MARC, 2006). BPAC stated:
(1) We recommend that high quality, practical and
appropriate bicycle pedestrian accommodations be on or
adjacent to the Paseo from Front Street to 16th Street, and
that this be explicitly included in the project design and
construction. (2) We recognize that the Heart of America is
currently an option for bicycle/pedestrian access across
the Missouri River and needs significant improvements to
increase the safety of all users and therefore we
recommend the necessary improvement be made as soon as
practicable. (3) MARC and MODOT will work cooperatively
with other appropriate stakeholders to further explore
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some of the crossings evaluated in this study as well as
others (MARC, 2006).
After lengthy discussion the TTPC voted unanimously to approve revised
recommendations to be included in the final EIS. The TTPC stated:
(1) We recommend that high quality, practical and
appropriate bicycle pedestrian accommodations be on or
adjacent to the Paseo from Front Street to 16th Street, and
that this be explicitly included in the project design and
construction. (2) We recognize that the Heart of America is
currently an option for bicycle/pedestrian access across
the Missouri River and needs significant improvements to
increase the safety of all users and therefore we
recommend the necessary improvement be made as soon as
practicable by MODOT. (3) MARC and MODOT will work
cooperatively with other appropriate stakeholders to
further explore some of the crossings evaluated in this
study as well as others (MARC, 2006).
On October 24, 2006, MARC’s TTPC presented recommendations
to the MARC Board of Directors. As an organization that promotes regional
planning and cooperation MARC found itself in a potentially awkward position
of being at odds with highway engineers. According to Mell Henderson, Director
of Transportation at MARC, the vote was not intended to lock MODOT into
building a bike/pedestrian lane, but was rather a comment by area residents
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that MODOT make an honest evaluation before they rule out any potential bike
access on the new Paseo Bridge (Henderson, 2006). MODOT District Engineer
Beth Wright said, “We’ll strongly look at their (MARC’s) recommendation”
(Cooper, 2006). TTPC is a very unique committee because it embodies elected
officials, all of the engineers, consultants and interest groups from the region
(for voting members see Appendix B). It also has representation from the
environmental groups, the bicycling groups and the pedestrian supporters.

Table 4.10: Paseo Bike/Pedestrian access timeline
April 2006: MARC adopts a metro-wide River Crossing Policy to guide decision
making about the inclusion of bicycle/pedestrian facilities on bridges over the
Missouri and Kansas Rivers (see Appendix C).
May 2006: Kansas City, Missouri City Council and Mayor Kay Barnes unanimously
approve Resolution 060564, which was sponsored by Councilman John Fairfield and
established the city’s official position in support of bike/pedestrian access on the
Paseo Bridge.
October 2006: 1) MARC Board of Directors voted to recommend MODOT include
bike/pedestrian access on the Paseo Bridge. 2) MODOT releases a study of several
potential Missouri River crossings and finds no significant safety or engineer
problems with the Paseo corridor option.
December 2006: The North Kansas City, Missouri City Council went in the opposite
direction of Kansas City, Missouri by opposing bike/pedestrian access on the Paseo
Bridge. North Kansas City Mayor Gene Bruns cast the tie-breaking vote.
October 2007: The Kansas City, Missouri City Council and Mayor Mark Funkhouser
re-iterate the city’s position in support of bike/pedestrian access on the Paseo
Bridge by unanimously approving Resolution 071092, sponsored by Councilman Russ
Johnson.
Source: Kansas City Star/MARC Board of Director meeting minutes

The TTPC is basically comprised of city and county
representatives, transportation agency representatives and non-voting
representatives of business, environment and federal government agencies.
Five separate “modal” committees have been established to provide input to
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the TTPC: (1) Aviation Committee; (2) Bicycle/Pedestrian Advisory Committee
(BPAC); (3) Goods Movement Committee; (4) Highway Committee; and (5)
Transit Committee. TTPC provides another level of scrutiny that is diverse
enough to ensure that a policy is not based upon the preferences of a few
jurisdictions but rather uses the consensus of numerous interests and
jurisdictions. The TTPC provides recommendations to the MARC Board of
Directors for consideration and adoption.
The highway department took MARC’s TTPC and Board of Directors
recommendations under advisement and did not rule out a bike lane on the
Paseo Bridge, but officials stated it would cost 6 to 9.5 million dollars – two or
three times the cost of building one on the Heart of America Bridge (Cooper,
2006). State officials warned that there is little room in the budget to add
amenities to the Paseo Bridge without sacrificing other parts of the project.
Much depends on what type of bridge is built; there is approximately a 50
million dollar difference between a signature bridge and a plain girder bridge
according to reports published in the Kansas City Star. While grateful for
MODOT’s commitment to a bike route on the Heart of America Bridge,
advocates for cyclists and pedestrians are determined to continue pushing for a
lane on the Paseo Bridge. One bike group suggested that a bike lane on the
Paseo Bridge would be a reasonable investment considering the changing
demographics and redevelopment opportunities near the Paseo Bridge (Cooper,
2006).
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The recommendations from the bike/pedestrian Missouri River Crossing
feasibility study were presented to the MARC Board of Directors on October 31,
2006. According to the meeting minutes, as a result of the BPAC, RCTF and
TTPC reports, “MODOT informed MARC committees that it has agreed to fund
one river crossing based on the findings of the feasibility study, and that a
commitment to complete the bicycle/pedestrian crossing on or before 2012
would be added to the final EIS” (MARC, 2006). The board of directors
unanimously approved the recommendations of the TTPC. However, the Board
raised concerns about the time frame as noted in a statement written in the
record before the vote was taken, “The committees are concerned about
waiting five years, until 2012 for the necessary improvements to be completed.
The Committees’ desires are for MODOT to find the resources and complete the
improvements before work begins on the new Paseo Bridge” (MARC, 2006).
MARC appealed to Senator Kit Bond, citing the regional significance for
trade and safety. This effort resulted in an additional 50 million federal dollars
for the project which allowed the region to design and build a structure that
the community desired, while addressing the economic significance of the
Paseo corridor. In 2005, as Chairman of the Environmental and Public Works
Subcommittee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Senator Bond co-authored
the six year transportation bill (SAFETEA_LU), in which he secured the funds to
boost the bridge corridor project funding to 245 million dollars. The project is
being funded in part by 195 million dollars from the state of Missouri which was
approved by Amendment 3 (see Table 4.11). Additional funds include: 50
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million dollars from the Safety Transportation bill; 10 million dollars from the
Kansas City Port Authority/Highways for Life; and a 1 million dollar grant from
the Federal Highway Administration. In 2007, at the request of the Missouri
General Assembly, MODOT announced the new bridge will be renamed the
Christopher S. Bond Bridge (Cooper, 2007).
Table 4.11: Paseo Bridge project funding
Source of Funds

Funds

Amendment 3

$195 million

Safety Transportation bill

$50 million

KC Port Authority/ Highways for Life

$10 million

Federal Highway Grant

$1 million
Total by Project

$256 million

Source: Mid-America Regional Council TIP

At the onset of the design of the bridge, MARC stepped up and
recommended to MODOT that they engage in due diligence in regard to a
Bike/Pedestrian crossing and not rush to rule out any option. If MARC’s TTPC
did not put forth the effort and have the vested power by the federal
government supporting them, the region most likely would not have received a
Bike/Pedestrian crossing between North Kansas City and downtown Kansas City.
TTPC prepared recommendations for Bike/Pedestrian Access and forwarded
these to the MARC board for approval, causing MODOT to make an honest
assessment of Bike/Pedestrian access. MARC formed the RCTF to represent the
region and to provide feasible options for Bike and Pedestrian Access across the
Missouri River. This feasibility study provided the appropriate policy to address
community needs.
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Community needs were further addressed by the additional funding
acquired through MARC’s appeal to Senator Kit Bond for an earmark in
SAFETEA_LU. MARC put together all of the funding and worked to acquire
additional funding in an effort to give the region the bridge they desired and
bike/pedestrian access.
Summary
The Paseo Bridge project offers evidence of the policy role and financial
role that MARC plays in the regional transportation process. It further
illustrates MARC making a difference by increasing public saliency (P1),
consideration of region wide factors in relation to quality of life factors (P2:
P2a), and an increase in the number and quality of elected officials (P3)
participating in the regional transportation process. However, there is not
enough evidence to substantiate that MARC made a difference in regard to
equity issues (P2c), land use or economic factors (P2b),as shown in Table 4.12.
Table 4.12: Propositions supported by Paseo Bridge case study

P1
X

P2
X

P2a
X

P 2b

P2c

P3
X

MARC was able to bring together diverse interest that once had no voice
in regional transportation policy. MARC’s creation of a River Crossing Task
Force with the inclusion of all interested parties led to an increase in public
saliency. The task force included bike groups, elected officials, bridge owners,
and state officials from Missouri and Kansas which provided public saliency. The
creation of the RCTF to resolve the dispute over bike/pedestrian access on the
Paseo Bridge offers more evidence. A LexisNexis search for the year 2006,
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citing MARC and bike/pedestrian access, uncovered twenty-two articles. To
substantiate the significance of these results I conducted the same search for
the year 2004 and acquired only six articles. This suggests that the creation of
the RCTF by MARC increased news coverage resulting in an increase in public
saliency.
Improved pedestrian access, as a result of the work of RCTF, connecting
North Kansas City stores and restaurants to downtown Kansas City residential
lofts and businesses points toward an improved quality of life for many who live
and work in downtown Kansas City. The new access will transcend the
geographic barrier separating downtown residents from North Kansas City shops
and restaurants. The access will bring the two cities amenities closer than ever
before providing a more desirable location for companies and citizens in
downtown Kansas City and a more lucrative shopping district in North Kansas
City.
In regard to economic factors, there is not enough evidence due to the
fact that the project is not complete. This makes quantifiable data in regard to
increased employment or investment in the area difficult and unreliable
because they are only projections for the future. As far as equity factors, it is
important to note that the project was part of workforce utilization partnering
agreement which is committed to increasing the number of female, minority
and disadvantaged on the project workforce. However, there was no discussion
from interviewees on the subject or any sufficient evidence to suggest that
MARC played a significant role. MARC staff was present at the community
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roundtable meetings which included union representatives, MODOT officials,
FHWA members, local contractors and short-listed project teams (kcICON,
2007).
MARC made a difference through the inclusion of a high number of
quality elected officials. On the Paseo project MARC included 56 local elected
officials in the regional transportation process. These officials participated
through various committees and at different stages in the development of a
bike/pedestrian policy. They were members of the River Crossing Task Force,
the Bicycle Pedestrian Advisory Committee, the Total Transportation
Committee and MARC Board of Directors (6 - Bicycle Pedestrian Advisory
Committee, 19 – Total Transportation Policy Committee, 31 – Board of
Directors). This evidence suggests once again that the MPO was successful in
creating horizontal cooperation and coordination.
After the initial concerns from the community about MODOT’s ability to
deliver something that the community would embrace, MARC engaged the
community in the project. Similar to the Triangle, MARC made a reasonable
difference. The level of cooperation was not a result of the MPO’s presence
alone. It took local interests approaching MARC in order for the MPO to begin
the process. As in the Triangle, this points toward a top down mentality by
MODOT. If MARC’s mere presence was enough to empower regional cooperation
then MODOT would be less likely to attempt to circumvent the regional
decision making process. Once MARC engaged the community their efforts
resulted in an increase in public saliency, increased elected official
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participation and improved quality of life. The difference was made possible by
the creation of the RCTF and the work of MARC committees which brought
attention to the project, provided a solution to bike/pedestrian access and
included numerous elected officials.
Red Bridge
The Red Bridge project is an 18.2 million dollar project in Kansas City,
which received a federal earmark (4.2 million dollars) for the expansion and
enhancement of a failing piece of infrastructure. The existing bridge on Red
Bridge Road was 75 years old . In 2005, MODOT determined it was a candidate
for closure and needs to be replaced (Clark, 2006). In order to satisfy the terms
of the earmark the size of the roadway and bridge must be increased. The
roadway needs to be increased from a non-improved two-way road to a four
lane road to accommodate a potential increase in traffic volume.
The increased size in the roadway and potential increase in traffic has
resulted in a vocal contingent of area homeowners taking a firm stance against
the proposal. Area residents are upset with the city’s failure to include them in
the planning early on and contend that the volume of traffic does not merit the
scale of the plan. They believe a bigger road, especially a wider much longer
and higher bridge would attract more traffic, particularly tractor-trailers, and
ruin the rural feel of the neighborhood (Uhlenhuth, 2006). Traffic flow
estimates suggest that by 2030 there will be 22,000 vehicles a day using this
stretch of roadway, however, traffic volume is not a large concern presently
with an average of 13,000 vehicles a day (City of Kansas City Missouri, 2007). In
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the near future the traffic is expected to increase due to a housing
development planned for the east side of the Blue River, a new intermodal site
at Richards-Gerbaur Airport and the relocation of the Honeywell plant (Worth,
2007 and Uhlenhuth, 2007).
Public discontent over the size of the proposed roadway and federal
funding defined MARC’s role. MARC was relatively powerless due to the
acquisition of a federal earmark. MODOT became heavily involved in the
process from providing additional funding, inspections and facilitating local
hearings. MARC’s role in the Red Bridge project does not involve the depth or
breadth of the Triangle and Paseo projects. For example, during the Triangle
project the public expressed strong opposition to the original concept, MARC
helped to reformulate the project with community leaders and created a
project that the community embraced. MARC committees discussed the Red
Bridge project with members of the community and were involved in
determining that the project met the terms of the earmark. The Red Bridge
project design does not have unanimous support from the public, but it has
satisfied the majority of people in the vicinity of the improvement, allowing
the project to move forward toward implementation.
The project’s history
The Red Bridge project consists of a series of smaller projects to widen a
narrow section of Red Bridge Road between US 71 and State Line Road. These
smaller projects are: 1) widen Red Bridge Road from State Line Road to Red
Bridge Shopping Center; 2) widen Red Bridge Road from Holmes Road to Blue
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River Road; and 3) widen Red Bridge Road from Blue River Road to Grandview
Road. Construction on the middle section (Holmes to Blue River) began in 2008.
The other sections are scheduled for completion by 2010 (Blue River to
Grandview), and 2020 (State Line to the shopping center). The new bridge will
be providing a 50 to 75 year service life spanning the Blue River and will also
eliminate the existing at-grade railroad crossing which requires building a taller
and longer bridge. The new bridge will be 1,200 feet long and will arch the
railroad track and the Blue River. In public meetings, officials from MARC,
MODOT and Kansas City made the case that the occasional flooding of the river
and the railroad track at street level are hazards to drivers and could interfere
with the efficient movement of emergency traffic. The new bridge is therefore
intended to improve safety, emergency response time and eliminate the
disruption of traffic due to trains.
The current plan by Kansas City Public Works, on the western side of the
Blue River, calls for a creek to be replaced with a concrete box culvert. This
will cause many homes to have their view of sycamore, elm, and hackberry
trees replaced with a road. On the eastern side of the river, the new road will
go straight through another wooded area and intersect with Blue River Road.
The Friends of Red Bridge (FORB), a group of local residents questioning the
project, was in favor of a more modest plan, with a bridge that would cross the
railroad tracks at-grade, similar to the current bridge. FORB believes the city
wants to make Red Bridge an alternative to I-435 in anticipation of heavy
traffic from a planned new terminal at Richards-Gebauer Municipal Airport
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(FORB, 2007). Their proposal calls for a multiuse (bike or pedestrian) lane on
one side of the road and a walking path on the other. FORB published accounts
of Kansas City having an ulterior motive to remove a trail and walking path in
the future, and replace them with traffic lanes.
Gathering feedback from the community was integral during each phase
of the project (see Table 4.13). Two public meetings were held during the
concept phase of this project to solicit input from residents of the area
regarding the study. The first public meeting was held on January 22, 2004 at
Table 4.13: Red Bridge project community meetings
January 15, 2003: Concept Study presented to Southern Communities Coalition.
October 28, 2003: Concept Study presented to Red Bridge North Neighborhood
Association.
November 19, 2003: Concept Study presented to Southern Communities
Coalition.
January 22, 2004: First public meeting held at Red Bridge Baptist Church.
January 27, 2004: Concept Study presented to the Center Planning and
Development Committee.
May 18, 2004: Second public meeting held at Swope Park Baptist Church.
May 24, 2005: Aesthetics Committee public meeting at St. Catherine of Siena
Catholic Parish.
March 7, 2006: Aesthetics Committee public meeting at St. Catherine of Siena
Catholic Parish.
Source: Kansas City Star/MARC Board of Director meeting minutes

the Red Bridge Baptist Church and the second meeting was held on May 18,
2004 at Swope Park Baptist Church. City staff also made several presentations
regarding the Concept Study at other community meetings, including the Red
Bridge North Neighborhood Association (10/28/03), the Southern Communities
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Coalition (1/15/03 & 11/19/03), and the Center Planning & Development
Committee (1/27/04). The Concept Study Report for this project was finalized
in August 2004 (Uhlenhuth, 2006).Additional input from the public was also
gathered during the planning and design of this project. An Aesthetics
Committee consisting of area residents was formed and held a series of
meeting to specifically solicit input regarding aesthetic enhancements for the
project. Two additional public meetings were held at St. Catherine of Siena
Parish during the design phase of the project: a public hearing on May 24, 2005
and a public meeting held on March 7, 2006.
During this time period, elected officials were gearing up for an open
Mayoral race in February 2007. Dr. Charles Eddy, a term limited Kansas City
Councilman, MARC TTPC member and local politician responsible for the
acquisition of the earmark, along with several others at MARC, were involved in
the Mayoral race and the Red Bridge project. There were four city council
people running for Mayor, and this was viewed as a political opportunity to
affect Dr. Eddy’s campaign if the project did not go forward. The atmosphere
at the MARC meetings was summed up by Linda Clark of MODOT, “There are
fourteen of them running for Mayor and this is silly season. You aren’t getting
no decisions, no opinions, no nothing out of nobody in this region until February
28th” (Clark, 2006).
The heightened political nature of the project, the strong opposition and
heavy involvement of MODOT in a city project, raised the level of intensity
surrounding the Red Bridge project. MARC found itself as being as much of the
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problem as the solution. The TTPC fell into infighting, though they bear the
responsibility for facilitating regional cooperation.
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Map 4.3: Red Bridge project area

Source: RandMcNally.com
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How MARC made a difference
Though MARC played a much smaller role on the Red Bridge project,
MARC made a difference through the responsible disbursement of funds and
was involved in the very public and controversial process as an observer to
ensure that the requirements of the earmark were satisfied by the project
design. Public discontent did little to advance MARC’s role beyond processing
the paper work. Their role did not limit the criticism by FORB during a
controversial process. In fact, the evidence illustrates that perhaps the
operation of MARC committees and members created further confusion in the
process. MARC’s hands were tied due to the federal mandates attached to the
earmark. This case illustrates MARC’s lack of authority over certain regional
projects, especially where communities acquire outside funds. As David Warm
suggests, “…some projects come about because of a congressional earmark and
then it is a project and you are going to deal with it” (Warm, 2006). In other
words, whether or not MARC felt it was a regional priority, it had to program
and deal with Red Bridge by facilitating the funding and attending meetings.
At the March 7, 2006 meeting at St. Catherine of Siena Gymnasium, I
observed a high level of tension between all interested parties. Members of
MARC, MODOT and Kansas City public works were present. As the meeting
progressed, Kansas City realized that the project was going to be more difficult
than most public works projects (MARC, 2006). City engineers, as well as
members of MARC and MODOT saw opposition to the bridge project growing in
both size and sophistication. The south Kansas City residents group, FORB,
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developed an idea for an alternative plan and expressed their discontent for
the current plan. The FORB plan was conceived by Michael Wallwork, a Florida
based planner who specializes in “people friendly” street and intersection
design. The plan included an at-grade railroad crossing, a bridge in similar size
to the existing one, and bike and pedestrian trails along the road, bridge and
river. The main concern of area residents was that the larger bridge proposed
by the city would make the Red Bridge corridor an alternate for highway
traffic. I observed between two and three hundred people at the citysponsored public meeting, far more than attendees suggested had been present
at any previous meeting about Red Bridge Road. The mood of the crowd was
summed up by one gentleman who stood at the microphone and, addressing Mr.
Stan Harris of the Kansas City Department of Public Works, said “What part of
‘no’ do you not understand?”
The city of Kansas City and Bucher Willis, the company hired to design
the project, conducted a survey of area residents in the weeks prior to the
meeting. The city invited members of the Red Bridge area to participate,
however, there is no evidence as to how many actually showed up. The
audiences were shown a series of slides and asked to write comments about
each slide. The photos consisted of various road configurations, hiking trails,
biking trails, street lights and railings. According to Charlie Schwinger, project
director for Bucher Willis, survey respondents made safety a high priority and
the current road’s curves did not comply with these standards. Kansas City
Councilwoman Cathy Jolly pointed out that 71 percent of the people in the
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area who were surveyed said they wanted a much longer bridge that would
cross over both the river and a nearby railroad track which would involve the
use of eminent domain to remove four homes in order to make room for the
improvements.
MARC was involved in the process because federal funds were provided
for the project, and MARC members were present at all meetings. MARC invited
members of the neighborhood opposition to attend MPO meetings. Upon the
advice of Ron Achelpohl, MARC’s Assistant Director of Transportation, members
of FORB representatives attended an October 2006 meeting of MARC’s Total
TTPC. According to FORB’s website, after the meeting ended, Ron Achelpohl
told members of FORB that they should have attended the previous Surface
Transportation Program/Bridge Priorities Committee meeting (STP/Bridge
Committee). That would have been the best bet to stop the project, but once
it was approved there, further approvals were practically automatic. According
to an observer at the MARC meetings, who was listed as anonymous on the Red
Bridge Road website, the experience of FORB is not uncommon, “If you ask
questions at the STP/Bridge committee meeting where this project is
discussed, they would likely tell you that the decision would actually be made
by TTPC the following week. If you ask at the TTPC meeting they would likely
tell you that TTPC accepts the recommendations of the STP/Bridge committee”
(FORB, 2007).
Citizens normally do not participate in TTPC meetings and MARC has no
provisions for actually taking citizen testimony. Yet, the opponents to the Red
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Bridge project were at a TTPC meeting and the committee members let the
citizens talk. Committee members contend they were very cordial and
hospitable to the citizens, but the citizens were irate as most people are when
they are upset with a program (Eddy, 2006). At MARC’s TTPC meeting that the
opponents of the project attended, Dr. Eddy, the councilman who created the
project and acquired the federal earmark, was the Chair. The TTPC alternates
the Chairmanship, and with Dr. Eddy as the Chair it put both MARC and Dr.
Eddy in a very awkward position. According to Dr. Eddy, “It is hard for me to
control a meeting when I am being yelled at personally about the project and
that was probably the most unusual experience that any of us (TTPC) had ever
gone through. Because rarely does anyone ever come down to the TTPC except
for the regular people that are always there” (Eddy, 2006). It is important to
note that these meetings though open to the public, are not public meetings in
any meaningful sense. The region’s public works people talk about projects in
the undecipherable language of programming, obligation and authority as it
relates to federal mandates, state laws, and MPO rules and regulations. This
makes it difficult for a citizen without a construction, engineering or
transportation background to keep up with the conversation, much less make
an intelligent contribution or informed decision related to the project being
discussed.
These same opponents of Red Bridge decided to express their discontent
and attempt to get the project stopped at a MARC board meeting. What is
important to remember is that the MARC board itself consists of elected
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officials from throughout the region. As a result, the city backed off and
changed a great deal of the project because in the original plans there were
areas that the road was going through and taking property that the city could
not take. Kansas City’s head of public works, Stan Harris, agreed to scale down
some aspects of the plan.
Despite FORB’s efforts, Kansas City claimed their plan for a larger bridge
and a wider road was a necessity, not only for future traffic but also to satisfy
the requirements of the earmark and building in a flood plain. Kansas City and
MODOT pointed out that residents of a Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) flood way, have to have flood insurance. The residents’ flood insurance
states, “If you build a new bridge and do not increase the rise (vertical feet of
the structure over river), you violate the flood insurance” (Clark, 2006). FORB’s
efforts to involve MARC, the organization responsible for resolving these types
of situations, failed. Upon the approval of the plan in March 2008, FORB
released a press release stating, “…it (Kansas City) had failed to consider a
variety of views and failed to achieve a consensus among stakeholders” (FORB,
2008). According to reports in the Kansas City Star, “Jerry Young, a south
Kansas City resident, said he remembered arguments about the road as far
back as 1999, although the Friends (FORB) contend that the process has been
secretive and not open to public input, Young said, ‘I’ve never felt shut out. I
think the product we have today is the best for our community’” (Uhlenhuth,
2008). The public may not have been shut out but the evidence and results
point toward a breakdown in the process. MARC was unable to help the
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development of a solution based around regional consensus. However, Linda
Clark of MODOT believes,”…the process worked, I just think the people are
very unhappy” (Clark, 2006). The reason the people are unhappy is because the
design and impact of the new bridge will change the face of the neighborhood.
It dwarfs the old bridge and separates motorists from the calming experience
of a drive through Minor Park, which visitors to the RedBridge.org website have
stated as a major reason for choosing to live in the Red Bridge area.
To create this new bridge and change the face of the existing road,
Kansas City received 4.2 million dollars in the form of a federal earmark, 4.3
million from city sales taxes, and a construction grant in the amount of 1.8
Table 4.14: Red Bridge project funding
Source of Funds

Funds

Federal Earmark

$4.2 million

Federal Construction Grant (2006-07)

$1.8 million

KC Capital Improvements (Bridges)

$2.1 million

KC Capital Improvements (Roadways)
Total funds available in 2007
Additional funds needed for completion, 2020

$2.4 million
$9.5 million
$8.7 million

Total projected costs for project

$18.2 million

Source: Kansas City Adopted City Budget 2006-07

million. The additional 8.7 million dollars to pay the anticipated price tag of
18.2 million have not been identified. The funds listed in Table 4.14 will fund
the construction of the first phase, the middle portion of the route, from
Holmes Road to Blue River Road which includes the new bridge. The major
concern during the planning stages of the Red Bridge project was losing the
federal earmark due to a small group of people fighting progress. One of the
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requirements of a federal earmark is to demonstrate progress within two years
of acquiring the earmark or the federal government will redistribute the funds.
FORB fought the project for so long hoping the region would lose the earmark
and the project would not be financed.
Summary
The Red Bridge project offers evidence of how the acquisition of a
federal earmark allows municipalities to work around the regional
transportation process, limiting an MPOs ability to make a difference. The
inclusion of FORB at MARC meetings points toward an increase in public
saliency (P1). Evidence to support the other propositions is weak. There is little
evidence of the MPO considering area wide factors – quality of life, land use,
employment or equity issues (P2: P2a, P2b, P2c). The evidence to support an
increase in public official participation (P3) is limited to officials that
participate on MARC committees and is insufficient. The case points toward a
limitation in the regional transportation process – the federal earmark for a
municipal project.
Table 4.15: Propositions supported by Red Bridge case study

P1
X

P2

P2a

P 2b

P2c

P3

The project offers evidence of how a single-jurisdictional project can
impose costs on other jurisdictions or groups of citizens. In the case of Red
Bridge, the City of Kansas City acquired an earmark for a new bridge and the
region had to coordinate resources and find a level of cooperation to make the
project a reality.
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The Red Bridge project was not a project that the Kansas City region
listed high on their priority list but once the earmark was acquired the regional
MPO and other local governments had to address the issue. MARC dealt with
public discontent on numerous fronts during the Red Bridge project. They
participated in public meetings, FORB members expressed their displeasure at
TTPC meetings and MARC Board meetings. Their role in the process was
documented by numerous local news sources. The research on the project
highlighted 38 articles, according to LexisNexis, that specifically dealt with the
conversations between FORB and MARC. This is typically not the manner in
which MARC intends to make a regional project salient, but their role in the
regional transportation process on previous projects has resulted in the
community viewing the MPO as the focal point for transportation policy.
Despite the circumstances, MARC did contribute to the saliency of this issue.
The Red Bridge project additionally offers evidence of how credit
claiming and short-term results can influence the regional transportation policy
process. The Red Bridge project was a point of contention for several members
at MARC, each of whom was running in the open Mayoral race. These political
actors put personal interest before regional concerns, making the process more
cumbersome and volatile.
The end result was that MARC discussed the Red Bridge project with
members of the community and were involved in determining that the project
met the terms of the earmark. The Red Bridge project design did not have
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unanimous support from the public, but it satisfied the requirements of the
earmark allowing the project to move forward toward implementation.
Conclusion
The cases of the Triangle, Paseo Bridge and Red Bridge in the MARC
region offer evidence of public saliency. The Triangle and Paseo Bridge offer
evidence of MARC’s ability to garner regional cooperation in an effort to
address certain regional factors. Specifically, these factors were related to
employment (Triangle) and quality of life (Paseo Bridge). Evidence of increased
elected official participation is apparent in both the Triangle and Paseo cases.
There is little or no evidence to substantiate the regional MPO in Kansas City
equity factors in any of the cases.
Table 4.16: Propositions supported by Kansas City case studies
Triangle
Paseo Bridge
Red Bridge

P1
X
X
X

P2
X
X

P2a
X

P 2b
X

P2c

P3
X
X

MARC increased public saliency (P1) through the creation of an advisory
committee in the case of the Triangle, the creation of a River Crossing Task
Force (RCTF) on the Paseo project, and its role or lack thereof in working with
the Friends of Red Bridge to find a locally acceptable solution for the project.
Information was readily available, according to LexisNexis searches; 78 articles
per year on the Triangle project, 46 per year on the Paseo Bridge and 38 per
year on the Red Bridge project. Also there were many articles regarding the
Mayoral race mentioned the Red Bridge project which were not included in
these numbers. The Triangle Advisory Committee consisted of representatives
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of public agencies, elected officials and residents. The RCTF consisted of
members from 27 different entities, including local counties, cities, interest
groups, neighborhood associations and transportation departments. MARC’s
dealings with FORB resulted in heightened public saliency. The members of
FORB viewed MARC as the organization to confront in an effort to get the city
to change the project, but unfortunately MARC’s hands were tied due to the
requirements of the federal earmark. Each of these cases point toward the
public role that MARC plays in the regional transportation process.
MARC made a difference through the consideration of area-wide factors
through their consideration of employment issues (P2: P2b) during the Triangle
project and quality of life factors (P2: P2a) during the Paseo Bridge project.
The premise behind the Triangle project was to open the region up for
economic growth. The evidence suggests that the role MARC played contributed
to a successful project. Interviewees suggested, “it was a success” and “all you
see is growth.” However, the numbers illustrate this more succinctly; 44
million dollars in non-residential construction and more than 700 jobs have
been created within the new and expanding companies, with a total of 8400
jobs created since work began. In the Paseo project, MARC adopted an areawide river crossing policy forcing the issue of bike/pedestrian access resulting
in an improved quality of life for area residents. The creation of this policy
pressured MODOT and resulted in new bike and pedestrian access for the
residents of downtown Kansas City and North Kansas City. The river crossing
will transcend a geographic barrier and provide access to restaurants,
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shopping, housing and employment that was previously only accessible by
automobile.
MARC created an increase (P3) in elected official involvement through a
25 person advisory committee on the Triangle and through their various
committees involved in the river crossing policy: 6 - Bicycle Pedestrian Advisory
Committee; 19 – Total Transportation Policy Committee; 31 – Board of
Directors. Further evidence of this increased elected official participation is
illustrated in Chapter 6.
MARC makes a makes a reasonable difference in regional transportation
policy, but are limited to certain areas. These reasonable differences highlight
the promise, success and problems involved in regional transportation policy.
The Paseo project highlighted some of the emergent policy networks in
regional transportation policy (e.g. bicycle groups). This is an example how the
enhanced role of MPOs created, “…a mechanism for sparking new activity
around transportation” (Weir et al., 2009). The Triangle project illustrates the
success of horizontal cooperation through the formation of an advisory board.
This suggests that MPOs act as, “…regional arrangements bring together a wider
range of stakeholders” (Gerber & Gibson, 2009). This allows the final project to
more closely align with regional needs. The Red Bridge project offers evidence
of how a single jurisdiction can disrupt the regional decision making process.
This type of action can nullify the entire regional transportation process
because, in theory, “…local governments, acting independently, produce
policies that are different from (and presumably inferior to) outcomes that
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would be produced by a regional body” (Gerber & Gibson, 2009). The promise,
success, problems and varying roles of MPOs is further illustrated by East-West
Gateway’s role in regional transportation policy described in the next Chapter.
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Chapter 5 – St. Louis
This chapter discusses East-West Gateway Council of Governments
(EWGCOG, or East-West Gateway) background, project funding, project
selection and three regional transportation projects within their region. EastWest Gateway, the regional MPO in St. Louis, has acquired a new role in
regional transportation policy since the passage of ISTEA. The increased
capacity of this MPO is due to numerous resources provided by ISTEA and
subsequent legislation. East-West Gateway is involved in planning and
programming (funding and selecting) regional transportation projects. This
chapter illustrates this role through East-West Gateway’s involvement in three
regionally significant projects: The new Mississippi River Bridge, Page
Extension, and I-64 reconstruction. These studies further suggest that the MPO
plays numerous roles depending upon the project, serving as the facilitator of
cooperation, the provider of additional monetary resources and acting as a
forum for the regional transportation process.
Background on East-West Gateway (EWGCOG)
East-West Gateway, as the regional MPO for the St. Louis area, is making
a difference through the use of numerous resources. It currently incorporates
planning studies (e.g. Major Transportation Investment Analysis) flexible
monetary resources, federal aid, outside consultants, public comment and
various committees to create regional transportation policy. These resources
have added depth and breadth to its policies and increased its capacity to
make a difference. Prior to ISTEA, East-West Gateway had a minimal role in
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transportation policy by performing limited tasks, such as, oversight of regional
meetings, filing federal documents and publishing study results for public
consumption.
Since the passage of ISTEA in 1991, East-West Gateway is considering
more issues and playing a more active role in transportation policy. The
designation of East-West Gateway as an MPO means the federal government,
Missouri and Illinois have vested authority and responsibility in the organization
to develop and adopt regional transportation plans, coordinate regional
cooperation, disburse funds and evaluate projects. Transportation planning at
East-West Gateway requires the ability to understand and address the complex
relationship between the region’s mobility, economy and community. As the
regional MPO, East-West Gateway is continually challenged to facilitate
regional transportation decisions, to maintain existing infrastructure and build
new facilities to support growth, while balancing the fiscal and political
constraints within the region.
Fiscal and political factors test East-West Gateway and their ability to
address regional transportation problems. For example, East-West Gateway is
constantly balancing the financial differences between Missouri and Illinois that
both fall within its region. Missouri has less revenue than Illinois to spend on
roads and more miles of road to maintain, and Illinois has more flexibility in
financing large projects. There are other important differences between the
two states that East-West Gateway must take into consideration. Missouri has
twice the number of lane miles in its highway system, 32,340 to Illinois’ 16,500
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lane miles (MODOT, 2007 & IDOT, 2007). Illinois ranks fourteenth in revenue
per mile (155,879 dollars), whereas Missouri ranks a lowly forty-fifth in revenue
per mile (47,463 dollars). Illinois collects a five-cent sales tax for gasoline,
whereas Missouri has no state sales tax on gasoline. The Illinois state charges
nineteen cents per gallon in tax on gasoline and 21.5 cents on diesel fuel,
whereas Missouri’s gasoline and diesel taxes are seventeen cents per gallon
(Crouch, 2007).
East-West Gateway not only has to balance the differences in state
revenues for transportation projects, but also has to deal with differing
political structures that determine transportation projects and provide
additional funds. In Missouri, raising the state gasoline tax takes a statewide
vote. In Illinois, the state legislature can increase the state gasoline tax as it
deems necessary. MODOT uses a complex formula to decide how much
construction money each of the state’s ten districts receives each year. The
policy’s intention is to remove politics from road spending and limit arguments
over who is getting more than their fair share of state transportation funds
(Hassinger, 2007). The formula, adopted in 2003, is based on population,
employment and estimated miles traveled on the area’s major roads and
highways (MODOT, 2007). In contrast, IDOT district projects compete against
each other for funding through the state’s legislative process. Every spring,
IDOT submits a list of priorities as part of a six year plan to the Illinois
legislature where the projects are evaluated and funding is provided. Once the
legislature approves funding for certain projects the governor signs off on the
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budget (Stack, 2007). According to Les Sterman, former executive director of
East-West Gateway, “Illinois preserves enough flexibility in its program that if
something big does come along, it has the ability to pay for it” (Sterman,
2007).
East-West Gateway has dealt with differing characteristics between the
two states in the St. Louis area since its inception in 1965, and has adopted a
sole focus in its transportation policy. Initially, as the region’s Council of
Governments (COG), and later as the designated MPO, East-West Gateway
traditionally put congestion relief at the center of its transportation policy.
The advent of congestion as a regional problem in St. Louis, began during the
1950s with the creation of the Interstate Highway System. This highway system
paved the way for new levels of commercial and social activity. In 1956, the
effects of suburban development were already being seen in the St. Louis
region with the construction of the region’s first Interstate, Interstate 70 (I70). The new roadways of I-70, Interstate 55 (I-55) and Interstate 44 (I-44)
provided an opportunity for significant expansion outward, primarily to the
north and west in the St. Louis region. St. Louisans began to feel an eagerness
to move away from the congestion, noise and pollution created by the factories
which comprised more than 50 percent of the region’s employment base
(EWGCC, 1999). At the same time, residents of St. Louis City became aware of
the attractiveness of a suburban lifestyle, less expensive land in the outer ring
and affordable mortgages available through the GI bill (EWGCC, 1999).
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East-West Gateway was already dealing with the problems created by
these circumstances at the time of ISTEA’s passage. Between 1950 and 1990,
the amount of developed land in the St. Louis region increased by 355 percent
and the number of passenger vehicles registered in the region nearly tripled
(EWGCC, 1999). Currently, in the bi-state St. Louis area, 17,662 miles of
publicly-funded roads are in place (Table 5.1) to connect cities, neighborhoods,
and employment centers within the region (EWGCC, 2006). The increase in
miles of roadway over the years in combination with an increase in the number
Table 5.1: Miles of roadway in the East-West Gateway region
Urban

Rural

Total Miles

City of St. Louis

1,178

0

1,178

Franklin County

147

2,236

2,383

Jefferson County

711

1,467

2,178

Madison County

1,375

1,101

2,476

Monroe County

58

620

678

St. Charles County

865

1,024

1,889

St. Clair County

1,185

1,020

2,205

St. Louis County

4,496

179

4,675

Regional Total

9,850

7,812

17,662

Source: East-West Gateway Coordinating Council

of automobiles provided easier accessibility to all areas at significant costs to
the region. According to MODOT, traffic congestion causes the average peak
period traveler to spend an extra thirty-eight hours of travel time and consume
an additional twenty-six gallons of fuel annually (MODOT, 2007). In St. Louis
alone, congestion wastes in excess of 26 million gallons of fuel annually, causes
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39.9 million hours of travel delays per year and costs 675 million dollars
annually (MO Governors office, 2008 & MODOT, 2008).
In 1992, in response to ISTEA and in an effort to better address regional
transportation problems, East-West Gateway created a highly structured
evaluation process and incorporated more resources for planning. This included
the ability to review all projects receiving federal funds, authority to program
projects in the region’s three official transportation documents (LRTP, TIP and
UPWP), which include population and employment estimates, land use and
transportation facility inventories and maps, environmental quality
assessments, computer models of existing and future travel patterns, activities
to engage interest groups and community residents, and the ability to move
transportation money to the planning side. This provides East-West Gateway a
larger and more significant role in regional transportation.
East-West Gateway embraced its enhanced and varying role in
transportation policy on different projects and programs. East-West Gateway
was engaged in the physical outcome of the St. Louis commuter rail,
MetroLink. The agency conceived and planned the project, and performed
some preliminary engineering before turning it over to Metro (Bi-State
Development Agency), a regional transit agency. In other cases, East-West
Gateway has identified a need and turned the project over to the state(s). For
example, in the case of the new Mississippi River Bridge, East-West Gateway
identified the need and turned the project over to Missouri and Illinois to
design the project and determine the best location. On rare occasions, such as
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the Page Extension, East-West Gateway, as the regional MPO, is approached by
local governments to fill gaps in funding. According to Les Sterman, former
Executive Director of East-West Gateway, “…people call us all the time and say
we got this project we know we will never get it funded in your process. We
(constituents) are going to Congress to try to get an earmark, will you help us?
We (EWGCOG) actually write support letters (for these constituents to take to
their representatives identifying the need and viability of the project) and help
out in a variety of ways, people come to us for ideas for funding and we try to
help out the best we can” (Sterman, 2006).
Case Studies
This study examines three projects in the East-West Gateway area. The
cases of the new Mississippi River Bridge, Page Extension and Interstate 64
offer the ability to determine if East-West Gateway is making a difference in
regional transportation policy. The new Mississippi River Bridge offers an
opportunity to evaluate the work of East-West Gateway as they attempt to
build regional consensus and cooperation between the two states, acquire
federal funds, and access external and public input. The Page Extension
provides the ability to assess East-West Gateway’s contribution to the regional
transportation process through regional consensus, cooperation between two
counties, public input, environmental concerns and acquisition of additional
funding to complete the project. The I-64 project allows for an analysis of EastWest Gateway through political brokering, public input, regional consensus and
ability to gain federal support. Each of these projects was designed to
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accomplish certain regional goals and offers the opportunity to evaluate EastWest Gateway’s ability to help the region attain these goals.
Transportation projects at East-West Gateway are derived from goals
and planning procedures within its LRTP for policy setting, planning and
development and project implementation. These goals and planning procedures
support the decision making process under which more than 18 billion federal
and local dollars will be invested in regional transportation infrastructure and
operations over a 20 year period from 2005 to 2025 (EWGCC, 2005). In the EastWest Gateway process, transportation solutions become funded transportation
projects. Proposals are solicited from local jurisdictions, transit providers, and
state departments of transportation. These proposals are then evaluated based
upon the transportation needs and priorities articulated in the LRTP. Projects
that best match these criteria are selected for inclusion in the TIP – the three
year list of projects scheduled for design and construction backed by federal
funds. The TIP acts like an accountant’s balance sheet. The total cost of
selected projects, also known as programmed projects, cannot exceed federal
and state monies earmarked for region wide transportation improvements.
The FY 2005-2009 TIP covered a five year period and programmed about
2.46 billion dollars in funding for 660 projects (EWGCC, 2004). The total
regional program summarized in the FY 2006-2009 TIP (Table 5.2) covers a four
year period and contains 689 projects at a total cost of about 2.28 billion
dollars (EWGCC, 2005).

Campbell, Joseph, 2010, UMSL, p.144

Table 5.2: East-West Gateway TIP, fiscal years 2006-2009
County

Preservation

Capacity
Adding

Operation
& Safety

Transit
Expansion

O t he r

TOTAL

Franklin

$48,328,595

$50,987,000

$1,218,000

$0

$3,762,000

$104,295,595

Jefferson

$27,833,791

$1,720,000

$49,200,000

$0

$224,000

$78,977,791

St. Charles

$196,463,194

$48,339,251

$109,560,000

$32,818,880

$0

$5,745,063

St. Louis

$400,305,699

$54,148,000

$45,779,470

$0

$20,035,826

$520,268,995

St. Louis City

$234,978,268

$2,996,000

$4,652,906

$0

$12,674,966

$255,302,140

Multi-County

$16,284,000

$291,000

$17,253,297

$316,062,625

$83,368,666

$433,259,588

Regional
Missouri
Total

$75,519,000

$0

$48,818,000

$0

$1,872,000

$126,209,000

$851,588,604

$219,702,000

$199,740,553

$316,062,625

$127,682,521

$1,714,776,303

Madison

$46,160,600

$69,064,000

$33,709,651

$0

$25,778,525

$174,712,776

Monroe

$6,796,263

$86,000

$722,000

$0

$0

$7,604,263

St. Clair

$92,265,592

$22,313,000

$3,248,400

$6,928,025

$16,376,281

$141,131,298

$5,025,000

$44,215,000

$1,601,000

$0

$29,360,477

$80,201,477

Multi-County
Regional
Illinois Total
Multi-State
Regional
Total
Regional %

$33,865,000

$0

$8,779,000

$0

$2,200,000

$44,844,000

$184,112,455

$135,678,000

$48,060,051

$6,928,025

$73,715,283

$448,493,814

$150,000

$2,885,000

$0

$0

$115,874,816

$118,909,816

$1,035,851,059

$358,265,000

$247,800,604

$322,990,650

$317,272,620

$2,282,179,933

45.40%

15.70%

10.90%

14.20%

13.90%

100.00%

Source: East-West Coordinating Council TIP

Recent programs have emphasized preservation of the existing
infrastructure, consistent with the goals stated in East-West Gateway’s LRTP.
The TIP also continues to illustrate the region’s emphasis in preservation of
existing infrastructure, committing forty-five percent of the program (1.04
billion dollars over a four year period) to resurface and reconstruct roads,
repair/replace bridges, and replace aging transit assets. Sixteen percent of the
FY 2006-2009 program (358 million dollars) is allocated to adding capacity in
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the form of new roads and new lanes on existing roads. Projects to improve the
operations and/or safety of the region’s transportation facilities account for
248 million dollars (about 11 percent of the total program). The “Other”
category includes such projects as transit capital improvements, transit
operating costs, and system enhancements.
The TIP is a product of the LRTP and the primary document outlining the
fiscal priorities of transportation policy. The TIP is part of the policy-setting
procedures at East-West Gateway and provides a foundation for planning and
decision making. East-West Gateway’s primary policy document outlining
transportation goals and region wide priorities is the LRTP. This twenty-year
plan, based upon social, environmental, energy and economic factors, provides
the framework for future transportation decisions.
Since 1992, the East- West Gateway project evaluation process has
consisted of six focus areas: (1) access to opportunity; (2) congestion relief; (3)
goods movement; (4) preservation; (5) safety and security; and (6) sustainable
development (EWGCC, 2005). The assessment of access to opportunity allows
East-West Gateway to address the mobility of low-income communities and
people with disabilities. The evaluation of congestion relief ensures that the
region’s roadways do not reach levels of congestion which negatively influence
productivity and quality of life. The analysis of efficient movement of goods
allows for improved movement of freight within and throughout the region by
rail, water, air and road transportation modes. Preservation of existing
infrastructure enables East-West Gateway to maintain the current road, bridge,
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transit and intermodal assets in good condition. The focus on safe and secure
operation in the region is intended to decrease the risk of personal injury and
property damage on, in and around transportation facilities. Sustainable
development involves coordinating land use, transportation, economic
development, environmental quality, energy conservation, and community
aesthetics (EWGCC, 2005).
East-West Gateway’s transportation agenda as defined in their LRTP
provides the criteria for the planning and development of the region’s
transportation needs. Public works employees, local leaders and citizens help
identify transportation needs, formulate solutions and select a regionally
preferred alternative. These solutions are measured against the criteria of the
LRTP through results of various planning studies. An example of a planning and
development tool is the Major Transportation Investment Analyses (MTIA) or
Major Investment Study (MIS). As defined in East-West Gateway’s LRTP, “A
Major Transportation Investment Analysis (MTIA) is a type of evaluation and
decision making process for highway and/or transit improvements which have
the potential for incurring substantial costs or causing significant alteration of
travel patterns” (EWGCC, 2005). The principal aim of an MTIA is to define the
general scope and design concept of the preferred transportation solution
within a particular corridor. The MTIA identifies and evaluates potential largescale, costly transportation solutions, conducted with partner agencies such as
the Missouri and Illinois departments of transportation and the Bi-State
Development Agency.
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Once policy setting, planning, and development procedures are
completed at East-West Gateway a policy moves to the project implementation
stage, where a project is designed and constructed. Responsibility for
implementation rests solely with a project’s sponsor (e.g. MODOT, IDOT), with
no formal role for East-West Gateway. Ideally, a project’s sponsor and EastWest Gateway work closely together to ensure consistency between
transportation policy and the completed transportation project.
Since the passage of ISTEA, East-West Gateway’s planning has focused on
this framework and offers the MPO the ability to better identify problems and
create more inclusive policies. Prior to ISTEA, East-West Gateway would
conduct traffic forecasts to determine where traffic would exceed capacity and
color the area red. By doing this, East-West Gateway developed a “cancer
map” illustrating thirty-five to forty red lines, each representing a project they
would like to pursue (Sterman, 2006). ISTEA encouraged East-West Gateway to
consider the transportation system more broadly. For example, East-West
Gateway launched a significant program called the St. Louis Jobs Initiative.
They leveraged into the program from the transportation component,
recognizing that there are significant transportation needs for reverse
commute and people without autos. East-West Gateway received private grants
and used a portion of their federal money to carry out a multi-faceted program
that not only provided transportation resources but also offered job training,
coaching and placement. The St. Louis Jobs Initiative is the type of policy that
would not have been possible prior to ISTEA and illustrates the enhanced role
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MPOs like East-West Gateway are now serving as they recognize that
transportation policy is not only congestion relief, but includes many other
goals that regional transportation can address.
East-West Gateway’s use of numerous resources and their criteria for
policy determination has offered them the ability to make their planning more
comprehensive than it was prior to ISTEA (Table 5.3). Included in East-West
Gateway’s comprehensive process for regional transportation policy are their
monetary resources.
Table 5.3: East-West Gateway monetary resources
2005
Resources:
Federal grants
$13,609,497
State appropriations and grants
36,190
Transportation Development Tax Credit 2,552,000
Local contributions:
Cash—per capita
310,367
Transportation Project Assessment Fee 335,089
Cash—other
550,831
In-kind services
888,668
Miscellaneous Income
112,090
TOTAL RESOURCES
$18,394,732
Expenditures:
Salaries, benefits
$3,510,816
Public agencies, planning consultants 5,057,696
In-kind services
888,668
Grant funded equipment
5,361,136
Operating expenses
737,204
TOTAL EXPENDITURES
$15,555,520
SURPLUS/(DEFICIT)
$2,839,212

2006

2007

$20,094,192
105,342
0

$12,957,902
155,197
0

310,367
223,621
44,253
524,588
163,950
$21,466,313

310,367
177,806
42,893
678,078
96,972
$14,419,215

$3,492,462
5,613,688
524,588
12,064,700
839,213
$22,534,651
(-$1,068,338)

$3,732,170
5,441,320
676,430
4,672,705
840,935
$15,363,560
(-$944,345)

Source: East-West Gateway Coordinating Council Annual Report 2005, 2006, 2007
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East-West Gateway has accessibility to funds through numerous sources
including an annual budget for administrative expenses, state grants, federal
grants, federal earmarks and the flexible funding categories included in their
TIP that come directly to East-West Gateway for responsible disbursement. The
TIP includes numerous categories (Table 5.4) in which funds are distributed.
Table 5.4: East-West Gateway Transportation Improvement fund categories
*Urbanized Area Formula Grant Program
*Elderly and Persons with Disabilities Program
*Nonurbanized Area Formula Grant Program
*Accelerating Safety Activities Program (ASAP)
*Statewide Bridge Rehabilitation and Replacement (BR)
*Metropolitan Bridge Rehabilitation and Replacement (BRM)
*Off-System Bridge (BRO)
*Congestion Management Air Quality (CMAQ)
*Congressional High Priority Project (HP)
*Interstate Maintenance (IM)
*Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS)
*Job Access Reverse Commute Program (JARC)
*National Corridor Planning and Development Program (NCPD)
*National Highway System (NHS)
*NHTSA Safety Grant
*Congressional General Provision
*Safety
*STP-Safety Program (SP)
*Safe Routes to School (SRTS)
*Statewide Surface Transportation Program (STP)
*Metropolitan Surface Transportation Program (STPM)
*Transportation and Community and System Preservation Program (TCSP)
*STP-Transportation Enhancement Program (TE)
*Alternative Analysis Program
Source: East-West Gateway Coordinating Council

The use of these varying monetary resources and the ability to move
federal funds from program to program is just another tool available to EastWest Gateway to address regional transportation challenges. Examples of
regional challenges and varying monetary resources are illustrated in the cases
of the new Mississippi River Bridge, Page Extension and Interstate 64 projects.
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East-West Gateway’s increased role in the region’s transportation policy
advanced their process for evaluating problems to a more inclusive level. EastWest Gateway is evaluating transportation solutions in terms of their
relationship to the larger social system within the region, resulting in a more
comprehensive process and use of more alternative avenues for funding. For
example, on the new Mississippi River Bridge they acquired an earmark in
SAFETEA_LU and eventually coordinated a regional solution; on the Page
Extension they used Missouri Amendment 3 and Proposition A (1987) money to
fund phase one and provided additional funds for a phase two which was underfunded; and on the I-64 project they supported the design-build concept in an
effort to decrease the project’s timeline and keep it on budget.
New Mississippi River Bridge Case Study
After decades of discussion, planning and delays, the Illinois and Missouri
Departments of Transportation eventually came to an agreement to build a
new 640 million dollar, four lane bridge across the Mississippi River on the
northern edge of downtown St. Louis. The new Mississippi River Bridge is a bistate project on both MODOT and IDOT systems. East-West Gateway wrote all
of the original reports, conducted all of the original research and then turned
the project over to Illinois and Missouri to design.
East-West Gateway, local leaders and businesses contend a new
Mississippi River Bridge is vital to the region for congestion relief and economic
growth. The St. Louis riverfront, on the Poplar Street Bridge, is one of three
areas in the country where two or more interstates make a river crossing using
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a bridge that is at least 40 years old. The other two are Cincinnati, Ohio where
Interstates 71 and 75 cross the Ohio River and Kansas City, Missouri where
Interstates 29 and 35 cross the Missouri River. By 2020, rush hour traffic on the
Poplar Street Bridge is projected to last three hours, up from 1.5 hours a day in
2006 (RCGA, 2006). With congestion on the rise and 10,964 peak hour trips in
the morning across the Mississippi River on all four bridges combined, the
region had to pursue a new Mississippi River Bridge (EWGCC, 2005). In
southwestern Illinois, 70,000 residents commute across the river to Missouri on
weekdays. These commuters represent the majority of the 121,800 average
daily crossings on the Poplar Street Bridge (I-70, I-55 & I-64). Only 14,000
Missourians in the St. Louis area make the reverse commute, according to EastWest Gateway (EWGCC, 2007). Thus although the bridge is important to the
economic future of the whole St. Louis region, Illinois seems to have a stronger
incentive to build the bridge. According to the St. Louis Regional Chamber and
Growth Association (RCGA), the new bridge will result in 15 to 20 billion dollars
in total economic output for the bi-state region during the life of the new
bridge. The new bridge is also expected to support an annual average of
between 1450 and 1900 full time jobs (RCGA, 2007). A new bridge will make it
easier for people within the region to get to their jobs, create the ability to
compete domestically and globally as a Midwestern hub for the distribution of
goods, and help reduce the severe congestion on the Poplar Street Bridge.
In an effort to address the congestion on the Poplar Street Bridge,
members of East-West Gateway mounted a federal lobbying effort for a new
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Mississippi River Bridge. In 2005, with the adoption of the most recent
transportation legislation – SAFETEA_LU, Congress agreed to spend 239 million
dollars on a new eight-lane bridge that would relieve traffic pressure on Poplar
Street Bridge and serve as a “signature” bridge to blend architecturally with
the Gateway Arch. The earmark was significant but it only covered a portion of
the cost for a new river crossing, leaving East-West Gateway to coalesce
regional support and financing to make the bridge a reality.
The project’s history
East-West Gateway first issued reports about the Mississippi River Bridge
in the early 1990s, but involvement in the bridge dates to the early 1970s.
East-West Gateway’s initial recommendation and first step was to rehabilitate
the existing older bridges - Martin Luther King Bridge, Eads Bridge and McKinley
Bridge - to move traffic more efficiently. All of these bridges were toll bridges
at the time and East-West Gateway recommended removing the tolls to get
more people to use them, and all the bridges were rehabbed between 1989 and
2007.
The Martin Luther King Bridge rehab was completed in the spring of 1989
for 24 million dollars. The bridge relieves traffic by connecting the concurrent
freeways of I-55, I-70, and I-64 in East St. Louis, and Illinois with the downtown
St. Louis streets, 3rd street, Memorial Drive and Convention Plaza. The bridge
was built in 1951 as a toll bridge to relieve congestion and was owned by the
City of East St. Louis. At one time, it carried US Route 40 and US Route 66
across the river. In 1967, the Martin Luther King Bridge fell into disrepair
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because toll revenues declined due to the construction of the Poplar Street
Bridge, which attracted more traffic because it did not have tolls. The
declining revenues and decreased traffic led to the eventual transfer of the
Martin Luther King Bridge dually to the Missouri and Illinois Departments of
Transportation and removal of tolls in 1987 (Historic Bridges of US, 2007).
The rehab of the Eads Bridge was completed in 2000 and allowed for the
restoration of vehicular traffic on the bridge for the first time since 1991. The
Eads Bridge was the first bridge to cross the Mississippi River in St. Louis. It
permitted transcontinental rail passage through Illinois and Missouri and
currently connects downtown St. Louis to Route 3 in Illinois. The Eads Bridge
rehab project cost 24.8 million dollars to re-deck the existing infrastructure
(BridgePros, 2007 and Historic Bridges of US, 2007).
Rehab on the McKinley Bridge, located north of the Eads Bridge
connecting Route 3 in Illinois to Interstate 70 and Salisbury Street in St. Louis,
Missouri, was completed in 2007. The McKinley Bridge project was a 45 million
dollar construction project which consisted of the removal and reconstruction
of the existing St. Louis, MO and Venice IL approaches. removal of an existing
toll collection facility, and the removal and replacement of the roadway and
navigational lighting (Historic Bridges of US, 2007). The location of these
bridges in the St.Louis region is shown in Map 5.1.
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Map 5.1: Downtown St. Louis Mississippi River Crossings in 2007

Source: East-West Gateway Coordinating Council
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Table 5.5: Mississippi River Bridge timeline
1990: The Illinois Department of Transportation started building support for a
new Mississippi River Bridge Project.
1993: Illinois and Missouri begin looking for a location to put the new bridge.
2000: Illinois and Missouri in cooperation with East-West Gateway begin
designing a new bridge.
2002: A New Mississippi River Bridge is identified as a high priority project by
the Missouri Highway Commission.
2005: Congress approves 286.4 billion dollar transportation funding bill that
contains 239 million for the bridge project.
2006: East-West Gateway hires expert panel to review Mississippi River Bridge.
2007: Mississippi River Bridge Expert Panel study results are released and EastWest Gateway calls special meeting and vote on the future of the project.
2008: Illinois and Missouri announce an agreement to build a four lane (coupler)
bridge across the Mississippi River connecting downtown St. Louis and Illinois.
Source: St. Louis Post-Dispatch & EWGCC

In the early 1990s, once the rehabilitation of existing river crossings had
begun, it was apparent that the region needed even more capacity crossing the
Mississippi River. The timeline for the development of this project is shown in
Table 5.5. In fact, the completion of the rehab projects in 2007 would leave
the region with fewer river crossings than it had in 1966. This was because of
the closure of the MacArthur Bridge to vehicle traffic in 1981 due to pavement
deterioration. The MacArthur Bridge was one of several bridges in St. Louis
which carried U.S. Highway 66 until the completion of the nearby Poplar Street
Bridge. Indeed, in 1966 there were twenty-two lanes crossing the river,
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whereas at the end of 2007 there were eighteen lanes (Stack, 2007). Illinois
began to push for a new crossing by approaching East-West Gateway, MODOT,
and business leaders. Missouri and Illinois both realized the current state of
affairs necessitated another Mississippi River crossing. Illinois’ success in
identifying the need and conveying the benefits of a new river crossing was
made evident by East-West Gateway recommending that a new bridge be built
and handing the project off to Missouri and Illinois (Sterman, 2006).
In 1993, Illinois and Missouri began looking for a location to build the
new bridge. MODOT and IDOT began the process by conducting environmental
studies and early design. There was never disagreement about the necessity of
a new river crossing connecting downtown St. Louis to Illinois or the
requirements to make the new bridge beneficial to both sides of the river until
they started talking about money. East-West Gateway programmed a new river
bridge in their LRTP and MODOT and IDOT had to identify a financing source for
it, as is usual when a program or plan goes in the LRTP. Missouri, Illinois and
the business community suggested they would acquire an earmark in the next
transportation bill from Congress.
In 2000, Illinois and Missouri in cooperation with East-West Gateway
began to discover the fiscal reality of building a new Mississippi River Bridge.
During the design phase, the project’s estimated cost closed in on 2 billion
dollars. In an effort to bring new revenue into the region East-West Gateway
was prompted to put a provision in their LRTP that the bridge would be built
only if 50 percent of the money comes from a federal earmark. However, due
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to a lack of monetary resources a fifty-fifty match did not appear to be
realistic. As a result, East-West Gateway drafted a general statement
suggesting the project was not fiscally feasible and that some new revenue
source would have to contribute to building the bridge. The federal
government offered little optimism that it was a source for additional revenue.
The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 and the war in Iraq meant a lot of
funds were going elsewhere, and infrastructure was low on the Bush
administration’s agenda. Because funding transportation was a low priority for
the federal government, and Missouri is a low tax state, it was difficult to
conceive how the project could be funded (Hassinger, 2007).
In 2002, a new Mississippi River Bridge was identified as a high priority
project by the Missouri Highway Commission. However, Missouri restated its top
priority was I-64, not a new Mississippi River Bridge. Because Illinois still had
the Mississippi River Bridge as its top priority there were very heated and
politically volatile discussions about which was the right project. Missouri
strongly supported an unsolicited proposal from a private vendor to build the
bridge and charge tolls. At peak times, the toll charges would be three dollars
for cars and six dollars for trucks and at non-peak times, these would be one
dollar and three dollars respectively (Hassinger, 2007). In response to the
Missouri proposal, Illinois brought forward a proposal for a much less ambitious
bridge they felt could be funded entirely with Illinois money.
In 2005, the local business community (e.g. St. Louis Regional Chamber
and Growth Association) and local elected officials, many of whom served on
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East-West Gateway committees, were successful in the acquisition of a federal
earmark for a new Mississippi River crossing. The federal funds for this new
bridge were the largest amount of funds dedicated for a single project in the
bill (EWGCC, 2007). Congress approved a 286.4 billion dollar transportation
Table 5.6: Federal earmarks for Mississippi River Bridge, 2007
Federal Mississippi River Bridge Project Funding
(SAFETEA_LU earmark for MRB project)

SAFETEA_LU Legislation for Missouri
- Highway Bridge Program funds (12.5 million per year for 4 years)

$50 million

- Transportation Improvement funds

$25 million

SAFETEA_LU Legislation for Illinois
- National and Regional Significant funds

$150 million

-Transportation Improvement funds

$14 million

Total funds

$239 million

To the State of Missouri for construction of a structure over
Mississippi River to connect the City of St. Louis to the State of Illinois.

Mississippi River Bridge St. Louis, Missouri

Mississippi River Bridge and related roads

Construct new Mississippi River Bridge and related roads in the vicinity
of East St. Louis, Illinois

Source: MODOT & IDOT

funding bill that contained 239 million dollars for the Mississippi River Bridge
project. Despite the additional revenue, the region had minimal funds to
contribute to the construction of a new Mississippi River Bridge project, and
this is where things started to unravel. East-West Gateway could not unite the
regional leadership to put that much money into a single project. East-West
Gateway and MODOT were aware that it would be a tough project to fund
(Sterman, 2007). Under the prevailing funding scenario in Missouri, neither
MODOT nor East-West Gateway could afford to take money out of the region.
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No one could identify any alternative funding sources and the project became
an issue that few in the region wanted to address.
In 2006, East-West Gateway created an expert panel to take hold of a
situation that appeared to be spiraling out of control due to funding issues. The
creation of the expert panel was intended to identify all the possible
alternatives sources of funding for the region regarding the building of a new
Mississippi River crossing. In early 2007, the expert panel provided a list of all
the possible choices to East-West Gateway. The panel suggested the following
choices: the region could appeal to the federal government for additional funds
by promoting the national significance of a new river crossing; build a smaller
more cost effective bridge – a companion bridge to the MLK Bridge; use existing
funds to further improve existing river crossings and infrastructure; or do
nothing. The final decision was determined by a vote in February of 2007 at
East-West Gateway. The vote determined that the region would follow the
second option described above and build a coupler bridge (a four lane, single
direction bridge) just north of the existing MLK Bridge (see Map 5.2) as part of
an Ultimate Concept addressing connectivity between Missouri and Illinois that
would relocate a portion of I-70.
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Map 5.2: Martin Luther King Coupler and Ultimate Concept Design

Source: East-West Coordinating Council
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How East-West Gateway made a difference
East-West Gateway made a difference through the formation of an
expert panel to consider all the possible options to relieve congestion on
Mississippi River crossings. The creation of an expert panel forced all parties
involved to sit down and discuss what the realistic options were. It provided an
opportunity to vote on the direction the region should go with the project. The
new Mississippi River Bridge is an example of East-West Gateway making a
difference by brokering a regionally acceptable, regionally affordable option
through elected official involvement and eliminating the possibility of losing
the largest earmark in SAFETEA_LU history, due to political infighting.
For thirteen years (1992-2005), East-West Gateway, business and local
leaders had described a new Mississippi River Bridge as one of the most
important transportation priorities in the St. Louis Region. Serious dialogue
about paying for the bridge began in the summer of 2005. According to reports
in the October 26, 2005 edition of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Missouri’s
transportation director, Pete Rahn stated, “Let Congress pay for it…this is a
project that has never been on our front burner” (Crouch, 2005). Pete Rahn’s
stance angered his counterparts in the Metro East area. Illinois doubted that a
new bridge was a priority for Missouri and suggested that MODOT should
consider that states must always put up at least twenty percent of the costs of
transportation projects (Stack, 2007). According to interviewee comments and
reports in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, prior to the change in leadership at
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MODOT, East-West Gateway and members of the community felt the region had
an agreement on a new Mississippi River Bridge. In 2001, before Rahn became
transportation director in Missouri, Les Sterman stated that Missouri and Illinois
agreed to pay half the project’s costs (Sterman, 2005). Bruce Holland, owner
of a Metro East construction company and a participant in the process for ten
years, was quoted in the Post-Dispatch stating, “There was not a disagreement
until Pete Rahn came along, the impression was that Missouri, Illinois and EastWest Gateway were going to find a way to fund it” (Crouch, 2007). Illinois
offered Missouri a loan to build a signature bridge since Missouri had lent
Illinois funds to build bridges in Hannibal, MO and Cape Girardeau, MO. In
January 2007, Missouri rejected the loan citing the fact that they would have
to find the revenue to pay it back. Illinois Representative Jay Hoffman said it
demonstrated Missouri’s unwillingness to cooperate. The US Representative
from Illinois, Jerry Costello, suggested that the bridge did not appear to be
Missouri’s number one priority, or there would need to be more movement to
resolve the issue. Missouri leaders countered this argument by stating that they
truly wanted to build the signature bridge, however, the problem was finding a
large pot of money (Crouch, 2007). Suspicion and distrust undermined the
attempts to make a deal.
After over a decade of discussions about the Mississippi River Bridge
project, the two states were taking firm stances on their priorities and funding,
while East-West Gateway was in the middle trying to balance the need, fiscal
constraints and political strife. In my Fall 2006 meeting with Les Sterman,
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Executive Director of East West Gateway, he suggested that it was time for the
region to think about alternatives. Sterman stated that the region needs to
consider, “…alternatives we can afford, given the current fiscal and political
constraints” (Sterman, 2006). Reports in the January 9 2007, Post-Dispatch
suggested that St. Louis Mayor Francis Slay viewed the river crossing in a
similar manner, suggesting that not enough effort had been put together and
too much effort had been put into taking positions (Crouch, 2007). At this time
the region was not experiencing any movement on the project.
East-West Gateway’s ability to make a difference and move the project
forward was contingent upon their ability to resolve funding issues. Missouri
had less money to devote and was not willing to commit as much to the project
as Illinois. Because the two states have different ways of paying for
transportation projects, Illinois has more flexibility in financing large projects
and Missouri is often handcuffed when big-ticket needs come along due to their
funding formula. Under the formula, the St. Louis, MO area: the city of St.
Louis, St. Charles County, Franklin County, Jefferson County, and St. Louis
County, get about a third of the state transport budget, or nearly 70 million
dollars a year, for new projects (Hassinger, 2007). To use transportation money
for a Mississippi River bridge, Missouri officials said they would either need to
take money from other parts of the state, or the St. Louis area could spend all
of its designated money on a bridge, foregoing other projects for years.
Due to these constraints, Missouri leaders viewed a toll bridge as their
only option. East-West Gateway had discussed tolls with area leaders for ten
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years which proved to be a point of contention for Illinois and Missouri.
Missouri’s transportation director, Pete Rahn, wanted to sell the future bridge
to a private entity, which would build it, maintain it and levy tolls. Illinois
leaders strongly opposed tolls, arguing they would not raise enough money and
would hit Illinois commuters the hardest. Missouri officials, including Pete
Rahn, believed tolls were a fair solution because the four other (free)
downtown bridges would remain. Turning the project over to a private entity
would give the two states a new bridge at no cost. This would also free up
money that would otherwise be spent maintaining it. The disagreement over
tolls was a focal point of contention and East-West Gateway could not get
either side to budge.
East-West Gateway recognized the need for a new bridge and dwindling
regional cooperation prompted the formation of an expert panel. The panel
was created to review everything that East-West Gateway, Missouri and Illinois
had developed since day one. The goal of East-West Gateway was to use the
information obtained from the review to coalesce more regional agreement on
the direction of the Mississippi River Bridge project. East-West Gateway
decided to take a stand because the stalemate had dragged on for too long
(2005-2007). Alan Dunstan, Madison County Board chairman and East-West
Gateway member said, “we are out of time,” and Mark Kern, St. Clair County
Board chairman and East-West Gateway member suggested, “We have afforded
ample time for all sides to weigh in, now is the time for us to act and get this
project moving” (Crouch, 2006).
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The panel of national transportation experts assembled by East-West
Gateway was intended to establish common facts intended to help Missouri and
Illinois move closer to building a bridge. The panel convened on January 8-9,
2007, in St. Louis, as part of a 50,000 dollar study paid for by East-West
Gateway. The Expert Panel was comprised of ten nationally recognized experts
with extensive experience in all aspects of planning, funding and
implementation of major transportation infrastructure projects. The panel
consisted of three former high-ranking officials from the Federal Highway
Administration (FHWA), including two former Associate Administrators and the
former head of the FHWA’s Office of Engineering Research and Development
(for a complete list of expert panel members see Appendix E). The panel’s
diversity of expertise and experience was designed specifically to address the
complex technical, financial and political issues associated with a new
Mississippi River Bridge. That expertise included: transportation funding and
finance, with particular emphasis on innovative finance techniques (such as
tolls) and public-private partnerships; transportation planning and traffic
engineering; and transportation policy, resource allocation and institutional
strategy. The Panel members offered hundreds of years worth of collective
experience in planning, funding and implementation of major transportation
projects.
The expert panel released their findings at East-West Gateway on
January, 31, 2007. The panel determined a new Mississippi River Bridge is the
region’s greatest need – the number one facility, and a lack of monetary
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resources is the number one problem. The bridge panel further determined
that the MLK coupler, an alternative to a signature bridge, proposed by Illinois
has merit. It cost 400 million dollars less than a toll bridge with similar
reduction of congestion. The panel identified time as the main enemy, in that
every month of delay would increase the construction cost and the resulting
cost to commuters and shippers, due to inflation and increased fuel
consumption. The region has already witnessed what time can do to
construction costs. As Les Sterman pointed out, the signature bridge began
(1995) at a price tag of 900 million dollars and by 2005 the cost inflated to 1.6
to 1.8 billion dollars (Sterman, 2005). The panel further confirmed that current
funding sources would not support a new bridge. In an effort to close the gap in
funding the panel proposed some options for East-West Gateway and the region
to consider. These included selling naming rights for the bridge, contributions
from St. Louis businesses, and a regional transportation tax. The panel further
suggested that a new bridge’s “national significance” might be used to
leverage more federal funds. Their analysis of tolls suggested that it was
doubtful that tolls could make up the financing gap on a new bridge, because
the area has plenty of free bridges as alternatives. For example, the Poplar
Street Bridge could remain a bottleneck if a new bridge is tolled. The existence
of four free bridges leading into St. Louis would divert traffic from a tollway,
which would attract a maximum of 28,000 vehicles – too few to make tolls a
realistic option (Aldaron, 2007).
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On Wednesday, February 21, 2007, East-West Gateway held a special
meeting to discuss the findings of the non-expert panel and carry out a nonbinding vote on how Missouri and Illinois should move forward on the new
Mississippi River Bridge.
East-West Gateway presented the region’s options at the meeting and
called a vote. The Illinois proposal (option 2) to build a coupler bridge using
mostly Illinois money obtained the most votes. The options facing East-West
Gateway were: 1) Figure out how to pay for the scaled back version of an
eight-lane “signature” bridge, at nearly one billion dollars. This option would
involve finding additional sources of state revenue or coming to an agreement
on tolls. According to the panel, it would take several years to explore
Missouri’s proposal to lease the bridge to a private investor who would build
and maintain the structure for a least fifty years and collect tolls to recover
costs and make money. 2) Build a companion bridge (MLK coupler) at the
Martin Luther King Bridge, for about 450 million dollars. It would involve
building a four-lane bridge north of the current Martin Luther King structure,
and it would carry westbound I-70. The existing bridge would be renovated,
with its four lanes becoming three wider ones, and would carry eastbound I-70.
3) Forget adding lanes and instead, use the 239 million dollars from Congress to
improve connections to existing downtown bridges, particularly the Poplar
Street Bridge. This option leaves open the possibility of building a new bridge,
depending on timing and money. 4) Do nothing. This would allow money to be
spent on other local projects - 50 million dollars from East-West Gateway and
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261 million dollars from Illinois. The longer Missouri and Illinois defrayed the
project the greater the chance of losing one of the largest earmarks of
SAFETEA_LU history - 239 million dollars (Stack, 2007; MODOT & IDOT, 2007).
The US Senate Transportation Committee continually evaluates progress on
earmarked projects and if a region shows no progress the committee can take
the money and designate it for a different region and project.
The East-West Gateway vote broke down along state lines with every
Missouri member voting against the coupler bridge and each Illinois member
voting for the coupler. The vote was twelve to ten in favor of the MLK proposal
because two Missouri members were not present. The vote stated that the
region agrees to let Illinois spend its money and build a coupler bridge adjacent
to the current MLK Bridge. According to Ed Hassinger, District Engineer at
MODOT,
“I have never seen that before, it was the first time. I
mean there has been some dissension on the board but it is
usually not like that. It is almost like drawing party lines, yes it
is, right down state lines. The chairman who is from Illinois
thinks that this is valid and says that this is what is going to
happen. And our director has said that if it is along state lines
that it means nothing” (Hassinger, 2007).

Mark Kern, East-West Gateway member from Illinois, suggested that if
the region does not act on the proposal, “…there is real danger that there will
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be no bridge – federal money will be lost and the cooperative relationship
between the two states and our local governments will be irrevocably
damaged” (Crouch, 2007). St. Louis County Executive, Charlie Dooley, EastWest Gateway member from Missouri, suggested, “It’s a mistake to draw a line
in the sand and say this is the way it’s going to be” (Crouch, 2007).
East-West Gateway intended for the vote to send a strong message. The
message solicited responses from each state’s capital. According to the
February 28, 2007 Post-Dispatch, Missouri Governor Matt Blunt stated that EastWest Gateway, “…did not allow time to review a new proposal that has come
forward” (Shields, 2007), whereas Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich suggested
the vote, “…took a big step in the right direction” (Shields, 2007).
The vote highlighted the partisan nature of the dispute, and brought the
two sides closer to an agreement than ever before. East-West Gateway,
Missouri and Illinois realized that this rift could damage their relationship in the
long term, and send a sour message to residents in the region. According to Ed
Hassinger, “This is a rift that may change the dynamics in the cooperative
relationship between MODOT, IDOT and East-West Gateway” (Hassinger, 2007).
This possibility resulted in the two states spending the next year coming to an
agreement.
On February 28, 2008, a year after the final vote, Illinois Governor
Blagojevich and Missouri Governor Blunt officially announced the two states
had reached an agreement to build a new, 4-lane bridge (MLK coupler) one
mile north of the Martin Luther King Bridge which serves as the first phase of
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an “Ultimate Concept” to build a new, modern river crossing between Missouri
and Illinois. The two states lack sufficient funding to construct all components
of the project at the same time. The estimated cost of the Ultimate Project
Concept is between 1.8 billion dollars and 2.2 billion dollars. The scope of work
announced on February 28, 2008 is the first phase of the project. The first
phase of the bridge is projected to cost 640 million dollars with Missouri
allocating 93 million dollars and Illinois allocating 213 million dollars for the
Table 5.7: Mississippi River Bridge initial phase funding
Funding by component:
Component Description
Illinois Relocated I-70 Roadways
Mississippi River Bridge
Missouri North I-70 Interchange
Total Estimated Cost

Estimated Amount
$264 million
$306 million
$70 million
$640 million

Funding by source:
Source
Illinois Funding
Missouri Funding
Federal Funding
Total Funding

Amount
$313 million
$88 million
$239 million
$640 million

*Calculations are based on construction beginning as early as 2010 and lasting four to six
years.
Source: East-West Gateway Coordinating Council

bridge. Missouri will also allocate 70 million dollars for roadway
connections and Illinois will allocate 264 million dollars. Construction on the
new bridge could begin in 2010 and is expected to last four to six years (IDOT,
2007 & MODOT, 2007). Breakdown of the funding is shown in Table 5.7.
East-West Gateway made a difference by garnering regional cooperation
and brokering a political deal between two states with distinct and opposing
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views. For over a decade, East-West Gateway struggled to find agreement
between Missouri and Illinois. The only commonly shared means for cooperation
between the two states was East-West Gateway where plans were discussed,
funding options evaluated and the political realities of the region highlighted.
In an effort to move a stagnant process along, East-West Gateway hired a panel
of transportation experts to ascertain common facts, and provide advice on
financing and design for Missouri and Illinois. The panel provided a list of
recommendations to the states’ and East-West Gateway which ultimately
provided the solution adopted by the region – the MLK coupler. The Martin
Luther King Coupler Bridge offers the region four additional lanes of river
crossing at a substantial savings. The coupler bridge is estimated to cost in the
region of 640 million dollars, much better value for money than a signature
bridge, with estimates ranging from 910 million to 1.8 billion dollars.
Summary
The new Mississippi River Bridge project offers evidence of East-West
Gateway leading the regional transportation process. The case illustrates EastWest Gateway making a difference by increasing public saliency (P1) and
elected official involvement (P3). There is little evidence at this point in the
project to support East-West Gateway’s consideration region wide factors (P2:
P2a, P2b, P2c) (Table 5.8)
Table 5.8: Propositions supported by new Mississippi River Bridge case study

P1
X

P2

P2a

P2b

P2c

P3
X
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East-West Gateway’s creation of an expert panel and calling a regional
vote increased public saliency. The seriousness of the issue was highlighted by
the neutral outside consultants gathered to advise Illinois and Missouri. From
the time the expert panel was created (December 2006) and the vote (February
2007) there were forty-two articles on the panel or vote in the Post-Dispatch
and Belleville News Democrat. Of these forty-two articles, twenty-two
appeared in January, and eight appeared during the week of the vote (Feb. 2027). The articles, with quotes from numerous state and local leaders,
highlighted the partisan nature of the debate. For instance, the exchange
between Missouri Governor Matt Blunt and Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich
published in the Post-Dispatch is a great example of how East-West Gateway’s
action’s increased the saliency of the issue. They forced state and local leaders
to find a regionally acceptable solution, prompting local news sources to cover
the issue. East-West Gateway’s efforts and stance on taking a vote brought
attention to the state of the project and provided an additional level of
scrutiny by constituents observing the process, and watching to see how their
regional leaders resolved the problem.
It is difficult to determine whether East-West Gateway’s actions will
result in support of the propositions addressing region-wide factors. Several of
the variables (e.g. land use, equity, quality of life) in the region-wide
propositions are contingent upon the work of East-West Gateway during the
design phase of a project and upon the project’s completion. While this study
was being written, many of the meetings that would offer additional evidence
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were just beginning. For instance, on April 16, 2009 a public meeting was
scheduled to discuss road closures, detours, bridge demolition, bridge
replacement, property impacted, and an overview of the first phase. At these
meetings the discussions about land use and the environmental impact were to
be discussed. On July 7 and 8, 2009 IDOT and MODOT planned two public
meetings to discuss a dual Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE) goal for the
project. These two DBE’s will offer contracts for work on the new bridge to
minority businesses and women-owned businesses (MODOT & IDOT, 2009).
These meetings would have provided evidence in regard to equity issues. The
project did include some discussion of employment factors. These were limited
to arguments for a new bridge by members from Illinois and the RCGA. There is
little evidence to suggest it was a major concern for East-West Gateway. All
the evidence points toward their concern to get a project that each state could
agree upon.
East-West Gateway made a difference through the inclusion of a large
number of major elected officials. The study alone highlights comments and
concerns by numerous state and local officials. These include: Illinois Governor
Blagojevich; Missouri Governor Blunt; St. Louis County Executive, Charlie
Dooley; Alan Dunstan, Madison County Board chairman; Mark Kern, St. Clair
County Board chairman; and East-West Gateway Executive Director Les
Sterman. The East-West Gateway vote included twenty-two elected officials –
12 from Illinois and 10 from Missouri. In the forty-two articles published local
newspapers during the height of the bridge debate there are thirteen different
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state and local officials quoted in the Post-Dispatch and seven quoted in the
Belleville News Democrat.
The case points toward the role the MPO plays as the focal point for
regional transportation decisions. The evidence suggests that the MPO was able
to create a modest level of horizontal cooperation between Illinois and Missouri
due to the advisement of an expert panel and an organizational vote. In many
instances the vote may be seen as a coercive measure, however, it illustrates
the capabilities of the MPO to bring together two government entities and
accept their role in shared policymaking. As a regional governance institution
the MPO’s role is to bring together two or more government entities in the
planning or provision of public goods (Gerber & Gibson, 2009). The MPO’s
ability to take a non-binding vote and garner coordination highlights the
potential and promise of these regional bodies. This was a direct result of EastWest Gateway increasing public saliency and elected official involvement.
Page Extension Case Study
The Page Extension project is the continuation of Page Avenue (County
Highway D), from the west side of Interstate 270 (I-270) in St. Louis County
across the Missouri River into St. Charles County. The project is on the MODOT
system and is illustrative of a regional project facilitated by East-West
Gateway, involving St. Charles County and St. Louis County. East-West Gateway
programmed the project, facilitated priorities and acquired additional funds.
As the population of St. Charles County has grown rapidly since the
1970s, congestion over the Missouri River into St. Louis County increased, and it

Campbell, Joseph, 2010, UMSL, p.175
became apparent there was a need for more crossings between the counties.
According to the St. Louis Regional Chamber and Growth Association (RCGA),
St. Charles County, with a population of 337,572, has been one of the fastestgrowing counties in the country for decades. The county experienced 55
percent growth in the 1980s, 33 percent growth in the 1990s, and another 13
percent growth between 2000 and 2004 (RCGA, 2007). The county’s rapid
growth increased vehicular traffic on the three bridges connecting St. Charles
County and St. Louis County.
In 2002, approximately 350,000 vehicles crossed the three bridges
between St. Charles and St. Louis counties on a daily basis: first, the
Blanchette Bridge (I-70); second, the Discovery Bridge (Route 370); and third,
the Daniel Boone Bridge (Route 40/I-64). The Blanchette Bridge carried 206,000
vehicles on I-70 on a typical weekday - the most in the St. Louis area – while
the Daniel Boone Bridge on Highway 40-I-64 carried another 81,000. Highway
370, a six lane route, with 63,000 vehicles a day was the least traveled of the
three river crossings (Leiser and Crouch, 2003). The Page Extension was
designed to relieve the congestion of commuter and interstate freight traffic
along I-70 and other major highways in the St. Louis area.
Construction on the Page Avenue Extension, officially called Missouri
Route 364 began in July 1997. Transportation officials expected the 325 million
dollar Page Extension to remove about 60,000 vehicles a day from the other
river bridges (I-70, Missouri 40/61, and Missouri 370). They anticipated that
about 85 percent of the motorists would use Page Avenue instead of I-70. An

Campbell, Joseph, 2010, UMSL, p.176
additional ten percent of the traffic would choose to cross the river on the new
extension rather than the Daniel Boone Bridge on Highway 40-61 (Crouch,
2003). According to a 2004 traffic study, the construction of Route 364 reduced
traffic volumes on I-70, Route 40 and I-370 by nearly twenty-six percent. In
2005, as many as 116,000 vehicles a day used the bridge (MODOT, 2007). Route
364 is to be completed in three phases with phase one, Page Avenue west of I270 to Highway 94, completed in 2003. Funding for phase one of the project
was split between state and federal funds. Twenty percent came from the
state and eighty percent were federal funds. Phase two, Highway 94 east of
Harvester Rd. to Mid-Rivers Mall Drive is scheduled for completion by the Fall
of 2009. As of 2007, Phase three (Mid-Rivers Mall Drive to I-64) had not secured
funding and no completion date has been determined.
The project’s history
East-West Gateway determined there was a need for the freeway in
1969. East-West Gateway studied the feasibility of the Page Avenue Extension
from October 1969 to August 1970, and concluded Page Avenue was a necessity
for the region. Since 1970, the region held numerous public meetings including
meetings with local residents, subdivision trustees, local governments, St. Louis
County, and St. Charles County officials to discuss the project.
In the 1970s there was a debate as to whether to build the Page
Extension project (then known as the Brown Road Extension) or the Missouri
370 project between St. Charles County and St. Louis County. According to Ed
Hassinger, MODOT District Engineer, at that time the St. Louis region was
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having a difficult time agreeing on which Missouri River crossing to build first.
MODOT stepped in and told the region to inform them once a decision had been
made on which project to build first. Meanwhile, MODOT was going to spend
the money on projects in Kansas City.
In the early 1980s, due to structural defects, the Old Rock Road Bridge
over the Missouri River needed to be replaced. This forced the issue of Missouri
370 being built before the Page Extension (MO-364). In 1988 construction began
on a new interchange at I-270 and Missouri 115 (later designated Missouri 370)
in St. Louis County, and also on a new Missouri River crossing between St. Louis
County and St. Charles County on Missouri 115 (MO-370). In 1993, after the
opening of the first leg of the project it became apparent the region needed an
additional crossing to provide a greater impact.
During the construction of MO-370, East-West Gateway, St. Louis County
and St. Charles County, were planning for another river crossing and moved
forward with the MO-364 process. In 1984, it became evident that earlier
proposals to connect the freeway to I-70 were no longer feasible due to the
rapid growth of the city of St. Peters. Several cities in St. Charles requested a
location study on the Page project and proposed a new alignment called the
Red Line connecting the highway to I-64. The Missouri Department of
Transportation (MODOT) authorized the project in the fall of 1986. In the spring
of 1987, Missouri voters approved a fuel tax increase which included funding for
the project. MODOT held numerous meetings but the alignment was not
approved until June 1990. The public hearing to select the alignment for Page

Campbell, Joseph, 2010, UMSL, p.178

Table 5.9: Page Avenue Extension timeline
1969: East West Gateway Master Plan for the St. Louis Area includes the Page
Extension.
1970: The Missouri Highways and Transportation Commission authorizes
a detailed study for extending Page Avenue.
1984: Several cities in St. Charles request a location study on the Page project.
1987: Proposition A: A gasoline tax increase of 4 cents a gallon is approved by Missouri
voters. The first phase Page Avenue is now funded.
1989: The Red line is given tentative location approval by the Commission.
1990: The Page public hearing is held in St. Charles. Approximately 1,100
attend and strongly support the Red line for the project. The Commission approves the Red
line and Creve Coeur Park mitigation plan for the Page extension.
1995: The National Park Service issues the Record of Decision for the additional
parkland.
1996: Page Avenue is assigned the name MO Route 364, bids are received for the Bike trail in
Creve Coeur Park, the first Page Avenue project ($486,000) and the Page Avenue
groundbreaking ceremony is held at Creve Coeur Park.
1997: Bids are received for the Bennington Place bridge, the first roadway
contract ($3.18 million)and the Missouri River bridge land piers ($8.6 million).
1997: The St. Louis County Council approves the acceptance of the mitigation
land and gives MODOT the right of way and easements through the park.
Approximately 1000 signatures are received by St. Louis County, which
provides 40 days to obtain 23,000 signatures to put the Page Avenue
ordinance to a vote.
1998: St. Louis County voters approve project to allow St. Louis County to
provide an easement to MODOT through Creve Coeur Park and MODOT
will give St. Louis County 1,005 additional acres for the park.
1999: The contract to construct the bridge over Creve Coeur Park was awarded
for $73.4 million and the contract to construct the remainder of the bridge over the Missouri
River was awarded for $79.3 million.
2001: The last Page Ave. roadway contract awarded. The $18.8 million project includes
concrete paving, signs, traffic signals, and lighting in St. Louis
County from west of Bennington Road to the Missouri River.
2003: Page (MO Route 364) opens to traffic.
Source: MODOT
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Avenue was held in June 1990. The environmental impact study was completed
in November 1992 and the project was then set to receive final clearance from
the federal government. However, at this time, Secretary of the Interior Bruce
Babbitt took office and ordered more environmental studies resulting in more
land mitigation for intrusion into Creve Coeur Lake Memorial Park. The timeline
of the project is summarized in Table 5.9.
The Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) was approved in December
1992. In the fall of 1995 the federal government gave the final clearance for
the project 11 years after active planning began. For nearly 27 years the
roadway was simply referred to as the Page Avenue Extension, but in February
1996 MODOT gave the freeway an official designation of Missouri 364.
Construction on the freeway was divided into three separate phases and the
first phase began in 1997. The total cost to construct Page Avenue from
Bennington Place to Route 40 was estimated at 600 million dollars.
The first phase of Page Avenue project opened on December 14, 2003.
Phase one originally included work from I-270 to Route 94 through the Creve
Coeur Lake Memorial Park including Veterans Memorial Bridge spanning the
Missouri River between St. Louis and St. Charles counties. The scope of the
construction was expanded due to concerns with traffic congestion. MODOT
decided to extend the freeway further west along its concurrency with Missouri
94 to Harvester Rd. Two major bridge structures were required to carry this
out. These were Veterans Memorial Bridge and Creve Coeur Lake Memorial Park
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Bridge at 79 million and 74 million dollars respectively. The total cost to
construct this phase was 394 million dollars (Table 5.10).
Table 5.10: Costs of Page Avenue Extension – Phase 1
Contractual Obligation
Construction
Right of Way
Park Land Mitigation

Cost
$350 million
$26 million
$18 million

Total

$394 million

Source: MODOT

Phase one also included improvements to the Creve Coeur Lake Memorial
Park. The park doubled in size and an existing bike trail was linked to the Katy
Trail in St. Charles County via the Veterans Memorial Bridge. The bike trail in
St. Louis County covers part of the 1,005 acres that had to be acquired as
mitigation – a federal requirement – for Page Avenue’s extension over the
Creve Coeur Park. On the west side, in St. Charles County, the bridge and bike
path connect to the Katy Trail. The freeway is proposed to continue from
Missouri 94 southeast to the Missouri N intersection. MODOT has begun
construction on the second phase of the Page Extension. Construction on the
project began in the fall of 2006 and is scheduled to be completed by winter
2009.
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Map 5.3: Page Extension

Source: RandMcNally.com
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How East-West Gateway made a difference
The Page Extension provided an opportunity for East-West Gateway to
make a difference. East-West Gateway helped St. Charles County with
priorities during the second phase, and with financing over an extensive period
of time. East-West Gateway provided some support to the region regarding
environmental issues. The freeway's alignment would take it through the Creve
Coeur Lake Memorial Park and the floodplain of the Missouri River, drawing
opposition from environmental groups including the Sierra Club and the
Missouri Coalition for the Environment. The project suffered significant cost
overruns and, at the beginning, critics claimed it would contribute to urban
sprawl. Opponents of the extension continually stated that the new roadway
would damage Creve Coeur Park, contributing to the exit of the middle class
from St. Louis and inner suburbs (Dummit, 1998). Funding shortages for the
project resulted in East-West Gateway coordinating priorities for phase two and
the failure of Proposition B has resulted in East-West Gateway and St. Charles
County postponing the construction of phase three.
Rising costs and uncertainty about the project’s impact on urban sprawl
resulted in many St. Louis County municipalities passing resolutions opposing
the freeway. Several of these localities called for East-West Gateway to
postpone or pull funding for other projects programmed in St. Charles County.
The project consisted of 57 million dollars in cost overruns due in large part to
high steel costs which added 23.8 million dollars. East-West Gateway agreed to
cover increased costs in Page Avenue, but St. Charles County would have to

Campbell, Joseph, 2010, UMSL, p.183
make some sacrifices. Members of East-West Gateway said St. Charles County –
believed by many to be the chief beneficiary of the new span – should have
some if its other projects postponed. The board unanimously decided to
postpone a 7.7 million dollar upgrade to seismic retrofit Highway 40 in St.
Charles County. In exchange East-West Gateway would cover the cost overruns
for Page Avenue (Leiser, 1999).
Opponents of the project at East-West Gateway pushed for the MPO to
scrap its support and to divert federal transportation dollars to fixing roads and
bridges and spending more on mass transit in the St. Louis metropolitan area.
These impending threats spurred St. Charles County officials to spend 150,000
dollars to help finance two educational campaigns designed “to counter a
drumbeat of opposition,” Ortwerth said. Both these educational efforts were
necessary to counteract what he called “fallacies” about the Page Extension,
such as suggestions that the new bridge would encourage urban sprawl. Joe
Ortwerth recalled that it was unlikely that East-West Gateway would pull
federal funds on the project, “but every year we (St. Charles County) have to
fight a battle to get funds for Page,” The more that the opposition to Page
went unanswered, he said, “the more those funds were placed in jeopardy”
(Ortwerth, 2007).
East-West Gateway makes financial adjustments to projects, such as the
added costs for fixing the Poplar Street Bridge in Downtown St. Louis as well as
Louis region was lobbying (East-West Gateway) for Page and their focus was to
sell the project to the State Highway Commission in an attempt to convince the
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commission it was worth funding. Ultimately, Governor Ashcroft decided it
should be included in the Proposition A package. In 1987, the initial funding for
Page was promised in proposition A. Missouri for the first time in several years
gave an increase in gas tax and stated that the Page Extension was a project
the tax would fund. The state of Missouri initially committed to paying twenty
percent of the Page Extension costs. However, this was a commitment that
could not be fulfilled by Missouri due to budget constraints (Ortwerth, 2007).
Critics of the Page Avenue Extension complained that the state left
nearly 200 million dollars out of its cost estimate of 542 million dollars. This
200 million dollar figure is what inflation was projected to add to the costs
over the course of the project. Tim Fischesser, executive director of the St.
Louis County Municipal League, a leading opponent of the project, argued that
the true cost was 937.6 million dollars. He said his total took into account
inflation and the cost of improvements to other highways due to the additional
traffic the extension would bring them. Linda Wilson, a spokesperson for
MODOT, noted that the 47.3 million dollars already awarded for seven
contracts to construct the extension was 15.7 percent less than expected
(Sutin, 1998).
In addition to East-West Gateway constantly trying to balance the
financing of the multi-phase project, the region had to deal with
environmentalists during the initial phase of the project. The Missouri Coalition
for the Environment unsuccessfully fought to block the extension. Their
attempts frustrated members of East-West Gateway, St. Louis County officials
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and St. Charles County officials (Goodman, 2000). The environmental groups
filed lawsuits from a variety of angles, and they had some leverage on the issue
of Creve Coeur Park. St. Louis County and East-West Gateway discussed
building the road through the park with the US Department of Transportation
(USDOT) and Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) prior to the project.
These talks revolved around the issue of expanding the park using federal funds
while leaving a corridor open for Page Avenue to cut through in the future. The
federal government stated that was not a problem. However, years later, the
federal government objected to the project on the basis it would be intruding
on federal park lands. This was the tough part of the process which ultimately
resulted in a public vote (Hassinger, 2007).
The long fight over extending Page Avenue reached a climax in late 1998
that put the region’s efforts in jeopardy. A petition to put the freeway up for
referendum was submitted in 1998, and enough signatures were collected to
force a vote. The vote was on a St. Louis County ordinance to grant right-ofways and easement for the expressway through Creve Coeur Park. On
November 3, 1998, voters in St. Louis County approved right-of-way for the 10lane highway and bridge by a 61 percent margin (Sutin, 1998 & Dummit, 1998).
With funding in place, the vote allowed construction to continue on the first
phase.
Financing the approved extension did not become an issue until the
second phase. The total cost to complete the first project in phase two is
estimated at 32.5 million dollars. After the completion of phase one, funds
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were limited and East-West Gateway helped St. Charles County with priorities.
East-West Gateway programmed each project over a period of time in an effort
to have the money and get critical elements for the freeway to function
completed. East-West Gateway officials are looking for other funding to carry
through the project, and are lobbying MODOT for the use of 9 million dollars
for the purchase of right-of-ways near the planned extension. That money was
programmed in 2003 for resurfacing Highway 94 between Highway 40 and Mid
Rivers Mall Drive. That project would still be completed, but held off a year.
According to Joe Ortwerth, "When the voters decided not to approve
proposition B, I'm sure they had many good reasons, but the fact of life
remains, when they turned it down, they basically decided to scuttle any
further work on the Page Avenue bridge project" (Cole, 2002). The region may
have to wait awhile for completion of the third phase due to the failure of
Proposition B because state funds are limited and significantly less than if the
proposition would have passed. The start of construction on the pending phase
two project will be in 2010, meanwhile, phase three will be delayed until at
least 2011, according to an East-West Gateway schedule. With Proposition B
funding, the project could have moved forward between 2003 and 2011.
Proposition B would have raised about 500 million dollars for statewide
transportation improvements through a 4-cent per gallon fuel tax, as well as a
half-cent sales tax increase. If passed, it would have provided 79 million dollars
of the 130 million dollars needed for the Page Avenue extension (EWGCC,
2007). Proposition B garnered only 255,575 yes votes and 674,749 no votes. The
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proposition won only one of Missouri’s 115 counties (114 counties and St. Louis
City). The final tally was 75 percent against and 25 percent for the new tax
(Missouri Secretary of State, 2002).
Funding has now been secured to extend the freeway from west of
Harvester Rd to west of Jungermann Road, and construction could begin by
2010. Some right-of-way is being bought and some design work has been
completed. However, no money has been allocated for construction, and no
dollars to purchase the right of way and finish construction on Phase two of
Route 364 from west of Jungermann Road to Mid Rivers Mall Drive is 70 million
dollars (MODOT, 2007). The phase three projects remain unfunded, however
most of the design work has been completed and MODOT has purchased
approximately 50 percent of the right of way needed. There is little money
available at this time to buy more property, no other money has been allocated
for construction and no construction start dates have been set. The estimated
cost in 2008 dollars to purchase the remaining right of way and construct Phase
three of Page Avenue is 140 million dollars (MODOT, 2008).
The opening of the freeway (MO 364) increased the number of lanes
across the Missouri River in the St. Louis metropolitan area from 23 to 33. It
provides an alternate route to the Daniel Boone Bridge, Blanchette Memorial
Bridge, and Discovery Bridge crossings. MODOT investigated traffic volumes on
MO 364 for Monday through Friday only. In March 2004, MO 364 only carried
approximately 45,000 vehicles a day Monday through Friday. By the fall of
2004, MO 364 carried nearly 54,000 vehicles a day Monday through Friday. MO
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364 serves mainly as a commuter route with strong traffic volumes Monday
through Friday, especially during the morning and evening rush hours. MODOT
officials are very pleased with the latest traffic counts, which show that traffic
volumes are continuing to increase since initial numbers were released in
March 2004. In addition, traffic volumes at the three other Missouri River
crossings have decreased significantly since MO 364 opened to traffic, with a 26
percent decrease on I-70, US 40/61 and MO 370 (MODOT, 2007).

Table 5.11: Total traffic volumes (Monday through Sunday) for Missouri
River crossings between St. Louis and St. Charles counties.
I-70
186,773 (fall 2003)
165,079 (fall 2004)
Decrease = 21,694 (12%)
Missouri 370
59,907 (fall 2003)
56,782 (fall 2004)
Decrease = 3,125 (5%)
US 40/61
85,183 (fall 2003)
77,523 (fall 2004)
Decrease = 7,660 (9%)
Missouri 364
49,969
Source: MODOT
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Summary
The Page Extension project offers evidence of East-West Gateway
supporting the regional transportation process. There is evidence to support
the premise that the project was publicly salient (P1), however, no evidence
supports the premise that this was a result of East-West Gateway’s efforts. The
evidence does support the proposition that East-West Gateway considered
quality of life factors (P2: P2a). There is no evidence that points toward EastWest Gateway’s consideration of employment factors (P2b), equity issues (P2c)
or elected official involvement (P3).
Table 5.12: Propositions supported by Page Avenue Extension case study

P1

P2
X

P2a
X

P2b

P2c

P3

East-West Gateway did not contribute to the public saliency of the Page
Extension. The evidence suggests that the issue was already highly salient
without the efforts of East-West Gateway. The saliency of the project was
because of a regional vote to approve the right-of-way through Creve Coeur
Park. This was due to strong opposition from environmental groups including
the Sierra Club and the Missouri Coalition for the Environment, as well as the
concern that the new roadway would contribute to urban sprawl, driving the
middle class from St. Louis County to St. Charles County. This suggests that in
this particular case the efforts of East-West Gateway in public saliency were
not required, therefore allowing it to focus on other issues. News articles often
focused on the controversial environmental issues. In fact, the LexisNexis
search determined that 72 percent of the articles in regard to the Page
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Extension were about either environmental or urban sprawl issues. Only 12
percent of the LexisNexis hits mentioned East-West Gateway. These covered
the additional funding that the MPO gave St. Charles County to pay for cost
overruns. The most significant effort to make the issue publicly salient was the
public campaign put forth by St. Charles County. The county spent 150,000
dollars in an attempt to counter the opposition’s point of view that the project
contributes to urban sprawl and is harmful the ecosystem.
East-West Gateway did contribute to the quality of life through their
efforts on the Page Extension. The Page Extension improved the quality of life
for the St. Louis region by connecting recreational resources in St. Louis and St.
Charles counties. The extension connects Creve Coeur Park in St. Louis County
and the Katy Trail in St. Charles County via bicycle and pedestrian traffic. The
completion of the first phase allowed residents on either side of the river to
enjoy these recreational benefits without the use of an automobile. The
significant contribution that allowed for this improved quality of life is EastWest Gateway covering the cost overruns of 57 million dollars. The additional
funds helped to complete an alternate route to the Daniel Boone, Blanchette
Memorial, and Discovery Bridge crossings which resulted in a 26 percent
decrease in traffic volumes on these three crossing combined (MODOT, 2007).
The MPO’s role in the project does not point toward the consideration of
other regional factors, such as employment or equity issues. The Page
Extension serves as a direct connection to Earth City, Maryland Heights and the
Westport area in St. Louis County. In St. Charles County the direct connection
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is primarily to residential areas. In St. Louis County there are numerous places
of employment, particularly due to a large industrial park in Earth City.
However, the interviewees and news sources never cited employment as a
reason or a priority. The driving force behind the project was to mitigate
traffic between the two counties.
The case offers no evidence that East-West Gateway increased the
participation of elected officials. The evidence does suggest that East-West
Gateway guided a cooperative and comprehensive planning process. They
helped to conduct the environmental studies, provided additional funding to
cover shortages and prioritized funds and project selection in the second
phase.
The MPO’s contribution to quality of life factors illustrates how these
regional governing bodies can align with regional interests to make a
difference. The project’s ability to reduce congestion, provide an additional
connection between the two counties and connect people without autos across
a geographic boundary influenced demographic patterns and job access. “By
influencing demographic patterns, job access, and income, transportation
decisions exert a profound impact…” (Weir et al., 2009). In this case the
impact was an improved quality of life.
Interstate 64 Reconstruction Case Study
Interstate 64/US 40 (I-64), locally known as Highway 40, is a 70 year old
stretch of roadway on the MODOT system that dissects the St. Louis region into
north and south. The highway runs east and west from St. Charles County
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through downtown St. Louis. For decades, I-64 has been the main thoroughfare
for the St. Louis region, connecting corporate downtown St. Louis with Clayton,
Missouri, a large office and business district located in Mid-St. Louis County,
and the prosperous arterial corridor of St. Louis County. The largest highway
rebuilding and first design-build project in Missouri’s history began on this
stretch of roadway in St. Louis County and the city of St. Louis during the
spring of 2007. It was finished in December 2009.
According to MODOT, the 535 million dollar project would replace
deteriorated road pavement and bridges, making travel through St. Louis safer,
easier and less congested. On average, about 170,000 vehicles a day travel
along the stretch of I-64 that have been rebuilt. There will be improved traffic
flow through better design, with elimination of short, tight entrance/exit
ramps and merges, and the addition of dedicated exit lanes and wider
shoulders. The construction involves the rebuilding of 32 overpasses, replacing
12 miles of roadbed and the interchange of I-64 and I-170 (MODOT, 2007).
Momentum to rebuild I-64 began taking shaping fifteen years ago.
Motorists were suffering from major congestion in both directions, between
Hanley Road and Kingshighway. In 1992, MODOT proposed a plan to add a lane
to each side of I-64, taking some of Forest Park in the process. Opposition
killed the plan because the construction would transform a small area within
Forest Park, as well as other issues. Despite the initial failure, the
determination of MODOT to address congestion problems only grew and the
region retrenched and decided to start a public process and
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engage its citizens. MODOT basically re-evaluated the environmental process
from a public standpoint and talked to thousands of people.
The vintage 1940s roadway was showing signs of irreparable wear.
Pounding from cars and trucks was turning some of the road’s foundation into
rubble. Each year, the bridges and overpasses fared worse in inspections. The
McKnight Bridge over I-64 was falling down with one lane closed temporarily.
The truth is that MODOT could not open the lane without the potential of cars
falling off the overpass on to the highway (Hassinger, 2007).
MODOT presented the project to East-West Gateway. Fortunately, the I64 project was one of East-West Gateway’s top priorities and they programmed
the first project. East-West Gateway’s twenty-one member board of directors
approved the concepts in 1997. This approval initially programmed 50 million
dollars from federal funds and gave MODOT regional blessing to move forward.
East-West Gateway conducted all the procedures that ISTEA required from
defining corridor groups, designating an aesthetics committee and conducting
meeting after meeting. The process included four citizen committees and
numerous subcommittees which put together a more detailed plan for the
twelve mile corridor, ranging from a design theme to the determination of
which homes would be taken through eminent domain (Crouch, 2006). MODOT
agreed to start work on the project in an incremental fashion because the 50
million dollars initially programmed at East-West Gateway was not enough to
complete the project (Hassinger, 2007).
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MODOT’s plan was to begin the I-64 project with work on the
Kingshighway interchange in 2008. However, it quickly became evident that the
region could not rebuild I-64 one interchange at a time. This could choke off
the region and cause numerous additional problems, or after completion of the
first interchange MODOT would not be able complete the rest because the
public outcry would be so great. MODOT’s overall strategy was that the region
needed to work on interstates one at a time, finish the projects rapidly, and
get out of there (Hassinger, 2007).
Fortunately, the passing of Amendment 3 (a new state constitutional
amendment that redirected existing highway user fees to MODOT and cut
MODOT yearly fees, providing additional funds to MODOT by cutting expenses
and increasing revenue) allowed the region to garner 300 million dollars for the
I-64 project. Voters approved Amendment 3 in November 2004, by a margin of
79 percent to 21 percent. Most of the additional revenue is generated by the
state’s vehicle sales tax. Previously, half the tax went to MODOT and half was
put in the state’s general revenue fund. Amendment 3 requires all vehicle sales
tax go to MODOT. Prior to Amendment 3, MODOT paid yearly fees to a variety
of state agencies for transportation related services. The amendment
eliminated those payments, except for the funds that go to the Missouri
Highway Patrol, and also reduced the amount of funds going to the Department
of Revenue. Amendment 3 took effect July 1 2005, and was phased in over four
years. When the amendment to full effect, in 2009, it added 180-190 million

Campbell, Joseph, 2010, UMSL, p.195
dollars a year to MODOT's budget for transportation system improvements
(MODOT, 2007).
The disbursement of the Amendment 3 funds left the Kansas City and St.
Louis regions to determine how best to spend their money. The state of
Missouri told these two regions they would receive their money from the
funding distribution and they could figure out their priorities. The St. Louis
region’s top priority in Missouri was the I-64 project.
The project’s history
The history of the I-64 project is summarized in Figure 5.13. The
highway department's intent in the 1930s was to build a freeway that would
relieve the amount of traffic on the other east-west roads in St. Louis County.
Residents in St. Louis were moving west to the county in droves. The first piece
of the highway opened in 1936 between Kingshighway and Skinker Road and
was named the Oakland Express Highway. In 1938, the highway reached
Chouteau Avenue. The roadway was St. Louis’ first highway with a speed limit
of forty-five miles an hour, but crashes were common and resulted in regional
pressure to lower the limit. During World War II, the speed limit was decreased
to thirty-five miles an hour in an effort to save rubber. The following year, the
St. Louis Board of Aldermen renamed the highway the Red Feather Expressway.
On the area’s western fringe, construction on fourteen miles of roadway
began at the Spoede Road overpass in 1936. This stretch of roadway between
Lindbergh Boulevard and the Missouri River opened to traffic in 1938, rolling
through cornfields and new subdivisions. It was quickly dubbed the "Daniel
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Boone Expressway." Extending the expressway east to Brentwood Boulevard
proved challenging. The buildup to World War II resulted in labor shortages and
slowed the pace of construction. Manpower was so short that the contractor
requested permission to use German prisoners of war as general laborers,
which was refused by the federal government. Steel shortages led to more
delays, with work on the bridge over Clayton and Warson roads held up for four
years because of the short supply. Finally, in 1946, that bridge opened to
traffic, completing the stretch between Brentwood Boulevard and Lindbergh
Boulevard. Finally, the connection between Brentwood Boulevard and
Kingshighway was completed in 1959 (MODOT, 2007).
In 1988, Highway 40 was designated as Interstate 64 extending from
downtown St. Louis through St. Louis County. In 1992, MODOT proposed
widening I-64 from six to eight lanes between Hanley Road and Skinker
Boulevard, taking 200 homes and part of Forest Park. Bitter opposition to
taking a portion Forest Park and forever transforming the park by moving a
heavily traveled bike/pedestrian path which parallels the interstate forced
MODOT to back away from the proposal. The events that took place in 1992
may have saved Forest Park but it did not eliminate the need for more
capacity.
In 1996, MODOT, East-West Gateway and Bi-State Transit Agency
conducted a joint study examining three regional transportation concerns:
improving 12 miles of I-64, extending Metrolink and extending I-170 south to
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Table 5.13: Interstate 64 timeline
1950s: MODOT links the Daniel Boone Expressway to the Red Feather Expressway. The
expressways, and some of their overpasses, were built in the 1930s and 1940s.
1988: Highway 40 designated as Interstate 64 extending from downtown St. Louis through
St. Louis County.
1992: State proposes to add a lane in each direction to Highway 40 between Hanley Road
and Skinker Blvd., taking 200 homes and part of Forest Park. Bitter opposition kills the idea.
1996: MODOT joins EWGCC and Bi-State Transit Agency in a study that examines improving
12 miles of Highway 40, extending Metrolink and extending Interstate 170 south to
Interstate 55.
1997: EWGCC governing board approves the study’s recommendations to rebuild 12 miles of
I-64.
1999: MODOT applied three and half inches of overlay on interstate to give the roadway
seven more years of service.
2000: MODOT formally begins New I-64 project and the environment studies required for
federal funding and approval.
2002: Missouri State Legislature approves design-build process
2004: Missouri voters pass Amendment 3 which provides 300 million dollars for the I-64
Project.
2005: Federal Highway Administration approves the plan. Missouri Legislature approves bill
allowing for three design build projects. Missouri Highway and Transportation Commission
and then EWGCC approve this method for the New I-64.
2008: Half of the I-64 project corridor is closed to traffic for one year.
Source: MODOT

I-55. Overwhelmingly, the study further illustrated the need for more capacity
along the thoroughfare. Upon completion of the study in 1997, the East-West
Gateway governing board approved the study’s recommendations to rebuild 12
miles of I-64 from Sarah Street in St. Louis City to Spoede Road in St. Louis
County. Despite these recommendations, East-West Gateway and MODOT knew
it might be a few years before they could acquire all the funds they had
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identified and complete the design for the new I-64. With this in mind, MODOT
applied three and half inches of overlay on the interstate to give the roadway
seven more years of service.
In 2002, after five years of planning, and ten years after MODOT’s most
recent attempt to address the traffic flow problems on I-64, MODOT began the
project by conducting the environment studies required for federal funding and
approval. In the same year the Missouri State Legislature approved the designbuild process. In 2004, with the project design and environmental work nearly
complete and a new option in design-build, Missouri voters passed Amendment
3 which provided 300 million dollars for the I-64 project. In 2004, MODOT and
East-West Gateway decided to fund Highway 21, Page Avenue Extension and
some other very important projects (for a complete list see Appendix D).
MODOT’s and East-West Gateway’s collaborative process to determine
priorities led to the setting aside of 300 million dollars for I-64. At the focal
point of these priorities was the thought that the I-170 interchange needed to
be addressed because it was the major problem. Prior to Amendment 3,
MODOT was resigned to fix the I-170, Kingshighway and possibly Lindbergh
interchanges and then walk away.
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At the time Amendment 3 passed MODOT got a new Director and MODOT
District Engineer Ed Hassinger told him “… if we are ever going to do this (I-64)
project, I need a way to get it all done at once” (Hassinger, 2007). MODOT had
the design-build tool at their disposal and the new Director Pete Rahn
suggested that the region do some innovative things with financing, using Grant
Anticipation Revenue Vehicle (GARVEE) bonds and leveraging future federal
revenue. According to MODOT, the design-build concept saves time and money.
Design-build is a project delivery method that combines both the design and
construction phases into one contract versus the state approved design-bidbuild. However, design-build is not the state approved method for providing
contracts, therefore, the state legislature had to approve the process.
GARVEE bonds are a tax exempt debt instrument that allows states to
finance the costs of construction right away. These bonds are backed by
federal appropriations and rely on future federal-aid money to repay the debt.
MODOT took these alternative funding options to East-West Gateway and
presented their argument that I-64 could be completed in this fashion. MODOT
convinced East-West Gateway that the use of the combination of design-build
and leveraging future federal funds would enable the project to be completed
all at once.
In 2005, the events of the previous eight years culminated when the
FHWA approved the plan, and the Missouri Legislature approved three designbuild projects, one of which was the I-64 project. Missouri Highway and
Transportation Commission and then East-West Gateway further approved the
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Map 5.4: I-64 project

Source: RandMcnally.com
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design-build method for the project. In 2007, construction began with the
clearing of right-a-way by removing homes at the intersection of I-170 and I-64.
How East-West Gateway made a difference
East-West Gateway made a difference by coordinating statewide
initiatives and regional priorities. East-West Gateway also provided the initial
financing, participated in the regional planning effort and provided additional
funds to mitigate traffic concerns caused by closure plans due to the designbuild process.
At the beginning there were doubts whether the region could ever
complete an I-64 project. In these early stages, East-West Gateway and MODOT
had to push back the I-64 project due to a gap in funding. Proposition B, a
proposed gas tax, failed on August 6 2002, meaning the project would have to
be piecemealed over twelve years. However, the region caught a break in 2005
when the Missouri State Legislature approved the project as the first design
build project.
The design-build process had never been used in Missouri and was only
introduced towards the end of the I-64 planning process. Several local
politicians who participated in this process felt it nullified much of their work.
The premise of design-build is that the contractor plans the project during the
construction process, rendering useless much of the preliminary planning that
was conducted by the politicians. East-West Gateway, MODOT and numerous
public committees had planned the I-64 project prior to the decision to use
design-build. These committees included an aesthetics committee and four
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citizens committees. Upon the emergence of the design-build idea in 2005, and
after five years of regional planning, MODOT brought out its design. MODOT
wanted to make Big Bend full access. This would close the Bellevue Avenue exit
which provides direct access to St. Mary’s Hospital, requiring emergency
vehicles to travel an additional mile via I-64 and Clayton Road to reach the
hospital.
St. Mary’s Hospital decided it did not want Bellevue closed. MODOT
redesigned McCausland at least twice in response to the concerns of St. Mary’s
Hospital. However the hospital was adamant, and would not even look at the
new plans and simply stated their objection – you cannot close Bellevue. In
response, an aide to Senator Kit Bond (MO) wrote MODOT a letter stating they
were not going to close Bellevue, and that it would remain an exit. MODOT did
not object to this proposal. Members of the five year planning process (EWGCC,
local politicians and citizens) began to become annoyed because MODOT began
making unilateral decisions. Their sentiment was that design-build would have
been fine if it was part of the process from the beginning and everyone knew
and could choose the contractor. Senator Joan Bray, in particular, was
outspoken on the issue, “… the fact that I-64, the largest project in the history
of Missouri, might not be the best time to use design-build for the first time”
(Bray, 2007). Senator Bray stated that the project was one of the largest in
Missouri history - its social and economic importance and the prospect of
lengthy closures of the thoroughfare are reason enough to pause and reconsider
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whether it was the appropriate project in which to test a new method of
construction.
In light of the possibility of the entire I-64 corridor being closed during
construction many of the local politicians who were already annoyed by MODOT
became even more concerned, prompting Senator Bray to present a bill in the
state legislature. The bill stated that MODOT could not close the entire corridor
at one time. In response, MODOT stated it could not guarantee anything
because of the design-build approach. The contractor would have to answer
that question because they (MODOT) do not know what the project is going to
look like or how the closures were going to work (Bray, 2007). The main point
was the region had spent five years designing the project and planning for
closures, but due to the design-build process much of the planning was now
thought to be irrelevant. Interviewees involved in the process suggested that
every time they asked a question in regard to the design of the project, no one
had an immediate answer and they had to wait for the contractor. The one
issue the region stood firm on - that the contractor could not close the entire
corridor - led to an agreement that the closures would be half and half. On
January 2, 2008 all lanes on I-64 between I-170 and Ballas Road would be
closed. Upon the reopening of this stretch of interstate on December 15, 2008,
all lanes of I-64 between I-70 and Kingshighway would then be closed for a
year.
The prospect of these closures led East-West Gateway to take a measure
it had never taken before. On Wednesday, April 25, 2007, in a unanimous
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decision East-West Gateway gave 12 million dollars in federal money to St.
Louis, St. Louis County and Metro to help relieve the burden of the increased
congestion with rebuilding I-64. This relief money would normally be the
responsibility of MODOT (Sterman, 2007) and was to increase the ability of
other roadways to handle the increase in traffic due to closures on I- 64. New
temporary lanes were created on other interstates to handle overflow traffic.
During the construction of I-64, I-70 and I-44 would not have any construction
work, plus MODOT would restripe the highways to add an extra lane in each
direction. I-70 would have an extra lane between I-270 and I-170, and I-44
would have an extra lane striped from I-270 to Grand Avenue. Any needed
maintenance work on these roads would be completed at night. MODOT also
upgraded the traffic signals on Page Avenue (MO 364), Olive Street Road (MO
340), Manchester Road (MO 100) and Lindbergh Boulevard (US 61/67) to make
these alternate routes move traffic as efficiently as possible. Other spot
improvements will be made by MODOT and its contractor to improve traffic
flow during construction (MODOT, 2007).
The design-build process allowed Gateway Constructors much flexibility
in overcoming design and construction challenges as they emerged, and aimed
to help them to stay within the 420 million dollar budget for actual
construction. Due to the design as they build process, the actual cost for
various segments and the different types of work conducted (e.g. right-of-way,
construction) would not be known, therefore, it is impossible to provide a
detailed breakdown of funding at this point of the study. Design-build is
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estimated to reduce actual construction costs on the project by about 20
percent (EWGCC, 2007).
The process the region put in place has provided the opportunity for the
region to receive the improvements needed in a shorter time span than under
conventional terms. Under conventional terms the length of the project would
be seven to ten years and cost 750 million dollars. MODOT reduced the right-ofway requirements by a drastic amount even though they were taking a number
of houses for the I-170 interchange. The contract for the proposed work is 420
million dollars. Incorporating the right-of-way and other bits and pieces that
MODOT needs to complete the total cost is about 535 million dollars and will be
completed in three years (2010) (MODOT, 2007).
Summary
The I-64 project offers evidence of East-West Gateway leading the
regional transportation process. As shown in Figure 5.14, the case illustrates
East-West Gateway making a difference by increasing public saliency (P1) and
consideration of quality of life factors (P2: P2a). There is little evidence to
support East-West Gateway’s consideration other region wide factors (P2b,
P2c). The evidence to support an increase in elected official involvement is
insufficient (P3).
Table 5.14: Propositions supported by Interstate 64 project

P1
X

P2
X

P2a
X

P2b

P2c

P3

The evidence from interviewees does little to support the premise that EastWest Gateway increased the public saliency of the I-64 project. On the other
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hand, the information available on their website and news articles suggests
that they did increase public saliency. The East-West Gateway website offered
newsletters, press releases and links to MODOT websites concerning the
project. Most of this information was used and cited in this study. These
documents were readily available to the public and often cited in news
articles. A LexisNexis search (2005-2008) returned 154 hits for articles
discussing the I-64 project and citing East-West Gateway. The search returned
256 articles during this time period discussing the I-64 project.
The evidence points toward the difference East-West Gateway made in
consideration of quality of life factors. The prospect of closures on a major
thoroughfare which carries 170,000 commuters a day prompted East-West
Gateway to fund projects to mitigate congestion on alternate roadways. The
MPO provided 12 million dollars in federal money to St. Louis, St. Louis County
and Metro to increase the capacity of alternate roadways. Their aim was to
ease the stress of commuters due to closures on I-64. The MPO offered little
evidence and the interviewees provided little substantive information when
confronted about the consideration of employment factors and equity issues.
Most interviewees pointed toward the fact that it was going to be easier for
transit to move throughout the county and it would be a smoother commute to
work for employees once the project is completed. At this point, there is no
way to evaluate these statements and little evidence to suggest that the new
roadway will provide more jobs in Clayton or downtown St. Louis.
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At the beginning of the process, public participation was high due to the
committees and subcommittees created by East-West Gateway to plan the
project. The process demonstrated evidence of all interested parties, such as
elected officials, public officials and the general public participating in the
process carried out by the MPO in coordination with state DOTs and transit
operators. It appeared as if these groups were making a difference, until
design-build was adopted by MODOT. Due to the adoption of design-build and
its nature of limited disclosure and the fact the planning takes place during the
building process, public participation made little difference. The design-build
process limits public input and places limitations on the planning process. The
issue of design-build suggests that MPO’s can facilitate regional agreement
internally, but these regional governance institutions lack the authority to
implement them because Departments of Transportation still wield a great deal
of authority (Sanchez, 2006; Weir et al., 2009).
Conclusion
The case of St. Louis and the role of East-West Gateway in the region’s
transportation policy points toward the different levels of participation an MPO
can have with any given project and offers insight into the promise, success
and problems of these regional governance institutions. A summary of the data
as it relates to the main propositions of this study is shown in Table 5.15. The
MPO is typically seen as the forum to plan regional transportation projects, but
the way they make a difference is as unique as the project itself. For example,
the new Mississippi River Bridge was a project that the MPO was heavily
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involved in, whereas the Page Extension the MPO played a more supporting role
to the region. In the case of I-64 the process began as one that the MPO was
heavily involved in, but resulted in a project that became consumed by the
design-build process. The process limited the MPO’s role, however, East-West
Gateway was still able to make a difference.
Table 5.15: Propositions supported by St. Louis case studies
MRB
Page Extension
I-64

P1
X
X

P2

P2a

X
X

X
X

P2b

P2c

P3
X

The evidence supporting East-West Gateway’s ability to create public
saliency (P1) was quantified by LexisNexis research. The qualitative evidence
illustrates particular actions taken by the MPO which heightened the public’s
awareness. In St. Louis, the most significant piece of evidence is the creation
of an expert panel, and the calling of a regional vote to determine the
direction the region should go with the new Mississippi River Bridge. A
LexisNexis research quantifies the significance of the expert panel. The panel
was created in December 2006 and the vote was held February 2007. In this
time span there were forty-two articles on either the panel or the vote (22 in
January and 8 the week of the vote). These articles, written as a direct result
of an action by East-West Gateway, made the public aware of the partisan
nature of the debate, which was highlighted by comments from local and state
officials.
In contrast, the public saliency of the Page Extension was the result of
actions taken by groups or individuals not associated with the MPO. The project
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was salient due to a public vote, opposition from environmental groups and
citizen concerns with urban sprawl. The environmental groups included two
powerful and notable interest groups; the Sierra Club and the Missouri Coalition
for the Environment. Their resources (money and media connections) allowed
them to create public saliency. The quantitative evidence further supports this
premise, illustrating that 72 percent of the articles in regard to the Page
Extension were about the sprawl or environmental issues, and only one in
thirteen of these articles referenced East-West Gateway.
The case of I-64 contrasts strongly with the high saliency created by
East-West Gateway in the new Mississippi River case. The qualitative evidence
discussed in the case offers little evidence to support this proposition.
However, it maybe that in cases where saliency is generated by other means,
in this case a highly publicized environmental concern, that the efforts of the
MPO are redundant. In fact, the information used to gather the information in
this study was available on their website and the frequent references and
citations of the MPO in news articles suggests they made considerable efforts
to increase public saliency. The East-West Gateway website offered
newsletters, press releases and links to MODOT websites concerning the
project. The quantitative evidence supports this proposition; according to
LexisNexis, for a time period between 2005 and 2008, 154 of the 256 articles
that discussed the I-64 project cited or referenced East-West Gateway.
The Page Extension and I-64 cases provide evidence of East-West
Gateway contributing to the quality of life (P2: P2a) in the St. Louis region.
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However, there is no evidence in any case supporting the premise that EastWest Gateway considered employment factors (P2b) or equity issues (P2c).
Quality of life was improved for the St. Louis region through the 57 million
dollar contribution of East-West Gateway during phase one of the project. This
financed the connection of Creve Coeur Park in St. Louis County and the Katy
Trail in St. Charles County via bicycle and pedestrian traffic, allowing residents
on either side of the river to enjoy the recreational benefits. The completion of
this phase of the project was made possible by East-West Gateway’s monetary
contribution.
In a similar fashion East-West Gateway contributed to the region’s
quality of life with their contribution of 12 million dollars during the I-64
project. The funds were used to mitigate traffic on alternate roadways due to
the displacement of 170,000 commuters a day. Their action eased the stress on
commuters by providing improved capacity and better traffic flow on alternate
routes.
The new Mississippi River Bridge project is still in its infancy with respect
to planning making it impossible to speculate as to whether the MPO will make
a difference in relation to the region wide factors proposition. Public meetings
were held on April 16th, July 7th, and July 8th 2009. At these meetings the
region discussed topics ranging from road closures to minority employment. It
is certain, however, that the region will have some level of minority
representation on the construction crews through the “New I-64 Work Force
Utilization Plan Partnering Agreement.” The fact that many of these issues that
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relate to the region wide factors proposition are unanswered makes it difficult
to support or refute this proposition. The consideration of employment factors
to date consists of arguments made by Illinois and the RCGA.
The new Mississippi River Bridge does point toward how the MPO
increases the number of quality elected officials. The vote called by East-West
Gateway which included 22 elected state and local officials coalesced these
regional leaders and highlighted the evidence to support this proposition. Once
the vote was final numerous local elected officials began to comment. These
officials included: Illinois Governor Blagojevich; Missouri Governor Blunt; St.
Louis County Executive, Charlie Dooley; Alan Dunstan, Madison County Board
chairman; Mark Kern, St. Clair County Board chairman; and East-West Gateway
Executive Director Les Sterman. In total, thirteen different state and local
officials are quoted in the Post-Dispatch and seven in the Belleville News
Democrat. This evidence points toward an increased level of involvement in the
process.
The Page Extension differs greatly from the new Mississippi River Bridge
regarding this proposition. The case offers no evidence that East-West Gateway
increased the participation of elected officials. In the I-64 case there is
evidence of East-West Gateway increasing elected official involvement early in
the process and the impact of regional leaders eventually being limited due to
the design-build process.
The evidence suggests that East-West Gateway makes a difference in
certain aspects of regional transportation policy. This difference is dependent
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on the particular nature of the project, and is influenced by many factors. The
evidence obtained was substantial enough to support several propositions, it
also offers some insight into the promise, success and problems of an MPO.
East-West Gateway’s contribution to quality of life factors illustrates the
promise of these regional governing bodies to align regional interests and
regional transportation policy. Their ability to garner coordination and
cooperation between Illinois and Missouri offers evidence of the success of
these regional institutions. They were able to bring together two government
entities and accept their role in shared policymaking. The adoption of designbuild and its nature of limited disclosure points toward an often sighted
criticism of MPOs, which is their lack of authority (Katz and Puentes, 2005;
Gerber & Gibson, 2009; Weir et al., 2009). East-West Gateway was able to
garner regional agreement on road closure and project planning internally, only
to see MODOT’s adoption of design build thwart these efforts.
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Chapter 6 – Analysis
This chapter discusses the results of the study and further examines the
propositions presented in Chapter 3. It highlights the way MARC and East-West
Gateway make a difference as the evidence relates to the propositions, and
discusses what this evidence tells us about the promise, success and problems
of MPOs and the regional transportation process. An MPO makes a difference
through advisory groups, their committees, provision of funds, proctoring
public meetings, and solicitation of outside advisement to solve regional
transportation problems. The six projects evaluated in the study support
different but overlapping propositions. There is not a project that supported all
the propositions and neither is there a project that did not support at least one
proposition, with those related to public saliency rated most highly. At MARC,
the evidence in the Triangle project supported the most propositions and the
Red Bridge project supported the least. At East-West Gateway, the I-64 project
supported the most propositions and the new Mississippi River Bridge supported
the least. Analysis of the evidence and the propositions suggests that MPOs do
make a difference and serve a dynamic and important role in the regional
transportation policy process.
Introduction
The enhanced role of Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs) since
the passage of ISTEA is evident in the cases of Kansas City and St. Louis, which
offer important examples of an MPOs role in regional transportation policy.
Since the passage of ISTEA, MPOs are making a difference by increasing public

Campbell, Joseph, 2010, UMSL, p. 214
saliency, contributing to their region’s quality of life, considering employment
factors and promoting elected official involvement. The data from these
studies related to individual propositions is shown in Table 6.1. In five of the
six cases the evidence points toward the MPO increasing public saliency (P1). In
four cases MPOs are considering region wide factors (P2), three cases support
MPOs contributing to the quality of life (P2a) and one case provides evidence of
the consideration of employment factors (P2b). There is no evidence to suggest
MPOs are considering equity issues (P2c). In half of the cases there is evidence
supporting the premise that MPOs promote elected official involvement (P3).
The evidence supporting these conclusions is both quantitative and
qualitative. Some of the qualitative information from particular cases is weak
due to the nature of the proposition, therefore, the use of quantitative data
was necessary to substantiate some findings. For example, an MPO’s impact on
public saliency (P1) is difficult to support without quantifiable numbers to
illustrate their saliency in local and regional news (LexisNexis). The
participation of elected official involvement (P3) is another proposition that is
difficult to qualitatively support. Therefore it was necessary to rely on
quantitative data to substantiate this proposition. In addition, P3 offered the
opportunity to evaluate the attendance records from MPO meeting minutes.
Table 6.2 and Table 6.3 illustrate the trend in elected official participation
pre- and post-ISTEA. The consideration of whether to support, refute or suggest
that more evidence is needed in regard to region wide factors is equally based
on quantitative and qualitative data.

Campbell, Joseph, 2010, UMSL, p. 215
Study Results
Table 6.1: Propositions supported by the cases of Kansas City and St. Louis
Triangle
Paseo Bridge
Red Bridge
MRB
Page Extension
I-64

P1
X
X
X
X
X

P2
X
X
X
X

P2a
X

P2b
X

P2c

X
X

P3
X
X
X

Proposition 1: ISTEA and its successors, empowered MPOs, resulting in an
increase in public saliency of regional problems
In the Kansas City and St. Louis regions there is evidence that the
regional MPO is increasing public saliency. In Kansas City each case offered
evidence to support this proposition and in St. Louis two of the three cases
provided evidence of increased public saliency. The evidence in Kansas City
includes the formation of an advisory committee, a river crossing committee
for bike and pedestrian traffic, and a high level of news coverage citing the
MPO and project. In St. Louis, the evidence includes an expert panel, a vote of
MPO members and a high level of news coverage citing the MPO.
In Kansas City, MARC performed two actions which increased public
saliency by including a wide range of interests and increasing news coverage of
the project. These actions are: (1) creation of an advisory committee, and (2)
creation of a river crossing committee. MARC responded to community
dissatisfaction during the Triangle project by forming a 25-person advisory
committee. Members included city council members, state legislative
representatives, officials from Kansas City, Missouri, and Jackson and Cass
Counties. Public works, police, and fire department staff from the City of
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Kansas City and public works staff from the City of Grandview were members of
the committee, as were local residents from the numerous neighborhoods
surrounding the Triangle. The advisory committee increased public involvement
and provided a level of transparency making the project more salient within
the region. The MPO led the group which visited the project site on a regular
basis, meeting with MODOT officials identifying concerns. According to several
interviewees and Kansas City Missouri, Assistant City Engineer Sherri McIntyre,
"The Citizens Advisory Committee definitely raised the level of involvement
from the community" (APWA, 2009).
MARC’s formation of a river crossing committee on the Paseo Bridge is
another example of a cooperative effort which increased public saliency. MARC
formed the River Crossing Task Force (RCTF), consisting of representatives from
local governments, MARC committees, local interest groups and bridge owners.
The RCTF includes: MetroGreen Civic Leadership Board; Kansas City River
Trails; MARC Bicycle/Pedestrian Committee; MARC Transit Committee; MARC
Highway Committee; Kansas Department of Transportation; Missouri
Department of Transportation; Federal Highway Administration; Kansas City
Port Authority; Clay, Jackson, Johnson, Leavenworth, Platte and Wyandotte
counties; Kansas City, MO, Shawnee, Leavenworth, Bonner Springs and North
Kansas City; Greater Kansas City Bicycle Federation; Missouri Bicycle
Federation; Johnson County Bicycle Club; Patti Banks Associates; Downtown
Neighborhood Association; Regional Transit Alliance (MARC, 2005). The RCTF
increased public saliency by involving a wide range of individuals in the

Campbell, Joseph, 2010, UMSL, p. 217
consideration of solutions for bike and pedestrian access between North Kansas
City and downtown Kansas City. Evidence of these two actions increasing public
saliency is further supported by the amount of news coverage the MPO’s
actions generated.
News coverage citing the MPO (MARC) and the project suggests that the
efforts of an MPO increase the saliency of an issue. These efforts can vary as
much as a story about a committee they formed or citation of an MPO press
release or publication. The LexisNexis searches identifying the MPO (MARC) and
the project (Triangle) provided 784 articles citing the MPO and discussing the
Triangle project over a ten year period (1997-2007). The creation of the RCTF
to resolve the dispute over bike/pedestrian access on the Paseo Bridge offers
more evidence. In 2006, the height of the debate over access, there were
twenty-two articles dealing solely with the bike/pedestrian crossing over the
Missouri River. This is a significant amount compared to other projects. For
example, a search of the MPO (MARC) and Triangle averaged seventy-eight
articles a year and a search of the MPO and Red Bridge provided thirty-eight
articles. To further substantiate the significance of this, I conducted the same
search for the year 2004 (MARC + bike/pedestrian access) and acquired six
articles discussing MARC and bike/pedestrian access, which is nearly onequarter as many articles. The evidence suggests that MARC’s actions resulted in
more news coverage, increasing public saliency.
In contrast to an MPO’s actions creating saliency, the actions of an
outside group coming to the MPO increased the saliency of the Red Bridge
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project. The Friends of Red Bridge (FORB) turned to the MPO in an effort to
change certain aspects of the Red Bridge project. FORB approached MARC on
two separate occasions resulting in thirty-eight news articles documenting their
conversations. FORB’s efforts included their attendance at a Total
Transportation Policy Committee (TTPC) meeting and a board meeting. FORB’s
inclusion of the MPO in their fight against the Red Bridge project points toward
the role the MPO plays in the region, and further suggests that they are seen as
the focal point for regional transportation policy. The unusual actions of the
interest group resulted in an increase in news coverage and increased
awareness among the public. This illustrating that sometimes, efforts of other
groups increase public awareness of these projects. However, it should be
noted that the MPO served as an outlet for the views of the FORB group. It is
the role the MPO plays in their community that contributes to the saliency of
an issue. The saliency of issues differs not only from project to project but MPO
to MPO as is illustrated in the case of St. Louis.
In St. Louis, East-West Gateway is increasing public saliency through
their actions and increasing availability of information. The MPO’s creation of
an expert panel (December 2006) and calling a regional vote (February 2007)
increased the public saliency of the new Mississippi River Bridge project. The
seriousness of the issue was highlighted by the outside consultants gathered to
serve as a neutral party to advise Illinois and Missouri. The vote further
illustrated the seriousness of the political rift, by placing more attention on the
issue and politicians involved. These actions were intended to send a message
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and prompted local news sources to increase their coverage of the issue. For
example, the vote prompted a public exchange between Missouri Governor
Matt Blunt and Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich which was published in the St.
Louis Post-Dispatch. Governor Blunt claimed the MPO did not give Missouri
enough time to review the proposal, meanwhile, Governor Blagojevich
suggested it was a step in the right direction (Shields, 2007). The articles, with
quotes from numerous state and local leaders increased the saliency of the
project. There were forty-two articles over a two month time span (December
2006 to February 2007) covering the new river bridge progress. Of these fortytwo articles, twenty-two articles were in January and eight were during the
week of the vote (Feb. 20-27). East-West Gateway’s efforts and stance on
taking a vote brought attention to the state of the project and provided an
additional level of scrutiny by constituents observing the process through local
news sources.
An MPO can increase the saliency of an issue by means other than
actions that create news coverage. The I-64 project offers the best example of
how an MPO can increase saliency by providing information directly to a region
via their website, press releases and publications. The MPO was highly involved
in updating closure information and providing links to additional websites in an
effort to keep the public informed. The majority of the information cited in the
I-64 case came directly from the MPO’s website and is cited throughout the
case. This information was readily available to the public and news sources.
The LexisNexis search (2005-2008) further supports this assumption. The search
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returned 256 articles during this time period on the I-64 project, 154 articles
discussing the I-64 project and citing East-West Gateway. This evidence
suggests that sixty percent of the news articles in local papers and business
journals made use of this information. It further suggests that MPOs actions can
include such things as a simple press release to increase saliency.
The Page extension offers another example of how an issue can become
salient. The MPO is not responsible for the saliency of an issue in all cases. An
issue can become salient due to outside interest groups, a public vote or
regional concerns. In the case of Page Avenue, the saliency of the project was
due to a vote to approve the right-of-way through Creve Coeur Park, opposition
from environmental groups including the Sierra Club and the Missouri Coalition
for the Environment and concern of how the project would contribute to urban
sprawl. The evidence to support this premise is based on news coverage. The
majority of news articles on the Page Extension, collected through LexisNexis,
focused on the three issues. The search determined that 72 percent of the
articles in regard to the Page Extension were about one or several of the
issues: the vote, environmental concerns or urban sprawl. Only 12 percent of
the articles mentioned East-West Gateway, this discussion was limited to the
additional funding that the MPO gave St. Charles County to cover cost overruns.
In the cases of St. Louis and Kansas City it is apparent that all the cases
were publicly salient. In two instances the saliency was due to outside
interests, with an interest group approaching the MPO in the case of FORB and
the Red Bridge Project and with interest groups waging their own public
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campaign in the case of Page Extension. The saliency of issues was also
increased by votes, with an MPO vote on a project’s direction and a public vote
to determine right-a-way for a project. The creation of committees by MPOs
also created saliency. In most cases (5 of 6), an MPO’s involvement raised the
level of news coverage resulting in increased public saliency.
Proposition 2: ISTEA and its successors empowered MPOs, resulting in more
consideration of area-wide factors in regional-level policy making.
P2a: ISTEA and its successors resulted in more consideration of
quality of life factors in regional-level policy making.
In the Kansas City and St. Louis regions there is evidence that the
regional MPO is considering and contributing to quality of life. In Kansas City
one case offered evidence to support this proposition and in St. Louis two of
the three cases provided evidence of the consideration of quality of life
factors. The evidence in Kansas City includes bike/pedestrian access. In St.
Louis, the evidence includes bike/pedestrian access, and a decrease in traffic
volume on other major arteries. The two examples in St. Louis are a result of
additional funding provided by the MPO.
In Kansas City, the MPO created the RCTF to make decisions about
bike/pedestrian access. The creation of this committee is not only a tribute to
regional cooperation but it is also illustrative of how MARC made a lasting
difference in the region’s quality of life. MARC’s efforts to coalesce regional
support for pedestrian access connecting North Kansas City stores and
restaurants to downtown Kansas City residential lofts and businesses will
improve the quality of life for many who live and work in the Kansas City
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region. The bike/pedestrian access allows the region to transcend the previous
geographic barrier between the two areas, providing access to amenities on
both sides of the river without the use of an automobile. In addition, it creates
a more desirable location for companies and citizens in downtown Kansas City
and a more lucrative shopping district in North Kansas City.
In St. Louis, the creation of a better quality of life is due to MPO
monetary contributions. On two separate occasions the MPO contributed money
to a project: (1) Page Extension for completion of phase one which includes
bike/pedestrian access between St. Charles and St. Louis counties and the
Veteran Memorial Bridge resulting in decreased traffic flow on other major
arteries; and (2) I-64 to increase the capacity of alternative routes during the
closure of the highway.
The Page Extension improved the quality of life for the St. Louis region
by connecting recreational resources in St. Louis and St. Charles counties and
decreasing traffic flow. East-West Gateway covered cost overruns of 57 million
dollars allowing the first phase of the project to be completed, and providing
an additional connection for auto traffic and a connection for bike/pedestrian
traffic. Phase one of the project and the opening of Veteran Memorial Bridge
increased the number of lanes crossing the Missouri River between St. Louis
County and St. Charles County from 23 to 33. It provided an alternate route to
the Daniel Boone Bridge (I-64), Blanchette Memorial Bridge (I-70), and
Discovery Bridge (MO-370) crossings. Traffic volumes on these river crossings
decreased significantly in the first year: I-70 carried 186,773 motorists a day in
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2003 which fell to 165,079 motorists a day in 2004 (a 12 percent decrease); I-64
carried 85,183 motorists a day in 2003 which fell to 77,523 motorists a day in
2004 (a 9 percent decrease); and MO 370 carried 59,907 motorists a day in 2003
which fell to 56,762 motorists a day in 2004 (a 5 percent decrease) (MODOT,
2004). The creation of a bike/pedestrian path on Veterans Memorial Bridge
improved quality of life by connecting recreational resources. The extension
connects Creve Coeur Park in St. Louis County and the Katy Trail in St. Charles
County. The completion of the first phase allowed residents on either side of
the river to enjoy the recreational benefits without the use of an automobile.
The I-64 case offers a similar example of how an MPO can improve a
region’s quality of life. East-West Gateway viewed the prospect of closures on
a major thoroughfare which carries 170,000 commuters a day as a potential
strain on the region. This prompted East-West Gateway to provide 12 million
dollars in federal money to St. Louis, St. Louis County and Metro to increase
the capacity of alternate roadways. This was an action that the MPO had never
previously taken. Their intention was to improve traffic flow on alternate
routes by adding lanes and increasing synchronization of traffic signals. The
MPO funds were used to create temporary lanes on other interstates to handle
overflow traffic. An additional lane, in each direction, was striped on I-70 and
I-44. Traffic signals were upgraded on Page Avenue (MO 364), Olive Street
Road (MO 340), Manchester Road (MO 100) and Lindbergh Boulevard (US 61/67)
to make these alternate routes move traffic as efficiently as possible. (MODOT,
2007).
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In St. Louis and Kansas City it is apparent that only three cases actually
addressed any quality of life issues. In two instances the improved quality of
life was a direct result of funds provided by the MPO: (1) 57 million dollars for
the completion of Page Extension and (2) 12 million for traffic mitigation
during the I-64 project. The quality of life was also improved by the provision
of bike/pedestrian access on two occasions: (1) Connecting downtown residents
and businesses to North Kansas City shops and restaurants, and (2) connecting
recreational resources in St. Louis and St. Charles counties. It is difficult to
quantify quality of life as it relates to bike/pedestrian access, particularly
since the project in Kansas City is not complete. Once the project is complete,
it will be possible to measure the number of businesses relocating to downtown
Kansas City or an increase in people moving downtown. This evidence could be
used to further support or possibly refute the bike/pedestrian access
contribution to each region’s quality of life. In a similar fashion, no data is
available to illustrate whether the shops in North Kansas City have seen an
increase in revenue. Bike/Pedestrian access does offer more options for
residents and provides opportunities that were not available prior to these
projects.
P2b: ISTEA and its successors resulted in more consideration of land use
and employment factors in regional level policy making.
In the Kansas City region there is evidence that the regional MPO (MARC)
considered employment factors in one case. In St. Louis, there is no evidence
that the MPO (EWGCOG) considered employment factors. The consideration of
employment factors in Kansas City is due to the design of an interchange. The
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purpose of this project was to improve the economic activity of the area,
Grandview.
The Triangle project improved accessibility and traffic flow through the
Grandview area resulting in increased employment. The completion of the
project decreased the number of accidents by 360 a year and the average
speed through the interchange during rush hour increased from 22.7 miles per
hour (mph) to 51.9 mph (MODOT, 2008). The benefits of this increased
accessibility are highlighted in the Kansas City Business Journal. The journal
suggests that the 8400 jobs have been created since work began on the 3-Trails
Crossing Memorial Highway (formerly called the Grandview Triangle) (Hubbard,
2009). Since the completion of the project in 2007, 44 million dollars in nonresidential construction has been invested in Grandview and more than 700
jobs have been created within the new and expanding companies (Grandview
Economic Development Council, 2009). The project improved rush hour traffic
flow by nearly thirty miles mph and reduced the accident rate.
P2c: ISTEA and its successors resulted in more consideration of equity
factors in regional-level policy making.
In the cases of Kansas City and St. Louis, there is no evidence in any case
to support the premise that MPOs are considering equity factors in regionallevel policy making. Equity factors ensure that transportation policies and
investments are representative of the region’s needs and demographics in the
allocation of resources.
The discussion of equity factors met some conflicting opinions among
interviewees. When the questioned was posed to Missouri State Senator Joan
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Bray she suggested that equity is relevant to, “…policy wonks, the bureaucrats
they are a factor but when it gets into the political arena it is not a priority,
power and money talks. So where is the next Metrolink line going to be? North
where a larger portion of the population doesn’t have cars or is it going to be in
the direction where the power and money is? It is a huge issue” (Bray, 2007).
Essentially, Senator Bray is suggesting that the more influential areas have
more resources and their policy concerns garner greater public concern.
Equity issues are not only about resources, they are also about whose
quality of life they consider more when designing a project. For example, in
this study, five of the six cases deal with major thoroughfares for commuters.
These projects are created to help citizens in suburban communities without
consideration of the direct effect on the urban community that the project is
going to be built in or through. In many instances the expansion or creation of a
new freeway is being built to connect a suburban community to the urban core
intended solely to benefit commuters. The planning may not consider how the
new or expanded roadway is going to affect the urban dwellers along the route.
Is it going to increase traffic in their neighborhoods? Increase noise? Increase
pollution in an area where people cannot afford to move? Often a project goes
through a central city community with a relatively higher proportion of
minority or low income residents than outlying suburbs. A project in a central
city community may have some direct time saving benefits for the suburban
community but the impacts are typically felt in these lower income urban
areas.
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Proposition 3: ISTEA and its successors increased the number and quality
of elected official participation in regional transportation planning.
Only three of the six cases offer any evidence to support the premise
that MPOs increase the number and quality of elected official participation. In
a similar fashion, as illustrated later in the chapter, the longitudinal data
suggests that each MPO is increasing elected official participation. The MPO
meeting minute attendance records pre- and post-ISTEA offer insight into the
trends in elected official participation. According to the data both MPOs are
increasing elected official participation.
The elected official involvement in the Kansas City region was a direct
result of the MPO creating two committees: (1) Advisory Committee and (2)
River Crossing Task Force. In St. Louis the elected official involvement was due
to a highly political project and the MPO hiring an expert panel and calling a
vote.
In Kansas City, the Triangle project involved many elected officials from
local governments in the MARC region. These officials participated in the
advisory committee pointing toward the difference MARC makes regarding the
number and quality of elected officials participating in the regional
transportation process. Members included city council members, state
legislative representatives, officials from the City of Kansas City, Missouri, and
Jackson and Cass Counties. In the case of the Triangle, the formation of the
committee, their role in advising and the general satisfaction throughout the
MARC community supports this proposition. MARC made a difference through
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the inclusion of a high number of quality elected officials on the Paseo project.
The project included 56 local elected officials in the regional transportation
process. These officials participated through various committees and at
different stages in the development of a bike/pedestrian policy. They were
members of the River Crossing Task Force, the Bicycle Pedestrian Advisory
Committee, the Total Transportation Committee and MARC Board of Directors
(6 - Bicycle Pedestrian Advisory Committee, 19 – Total Transportation Policy
Committee, 31 – Board of Directors).
In St. Louis, East-West Gateway made a difference through the inclusion
of a high number of notable elected officials. The region witnessed a high
degree of involvement due to the creation of an expert panel and an MPO vote.
News articles highlighted the amount of participation. The articles included
comments by: Illinois Governor Blagojevich; Missouri Governor Blunt; St. Louis
County Executive, Charlie Dooley; Alan Dunstan, Madison County Board
chairman; Mark Kern, St. Clair County Board chairman; and East-West Gateway
Executive Director Les Sterman. Stories about the new Mississippi River Bridge
included thirteen different state and local officials quoted in the Post-Dispatch
and seven quoted in the Belleville News Democrat. This evidence alone does
not illustrate the complete story in regard to elected official involvement in
Kansas City and St. Louis. Each MPO consists of a committee structure intended
to be politically inclusive through elected official involvement.
MPOs are inherently political organizations with elected and appointed
officials from various regional governments serving in varying capacities on

Campbell, Joseph, 2010, UMSL, p. 229
numerous committees throughout the hierarchal structure of the institution.
For example, MARC’s Total Transportation Policy Committee (TTPC) consists of
an entire committee structure dealing with a wide range of issues: STP and
Bridge Committee, Highway Committee, Bike and Pedestrian Committee,
Transit Committee, and Air Quality Committee. At MARC, the board consists of
33 locally elected leaders from the nine member counties and the six largest
cities in the region. At East-West Gateway, the board consists of 21 voting
members, seven are the chief elected officials from local governments in
Illinois, seven are the chief elected officials from local governments in
Missouri, six are citizens representing both states, and one is the Chair of the
Bi-State Development Agency. Representatives of a number of other state and
federal agencies sit on the Board as non-voting members.
The following table (Table 6.2) illustrates the rate of change in elected
official involvement pre- and post-ISTEA. The data was compiled from meeting
minutes (1978-2006) and suggests that elected official involvement at the
regional MPO has increased. The mean number of members at each MPO
meeting was calculated for the two times periods and used to calculate the
rate of change.
Table 6.2: Member participation at
MP O
Members present
pre-ISTEA
(1978-1991)
MARC
13.70
EW Gateway
12.18

their regional MPO
Members present
post-ISTEA
(1992-2006)
15.31
15.96

%Change
11.8
31.0
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Table 6.2 measures the number of East-West Gateway and MARC
members present at their meetings, excluding the MPO staff. The table
illustrates an increase in member participation at each MPO. Pre-ISTEA MARC
averaged 13.7 elected officials per meeting which increased to 15.31 per
meeting resulting post-ISTEA. The data suggests that since the passage of ISTEA
the MPO has witnessed an 11.8 percent increase in elected official
participation. At East-West Gateway their elected official participation
increased from 12.18 per meeting pre-ISTEA to 15.96 per meeting post-ISTEA
resulting 31.0 percent increase in elected official participation.
The increase in elected official participation is evidence of the evolution
of the MPO in regional transportation policy. An MPOs role as the facilitator of
funds for regional projects is a large reason why this change occurred.
According to interviewees, elected officials still view MPOs as the bank for
transportation money. Les Sterman, further illustrates this point, when asked
about elected official participation, he stated, “The reason they show up is
because the transportation money goes out the door here, I mean that is why
they (elected officials) are here” (Sterman, 2006).
Table 6.3: Member participation at East-West
MP O
Members present
pre-ISTEA
(1978-1991)
EW Gateway & MARC
12.96

Gateway and MARC combined
Members present %Change
post-ISTEA
(1992-2006)
15.62
20.5

The combination of the two MPOs (Table 6.3) further illustrates a
significant change in the number of elected officials participating. The data
suggests, since the passage of ISTEA there has been a 20.5 percent increase in
elected official involvement. These two MPOs are not anomalies, it is apparent
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that other regional MPOs have seen significant increases in participation.
According to J. William Van Dyke, Chairman of North Jersey Transportation
Planning Authority (NJTPA), upon the passage of ISTEA the local elected
officials on the NJTPA board responded with enthusiasm to the new role and
authority granted them by ISTEA, “At our monthly meetings, these
representatives of the people now show up in person rather than sending
surrogates, despite their busy schedules” (senate.gov, 1997).
The data collected on elected official participation at East-West
Gateway and MARC illustrates a significant increase. The numbers point toward
a trend that was not identifiable in every case in this study. In this study only
three of the six cases provided evidence of significant elected official
involvement.
The promise, success and problems of MPOs in Kansas City and St. Louis
The cases of Kansas City and St. Louis offer some insight into the
promise, success and problems related MPOs. The promise of MPOs is
highlighted by the evidence of emergent networks/interests in the regional
transportation process and contribution to quality of life factors. Evidence of
this promise is the River Crossing Task Force (RCTF) on the Paseo Bridge. This
task force consisted of over twenty local networks and interests. This suggests
that groups are taking advantage of the new role offered by their regional MPO
and embracing the new possibilities in regional transportation, “connections
across diverse groups and promoted new ways of thinking about
transportation’s role in the metropolitan area” (Weir et al., 2009).
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The success of these regional governance institutions (MPOs) is
illustrated by their ability to bring together a wide range of stakeholders and
garner cooperation. MPOs have significant policymaking responsibility and their
success is based upon their ability to coordinate the efforts of several
governments in the planning and provision of transportation policy (Gerber &
Gibson, 2009). East-West Gateway’s ability to coordinate the effort of Illinois
and Missouri offers evidence of the success of MPOs. They were able to bring
together two government entities and accept their role in shared policymaking.
A problem with MPOs and the regional transportation process is single
jurisdiction projects and credit-claiming. The best example of how this can
disrupt the regional decision making process is the Red Bridge project. Kansas
City Councilman Charles Eddy acquired an earmark for bridge and road
improvements in his district. During this time, Eddy and many of his
counterparts were running for mayor of Kansas City, throwing the entire
regional process off track. Eddy’s earmark imposed costs on other jurisdictions
to fund the remaining portion of the construction which the earmark did not
cover. This is an area the MPOs need to address, “A project to repair a specific
road within a single jurisdiction, allows an official to point to a road on a map
and residents can witness the repairs; the benefits come as soon as the
construction equipment is removed; and the project targets a specific
constituency. Such projects provide greater credit-claiming opportunities.
Elected officials who are members of an MPO are rewarded for the resources
they can bring home from MPOs” (Gerber & Gibson, 2009).
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Conclusion
The cases of Kansas City and St. Louis illustrate that MPOs make some
difference. According to this study, there are four ways an MPO makes a
difference: (1) increase public saliency; (2) contribute to quality of life; (3)
consideration of employment factors; and (4) promote elected official
involvement. This study further suggests that there are numerous means in
which these differences can occur. First, an increase in public saliency is a
direct result of an increase in news coverage. In this study the evidence
suggests that MPOs creating committees separate from the traditional
committees housed in the MPO garner a higher level of news coverage. Second,
quality of life can be influenced by the MPO supporting bike and pedestrian
access. The study illustrates that certain MPO actions (formation of committees
and public pressure) can result in this type of access which transcends
geographic boundaries connecting recreational amenities, residents,
businesses, retail stores and restaurants. Quality of life is also influenced when
the MPO provides funds to improve traffic flow. This can happen as a direct
result of the project or on alternate routes to mitigate traffic during
construction. Third, traffic flow can also have a great effect on employment
factors. This study illustrates that designing a project with the sole purpose of
improving traffic flow can create prosperity within a region. Finally, an MPO
can and does increase elected official involvement by creating forums for
participation beyond the traditional MPO committee. The evidence also
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suggests that the trend in elected official involvement is towards increased
engagement in the process post-ISTEA.
This study illustrates that MPOs make some difference in metropolitan
areas and offer stories of success and highlight the problems of MPOs. The
manner in which they make a difference varies and is reliant upon several
factors. These factors include: how the project appeared on the agenda, the
nature of the project, the funding reality for the project and the regional
MPOs’ leadership capabilities. The evidence further suggests that MPOs hold
promise and offer stories of success in regard to coordinating local government
efforts, and moving regional transportation process and discussions beyond the
traditional limited coalition and out of the DOTs board room. The problems
that still plague the regional transportation process are cause to suggest that
the difference they make may only be marginal at best.
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Chapter 7 – Conclusion
This chapter summarizes the study in seven parts: (1) the importance of
MPOs, (2) the need for the study, (3) the selection of the cases, (4) the steps
involved in determining whether MPOs make a difference, (5) what the study
determined, (6) the implications of these results, and (7) future research. The
passage of ISTEA offered MPOs a greater role in regional transportation. The
significance and effectiveness of these increased functions has not been
determined. The work of other scholars is insufficient to determine whether
MPOs are making a difference and called for further research. There was a
need for an in-depth examination of MPOs through a comparative case study.
The cases were chosen based upon similar characteristics (e.g. bi-state region,
MPO housed in COG). In an effort to substantiate the findings based upon logic
and the scientific model the study included a review of regional planning
literature, research design, two cases studies discussing and examining the
regional transportation process in St. Louis and Kansas City, and an analysis of
the cases. The evidence suggests MPO make a difference through several
means. They make a difference in public saliency, quality of life, employment
factors, and elected official involvement. The means range from hiring expert
consultants to managing funds. The study and results provide an opportunity
for future research which needs to include more cases, more interviews,
increased data collection and additional propositions.
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The Importance of MPOs
The passage of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act
(ISTEA) ushered in a new era in transportation policy at the federal, state and
local levels. After years of MPOs playing a limited role in transportation policy
dictated by the states, metropolitan areas were offered a greater role in
transportation decisions through their regional MPO. ISTEA and subsequent
legislation intended “to move transportation decision making out of the back
rooms and board rooms of the highway establishment” (Katz, Puentes and
Bernstein, 2005). The legislation empowered MPOs to facilitate regional
cooperation and create a transportation policy that addresses more than traffic
flow within a region. In theory, ISTEA would allow MPOs to create
transportation policies which increase public saliency, improve elected official
involvement, address economic development, consider social equity and
contribute to quality of life.
The empowerment of MPOs is based upon a comprehensive and inclusive
state and local partnership to garner greater regional cooperation. The
legislation requires transportation plans to be developed, at the regional MPO,
with input from local governments, area transit providers and state
Departments of Transportation. ISTEA made MPOs the central tool for
improving transportation planning and for broadening its scope.
The Need for a Study of MPOs
Regional review agencies (e.g. Councils of Government) experienced a
moderate amount of success. These regional review agency successes include
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constructing airports, highways and transportation facilities. Despite these
achievements Councils of Government (COGs) and their role as MPOs was
limited by low participation, little revenue, and minimal public saliency.
Recent federal legislation (ISTEA, TEA_21 & SAFETEA_LU) gave these MPOs new
responsibilities and the ability to address large transportation policy issues. An
exponential increase in funding accompanied their expanding role in regional
transportation. This offered regions the ability to move away from a one size
fits all transportation policy and state control, to a more comprehensive
approach tailored to meet each region’s needs. Despite their existence since
the mid 1960s and empowering legislation in 1991, there is a lack of sufficient
data to answer the question of whether MPOs made a difference in the regional
transportation process.
For forty years MPOs have played a role in regional transportation.
During this time period, MPOs have witnessed an increase in funding, power
and responsibilities. Until recently, regional transportation decisions were
made by state Departments of Transportation with little input from MPOs which
basically served as a rubber stamp for state decisions. Currently, MPOs develop
regional plans, provide planning and technical assistance, assist local
governments in planning, offer a forum for regional cooperation, disburse
federal transportation funds, and develop and manage the major regional
transportation documents. The significance and effectiveness of these
increased functions has not been determined. The early evaluations suggest
that MPOs, metropolitan areas and states have struggled to change and balance
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the transportation policy process. These evaluations called for further research
to determine if MPOs are actually improving regional transportation policy.
There was a need for a direct observation of specific cases study.
The Cases
The selection of the cases of Kansas City and St. Louis is based on the
grounds they offer similar systems and contain a well established COG, housing
a regional MPO in a bi-state region. The East-West Gateway (St. Louis) board
consists of twenty-one voting members, roughly one vote per 100,000 residents
The MARC board consists of twenty-nine voting members, roughly two votes per
100,000 residents (Sanchez, 2006).
These cities represent average American cities and are not either
enormous or small metropolitan areas. Kansas City and St. Louis contain an
urban core with the majority of the population living in suburban areas. These
two metropolitan areas have a population range between 1.5 and 2.5 million,
with the largest portion of their populations located within the state of
Missouri. Kansas City and St. Louis represent two metropolitan areas based in a
single, representative state and provided a good opportunity to examine the
strengths and weaknesses of MPOs.
These two regions have similarities and differences that make them
ideal for studying regional transportation planning. Missouri is the seventeenth
largest state; has seventh largest state-owned highway system; and the eighth
largest total of state and local lane miles in the country (Liu, 2004). Missouri is
eighth largest state in terms of fragmentation with 3,416 local governments,
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114 counties, 962 local governments, 1400 plus rural “special districts,” and
308 road districts (largest in nation). The Missouri portion of the St. Louis
metropolitan area has 312 local governments and the Missouri portion of the
Kansas City metropolitan area has 182 local governments (Katz, 2004).
During the 1990s, the St. Louis region grew at a rate of 4.5 percent
(111,000 new residents), whereas, the Kansas City region grew at a rate 12.2
percent (193,187 new residents). The St. Louis downtown population grew by
4.2 percent, whereas, the Kansas City downtown population decreased by 13.2
percent. In Kansas City forty-five percent and St. Louis fifty-eight percent of
the jobs are located ten miles from the central city. St. Louis County, the
economic core of the region, contains nearly half the region’s jobs and only
thirty-nine percent of the population (Brookings, 2002). Kansas City is
somewhat different. Population and job growth have taken place in Johnson
County, KS. Jackson County, Missouri, once viewed as the economic core for
the Kansas City region achieved a job growth of 2.3 percent from 1990 to 2008,
meanwhile, Johnson County’s job growth was 70.7 percent. Jackson County
now holds 304,209 private sector jobs and Johnson County offers 268,991
private sector jobs (Stafford, 2009). St. Louis has forty-two and Kansas City
hosts eighteen large corporation headquarters. St. Louis boasts 520 and Kansas
City is home to 409 mid-sized corporation headquarters. (Katz, 2004).
Each of these six projects studied offers a different perspective to
evaluate an MPO’s role in regional transportation policy. The Triangle project
is a regional project which involved the redesign of a major interchange. The
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purpose of the project was to alleviate congestion and open the area up for
economic prosperity. This case offered an opportunity to evaluate the work of
MARC as they attempted to garner regional consensus, cooperation between
multiple municipalities, access funds for its completion, community
involvement and public input.
The Paseo Bridge project is a regional project intended to alleviate
congestion on a major trade route through the Kansas City area. The
acquisition of additional funding resulted in regional groups insisting upon
bike/pedestrian access across the Missouri River. The case offers the
opportunity to assess MARC’s contribution in the regional transportation
process through regional consensus, cooperation between two counties, and
acquisition of additional federal funding to create a project the region desires.
The Red Bridge project is a project in which Kansas City acquired an
earmark for the modification of a bridge and roadway in a scenic portion of the
city. The project provides an example of a situation were the MPO had a
limited role and little authority due to a federal earmark. The case provides an
opportunity to evaluate what happens to the regional transportation process
when a municipality acquires a federal earmark and regional consensus is
lacking.
The new Mississippi River Bridge is a federally earmarked project where
regional consensus was lacking and the MPO had to step forward to coalesce
regional consensus. The intent of the project is to relieve congestion on the
four river crossings between southwestern Illinois and downtown St. Louis. The
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case offers the opportunity to evaluate the work of East-West Gateway as they
attempt to garner regional consensus, cooperation between two states, acquire
federal funds, access outside and public input.
The Page Extension is a regional project that encountered several
obstacles (e.g. public opposition and funding shortages). The project included
the creation of bike/pedestrian access crossing the Missouri River and the
construction of a fourth river crossing between St. Charles and St. Louis
counties. The purpose was to alleviate congestion and improve traffic flow on
the three current river crossings. The case provides the opportunity to assess
East-West Gateway’s contribution in the regional transportation process
through regional consensus, cooperation between two counties, public input,
environmental concerns and acquisition of additional funding to complete the
project.
The I-64 project is a federally earmarked project and the first designbuild in the state of Missouri. The purpose of the project is to improve traffic
flow on the central thoroughfare in the St. Louis region. This case offers the
opportunity to evaluate East-West Gateway’s ability to politically brokering,
gather public input, obtain regional consensus and gain federal support.
The cases of Kansas City and St. Louis offer the ability to compare across
cases with common demographics. In the six cases, each project was designed
to accomplish certain regional goals and offer the opportunity to evaluate the
MPOs’ ability to help the region attain these goals.
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Investigation of the Problem
The investigation of whether MPOs are making a difference involved
several steps. First, a review of the development of regional planning and the
role created for MPOs by federal legislation. Second, the development of a
roadmap to guide the research. Third, a discussion of regional transportation in
Kansas City. Fourth, a discussion of regional transportation in St. Louis. Finally,
an analysis of how each MPO is making a difference in their regions
transportation process. These steps were necessary to provide clear, step by
step logic for my conclusions.
The first step was to review the development of regional planning and
the role created for MPOs by federal legislation. A review of the development
of regional planning illustrates the significance of regional policymaking
institutions in the transportation policy process. This discussion uncovers what
is currently known about regional planning agencies and offers insight into
what we need to know, resulting in a clearer picture of how to design the study
and determine if MPOs are making a difference in regional transportation
policy.
The second step was to describe the design of the study. This step
involved describing the process for conducting interviews and compiling
quantitative data. This allowed for the development of a roadmap to guide my
research and discussion of the focal points of the study. The chapter outlines
how the study will answer research questions, collect data and analyze results,
allowing for a theoretical connection between the known and unknown. It
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further explains why the study was designed in a particular manner, the
reasons for the inclusion or omission of particular data and how the results will
contribute to the existing literature on MPOs. The chapter details the
development of the research questions and the reasoning behind the collection
of various types of data used to answer the proposition posited in this study.
The third step involved the discussion of the regional transportation
process in the Kansas City region. The chapter illustrates the difference in
regional transportation planning and project selection pre- and post-ISTEA. This
discussion and the evaluation of three regional projects illustrates the different
roles of the regional MPO (MARC). This chapter uncovers the difference the
MPO is making in the Kansas City region.
The fourth step involved the discussion of the regional transportation
policy process in the St. Louis region. The chapter illustrates illustrate the
difference in regional transportation planning and project selection pre- and
post-ISTEA. This discussion and the evaluation of three regional projects
illustrates the different roles of the regional MPO (East-West Gateway). This
chapter will uncover the difference the MPO is making in the St. Louis region.
The final step involved a discussion of the difference each MPO is making
as it relates to the propositions. The chapter offered an analysis of how each
MPO is making a difference in regional transportation policy. The culmination
of these steps helped to determine the different roles MPOs play, how they
increase public saliency, improve elected official involvement and what
regional area factors they consider.
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What the Study Determined
The cases of Kansas City and St. Louis illustrate that in each case the
regional MPO is making a marginal difference and that despite East-West
Gateway’s and MARC’s limitations each MPO offers a glimpse of the promise
and their success in regional transportation policy. These differences varied
from project to project, proposition to proposition, and region to region. The
evidence suggests that there are four ways an MPO makes a difference: (1)
increase public saliency; (2) contribute to quality of life; (3) consideration of
employment factors; and (4) promote elected official involvement. There are
several means in which an MPO can make a difference: (1) hire expert
consultants; (2) call a vote on a regional project; (3) provide public
information; (4) create committees outside their traditional committee
structure; (5) acquire additional funds; and (6) manage fund disbursement and
priorities. Each of these MPO actions provided benefits to their region. These
include: (1) alleviation of traffic congestion; (2) improved traffic flow on
alternate routes during construction; (3) bike/pedestrian access; (4) regional
consensus; (5) economic prosperity; and (6) projects the community could
embrace. Each of these conclusions follow a chain of evidence. For example,
the Triangle project alleviated congestion (better traffic flow) making the area
more accessible to commuters and shoppers, resulting in an increase in nonresidential construction, leading to increased employment. The study suggests
an MPO’s actions influence the regional transportation process and the
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outcome of the project which has a direct effect on public saliency, region
wide factors and elected official participation.
The study further shows that these MPOs offer the promise of new
groups and new ways of thinking about transportation, the success of regional
coordination and the problem of single jurisdiction projects and creditclaiming. The MPOs’ ability to include outside points of view provides promise
for their future as regional governance institutions (e.g. Paseo Bridge, Page
Extension). The inclusion of new groups provides a fresh view on a once siloed
policy process (Weir et al., 2009). The MPOs ability to bring together a wide
range of stakeholders and garner cooperation is a success for a regional
governance institution (e.g. Triangle, new Mississippi River Bridge). A regional
governance institution’s success is based upon their ability to coordinate the
efforts of several governments in the planning and provision of public policy
(Gerber & Gibson, 2009). East-West Gateway’s ability to coordinate the effort
of Illinois and Missouri offers evidence of the success of MPOs. They were able
to bring together two government entities and accept their role in shared
policymaking.
A problem facing MPOs is single jurisdiction projects and credit-claiming.
These projects impose costs on other jurisdictions with minimal regional
benefits. These types of projects are often the result of an elected official
looking for some credit or political capital within his jurisdiction. These elected
officials, who are also members of their regional MPO, are rewarded by their
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constituents for the funds they can bring home from MPOs (Gerber & Gibson,
2009).
The Implications of the Results
The cases of Kansas City and St. Louis represent only two of the fortynine large metropolitan areas in the United States, yet they offer optimism for
the potential of MPOs. The regional transportation process at Mid-America
Regional Council (MARC) and East-West Gateway Council of Governments
(EWGCOG) is required to be collaborative and all-encompassing. Through this
process MPOs make a marginal difference through their actions. These actions
have an influence on the direction of regional transportation policy. The results
in this study point toward the need for more focus and resources to be
provided to MPOs. The cases of the new Mississippi River Bridge (EWGCOG) and
Paseo Bridge (MARC) offer a glimpse of what MPOs are capable of
accomplishing. These cases illustrate that even though much of an MPO’s
powers to coalesce regional cooperation are informal, MPOs still make an
impact.
The creation of an expert panel, on the new Mississippi River Bridge
project, to take hold of an issue spiraling out of control illustrates an MPO
using informal powers to have a significant impact. The MPO formed the expert
panel to provide all the possible alternatives for the region in regard to
building a new Mississippi River crossing. The panel made several
recommendations to the community, in an effort to coalesce regional
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cooperation the MPO called a vote on these recommendations. This vote was
non-binding, however, the region embraced the decision of the MPO.
In a similar fashion, MARC created an outside committee (RCTF) to
address bike/pedestrian crossings on the Kansas and Missouri rivers. This
further illustrates the influence of MPO informal powers. The recommendations
from the bike/pedestrian committee were adopted by the MARC Bridge and
Pedestrian Access Committee, Total Transportation Policy Committee, Board of
Directors and MODOT.
The ability of the region to facilitate cooperation without reservation is
a strong suit for each MPO. The implications of MPOs wielding such great
influence, with only informal powers offers the prospect of great potential for
the policymaking institutions. These institutions garnering even more
responsibility and formal powers, in theory, could move regional transportation
to new levels.
The difference MPOs make in regard to equity issues is very limited. In
each of the projects there was no evidence of the MPO addressing equity issues
and five of the six dealt with major thoroughfares for commuters. It is
important to note that none of these projects went through a low income area.
The projects went through primarily middle income areas, industrial areas,
business districts and suburban communities. The implications of this lack of
consideration of equity are significant for the future of regional transportation
planning and the effectiveness of MPOs. MPOs should take into account how a
project is going to affect low income residents and focus less on the direct
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time saving benefits for suburban commuters. In many instances, during the
expansion or creation of a new freeway, the regional transportation process
focuses on connecting suburban commuters to the urban core without
consideration of how the new or expanded roadway is going to affect the urban
dwellers along the route in regard to air quality, noise and pedestrian access
for people without autos.
In short, MPOs make a marginal difference by coordinating local
government efforts, garnering cooperation, and including diverse points of
view. These regional governance institutions are limited by their lack of
authority to implement and the authority that states wield over transportation.
Future Research
The role of MPOs in the regional transportation process warrants further
discussion and research. Future research needs to include more cases, more
interviews, increased data collection and additional propositions. A study
incorporating the research listed above would offer a greater generalizability,
a higher degree of reliability and more evidence of whether MPOs are making a
difference.
The study points toward the need for further research to include more
cases and more varied cases, in terms of the region and the type of project
being carried out. The ability to compare and contrast several MPOs versus two
would greatly improve the researcher’s ability to draw inferences that are
generalizable to all MPOs. For instance, the addition of the cities of Oklahoma
City, Denver, Pittsburgh and Louisville, in addition to Kansas City and St. Louis,
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would greatly enhance the study’s findings. The selection of these cities is
based on geographic location, size of area and demographics. Each city ranks in
the lower half of mean populations for new Metropolitan Statistical Areas
(MSA). The mean population for MSAs is 3.6 million people, these cities range
from 2.6 million to 1.1 million people (US Census, 2000). The largest MSA is St.
Louis with 2.6 million versus the smallest Oklahoma City at 1.1 million people.
In addition to size, demographics are important criteria for the selection cities.
For example, Pittsburgh offers a highly fragmented metropolitan area similar to
the St. Louis metropolitan area. Louisville and St. Louis are both bi-state,
lower Midwestern cities with rivers serving as geographical boundary between
states. Denver and Kansas City are both metropolitan areas in the Great Plains.
The selection of additional cities such as the ones previously mentioned would
allow the identification of more varied cases. These cases may involve the
traditional bridge or highway project examined in this study or, perhaps, will
allow for the examination of a transit project or community project (e.g. MAPS
in Oklahoma City). The examination of varied cases would further enhance the
results by highlighting a greater number of MPO roles.
In addition to more cases, future research needs to consider the means
to collect more data. The researcher needs to plan two face-to-face interviews
over a year’s time with interviewees, a research might consider following a few
projects from inception to completion.
The need for two face-to-face interviews was made apparent during this
study. I often found myself asking different questions: Why did the MPO do

Campbell, Joseph, 2010, UMSL, p. 250
this? Why didn’t the MPO do that? Why the sudden change of course on the
direction of the policy? The meeting minutes provided little information in this
study, they often presented topics of discussion containing only a paragraph of
information. In several instances the MPO addressed the same topic two or
three times in a year and the discussions revolved around differing criteria.
This nuance leaves a researcher to wonder what had changed and why. The
inclusion of a planned second interview would allow the researcher to develop
well articulated questions in effort to highlight the reasoning and
circumstances behind these changes. In a similar fashion, following a project
from inception to completion would allow for the same questions to be
answered. The problem with this method is the study would offer less variety,
be time consuming and uncover less information relating to MPOs in general.
The expansion of the collection of data and increased number of cases would
greatly improve the generalizability and reliability of the study. In an effort to
increase the amount of information future research should offer answers to
additional propositions.
Future research needs to address the significance of the type of MPO,
size of MPO and amount of trust within varying MPO structures. The questions
that need to be answered are: (1) Does the MPO create a level of trust among
all constituents (2) Is this level of trust between state DOTs and local
governments greater in a free standing MPO, housed in a COG, or an MPO
controlled by the DOT? (3) Do free standing MPOs have fewer political tensions
and a higher degree of trust among participants in the regional transportation
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process? (4) Do large MPOs have a higher level of elected official participation
and a greater influence in the process?
The combination of more cases, varied cases, more propositions and
expanded data collection need to be considered in future research. A study of
this nature would offer more information, more reliability, greater
generalizability and have a substantial impact on the current literature on
MPOs and the regional transportation process.
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Appendix A
List of Interviews
Senator Joan Bray

Missouri State Senator – District 24

Doug Brown

Overland Park, KS Public Works Director

Linda Clark

MODOT Assistant District Engineer – District 4

Thomas Dow

KDOT Urban Planning Manager

Charles Eddy

Kansas City Councilman

Ed Hassinger

MODOT District Engineer – District 6

Mell Henderson

MARC Director of Transportation

Richard “Dick” Jarrold

KCATA Sr. Director System Development

Joe Ortwerth

Former St. Charles County Executive

Jim Stack

IDOT Chief, Transit and Metro Program Planning

Les Sterman

EWGCOG Executive Director

David Warm

MARC Executive Director
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Appendix B

MARC Total Transportation Policy Committee
Voting Membership
Agency
Cass County
Cass County Municipalities
Clay County
Clay County
Clay County Municipalities
Jackson County
Jackson County
Jackson County
Jackson County
Jackson County
Jackson County Municipalities
Jackson County Municipalities
Johnson County
Johnson County
Johnson County
Johnson County Municipalities
Johnson County Municipalities
Leavenworth County
Leavenworth County Municipalities
Platte County
Platte County Municipalities
Wyandotte County/KCK
Wyandotte County/KCK
Wyandotte County/KCK
Wyandotte County Municipalities
Independence
Kansas City, Missouri
Kansas City, Missouri
Kansas City, Missouri
Kansas City, Missouri
Kansas City, Missouri
Kansas City, Missouri
Olathe, Kansas
Overland Park, Kansas
Overland Park, Kansas
MODOT
KDOT
KCATA

Member
Cliff Fain, Dir. Public Works, Belton
Gary Lathrop, Alderman, Belton
Craig Porter, Eastern Commissioner
Duane Jackson, Asst. Dir. Of Operations, Clay County
Robert Steinkamp, Mayor, Liberty
Larry Creek, Dir. of Public Works, Grandview
Earl Newill, County Engineer, Jackson County
Oliver DeGrate, Director of Public Works, Blue Springs
Stan Salva, Mayor, Sugar Creek
Jerry Page, Director of Public Works, Jackson County
Karen Messerli, Mayor, Lee’s Summit
Ron Martinovich, Director of Public Works, Sugar Creek
Jim Allen, Commissioner
Douglas Wood, Commissioner
Alice Amrein, Director of Transportation
Ron Norris, Director of Public Works, Lenexa
Vacant
Mike Spickelmeir, County Engineer
Charles Campbell
Jim Plunkett, Commissioner
John Smedley, Mayor, Platte Woods
John Mendez, Commissioner
Marcia Bernard, Director of Transit
Bob Roddy, Assistant County Administrator
Chuck Adams, Councilmember, Edwardsville
Jim Schultz, Councilman
Charles Eddy, Councilman
Ed Ford, Councilman
John Sharp, Councilman
Stan Harris, Director of Public Works
Thomas Coyle, Dir. Planning and Development
Mark McHenry, Dir. of Parks and Recreation
Marge Vogt, Councilwoman
Doug Brown, Director of Public Works
Mark Stuecheli, Transportation Planner
Linda Clark, Assistant District Engineer
Davonna Moore, Urban Planning Unit Manager
Mark Huffer, General Manager

Alternate
Gary Mallory, Presiding Commissioner
Richard Scharfen, Mayor, Lake Winnebago
James McQuerrey, Highway Administration
Ed Quick, Presiding Commissioner
Bill Biggerstaff, Councilman, N. Kansas City
Larry Finley, City Engineer, Grandview
Mark Trosen, Jackson Co., Develop. Admin.
Vacant
Stan Sagehorn, Alderman, Sugar Creek
Mark Trosen, JaCO Development
Chuck Owsley, Dir. of Public Works, Lee’s Summit
Vacant
Mac Andrew, Dir. Infrastructure/Public Works
Brian Pieteg, Assistant County Engineer
Chuck Ferguson, Deputy Transit Director
Vacant
Peggy Dunn, Mayor, Leawood
Mickey Schwartzkopf, Deputy County Engineer
Michael McDonald. Dir.Public Works, Leavenworth
Kathy Dusenbery, Commissioner
Kathy Rose, Mayor, Riverside
Vacant
Mike Tobin, Assistant Director of Public Works
Fred Backus, City Engineer
Dan Byers, Bonner Springs
Larry Kaufman, Assistant City Manager
Patty Hilderbrand, Prog. Mngmt & Development
Bob Langenkamp, Asst. Dir. Planning & Development
Mike Herron, Manager North Parks Region
Vacant
Vacant
Vacant
Rick Biery, Public Works Director
Dan Miller, City Engineer
Brian Shields, City Traffic Engineer
Lee Ann Keli, Planning Manager
Thomas Dow, State Transportation Planner
Dick Jarrold, Senior Director
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Appendix C
MARC Bicycle/Pedestrian Resolution
Policy on Bicycle and Pedestrian Accommodations on Missouri and Kansas River Bridges is
intended to address major barriers for bicyclists and pedestrians, connect the communities
of our region, and implement the policies identified in the LRTP in a cost-effective
manner. This policy also reflects the LRTP’s goals to support a visionary multi-modal
transportation system that will provide value and utility to all citizens of the region. The
principal objective of this policy is to ensure that safe, practical and appropriate bicycle
and pedestrian accommodations will be considered in the planning and design of all
surface transportation projects that cross the Kansas and Missouri Rivers in the Kansas City
metropolitan area and that such accommodations will be made wherever warranted and
feasible.
This policy applies to projects in MARC’s LRTP and Transportation Improvement Program
(TIP). The policy is also provided as a recommended good practice for projects not
identified in the LRTP or TIP.
Implementation of this policy will require that the lead agency develop and foster a
partnership with KDOT, MoDOT, appropriate local governments, advocacy groups and other
appropriate groups which MARC will facilitate. The intent of the partnership should be to
work together to identify issues, review progress, establish priorities, and identify funding
sources.
1. Warrants for Planning and Design:
1

The investigation and evaluation of bicycle and pedestrian accommodations in all projects
for bridges crossing the Missouri and Kansas Rivers during planning and design activities is
necessary when both of the following conditions exist:
a) Existing or Anticipated Demand – Warrant accommodations exist when sufficient existing
2

or planned future bicycle or pedestrian traffic generators are located within one mile of
the project. Such generators may include residential neighborhoods, employment centers,
shopping centers, schools, parks, trails, etc. Local governments should assist project
sponsors in defining when current and future bicycle and pedestrian traffic generators will
result in sufficient need to warrant accommodation. For projects where no existing or
planned bicycle or pedestrian generators are located within one mile of the project, the
project sponsor should also consider including provisions for future bicycle and pedestrian
accommodations if the anticipated life of the project exceeds the planning horizon of the
LRTP. However, each bridge shall be evaluated on its own merits with a decision based on
a technical evaluation, not a set distance from traffic generators.
3

b) Legal Access – Bicyclists and pedestrians are legally allowed to use roadways except
where prohibited by law or local traffic ordinance. If bicyclists and pedestrians are not
legal users but other safe, practical, and appropriate accommodations for bicyclists and
pedestrians can be established elsewhere within the right-of-way or within the same
transportation corridor, the project sponsor should investigate and evaluate such
accommodations. MARC and the appropriate local government should assist in providing
relevant planning information.
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2. Feasibility for Construction:
a) If the warrants listed above exist for a proposed major river crossing project, and if the
cost of establishing safe, practical and appropriate bicycle and pedestrian
4

accommodations on a bridge does not exceed 15% of the cost of the entire bridge
structure, MARC will consider bicycle or pedestrian accommodations to be feasible and
should be provided in the design and construction of the project.
b) Documentation will be developed by the project sponsor on all projects to support the
decision to provide or not provide bicycle and/or pedestrian accommodations.
3. Other Design Considerations:
a) Bicycle and/or pedestrian connections should be made to streets, roadways, sidewalks
or trails found in proximity to river crossing accommodations so that the system is
seamless and useful to the traveling, walking, and bicycling public. For portions of the
system outside of the corridor right-of-way, the local governments should plan for making
needed extensions to the local or regional facilities to make these connections possible.
b) Bicycle and pedestrian accommodations to, on and from major river bridges should be
designed, constructed, operated and maintained to meet federal ADA requirements so that
all bicyclists and pedestrians, including people with disabilities, can travel safely and
independently.
c) Projects should be planned to address needs for the long-term. Bridge crossings are
long-term investments that remain in place for many years. The design of the bridge
should anticipate both current and future demand for bicycling and walking facilities.
d) Bridge design should be done in a manner that gives strong consideration to the safety
of all modes. The design should be done in a manner to minimize detrimental effects for
any mode.
e) Major river bridges should be designed to allow bicyclists and pedestrians to travel along
the rivers and under the bridges.
f) Facilities should be designed to appropriate standards and guidelines. The design of
Kansas and Missouri River crossing facilities for bicyclists and pedestrians should follow
design guidelines and
1
2

“All” is not intended to include routine maintenance.

Expected future generators are defined as being documented on an agency’s plan (i.e.
MetroGreen, future land use plans of local jurisdictions).
3

4

It is not the intention of the policy to refer to interstate travel ways.

The policy’s intent is not to mandate that 15% of a bridge structure budget should be
dedicated to bicycle and pedestrian facilities. Rather any percentage below 15% that will
establish the facilities or structural accommodations is satisfactory. If the accommodations
exceed 15%, they can still be included in the project.
Standards that are commonly used, such as the AASHTO’s Guide for the Development of
Bicycle Facilities, AASHTO’s Guide For The Planning, Design and Operation of Pedestrian
Facilities, FHWA’s A-RD-92-073 Selecting Roadway Design Treatments to Accommodate
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Bicycles, AASHTO’s A Policy on Geometric Design of Highways and Streets, ITE’s
Recommended Practice "Design and Safety of Pedestrian Facilities", the Kansas City
American Public Works Association’s (KCAPWA) Incidental Construction and Local Bicycle
Facility Design Guidance, and the ADA Accessibility Guidelines (ADAAG).
g) The project sponsor, and local government and/or local agencies will work together to
ensure that the bicycle and pedestrian accommodation is ground to ground, allowing for
connections to other bicycle and/or pedestrian facilities.
h) The bridge and its approaches should be designed to avoid obstructions for current or
future connections to bicycle or pedestrian facilities on either end of or under the bridge.
4. Funding:
Funding of bicycle and pedestrian accommodations for major river crossing projects must
be determined on a case-by-case basis for each project. Potential funding sources for
these improvements may include federal, state, and local funds as appropriate, including,
but not limited to, federal funds administered by MARC in the TIP.
The project sponsor, local governments and/or local agencies will work together to
develop project financial plans, fund applications, and project funding agreements
between participating state or local governments; however, nothing in this policy should
be construed as requiring or preventing any project sponsor from bearing all or part of the
cost of providing safe, practical and appropriate bicycle/pedestrian accommodations.
MARC will assist in the development of financial plans for all major river crossing projects
to be included in the regional LRTP and TIP, as requested by project sponsors, member
local governments or other metropolitan planning stakeholders.
Because this policy elevates the priority of bicycle and pedestrian accommodations on
major river crossings, MARC shall review the evaluation criteria for relevant federal funds
under its control, including suballocated Bridge, CMAQ, STP, and STP-TE to ensure that
appropriate consideration is given for applications for these types of improvements in
regional competitive programming processes.
5. Replacement of Existing Accommodations:
Major river bridge projects that replace existing bridges with bicycle and pedestrian
accommodation should provide for at least the same level if not safer levels of
accommodation.
6. Maintenance:
Maintenance of bicycle and pedestrian facilities is an important element of assuring safe
and convenient crossings of the Kansas and Missouri Rivers for all travelers. Once again,
the arrangements for maintaining these facilities should be made on a case-by-case basis
and may require participation between multiple state and/or local agencies. However, the
owner of the bridge is ultimately responsible for maintenance either by maintaining the
bicycle/pedestrian facilities themselves or by securing maintenance agreements from
other agencies.
7. Policy Updates:
This policy will be reviewed periodically as the state of the practice for such matters as
forecasting bicycle and pedestrian demand evolve.
Source: Mid-America Regional Council
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Appendix D
St. Louis Region - Amendment 3 Projects
(Dollars in thousands)

Franklin County

I-44
Fog seal shoulders from Route 30 to Crawford County.
$155
Route 47
Coldmilling and resurfacing from south of I-44 to Route 47/30 split. Accelerated from 2006 to
2005
$2,056
Route 47
Pavement repair and resurfacing from Route 50 to I-44. Accelerated from 2006 to 2005
$1,961

Jefferson County

Route 21
Diamond grind pavement and fog seal shoulders from Old Route 21 to Schenk Road.
Approved December 2004
$1,122
Route 30
Diamond grind pavement and fog seal shoulders, resurface pavement and shoulders with 1 3/4
inches and 3
3/4 inches of asphalt from I-270 to south of Routes B/NN (end of 4-lane divided). Approved
December
2004
$7,609
Route 61
Chip seal shoulders from Route Z to Route A.
$319
Route 67
Mill and resurface pavement and shoulders with 1 3/4 inches of asphalt from I-55 to 2.0 miles
south of I-55. Resurface pavement and shoulders with 1 ¾ inches of asphalt from 2.0 miles
south of I-55 to Route 110, resurface pavement & shoulders with 3 3/4 inches of asphalt from
Route 110 to the St. Francois
County line. Approved December 2004
$4,891
Route 141
Resurface pavement and shoulders with 3 3/4 inches of asphalt from north of Route 30 to north
of I-55.
$3,419
Route 30
Rehabilitate westbound lanes of bridges over Big River and Skullbones Creek from 0.2 mile east
of Route B to 0.8 mile east of Route B. Accelerated from 2007 to 2006
$1,775
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St. Charles County

Route N
Resurface pavement and shoulders with 1 3/4 inches of asphalt from Route 364 to west of
Route K and from Spring Orchard Road to Motherhead Road. Approved December 2004
$735
Route 40
Resurface eastbound pavement and shoulders with 3 ¾ inches of asphalt and resurface
westbound pavement and shoulders with 1 3/4 inches of asphalt from I-70 to east of Lake St.
Louis.
$855
Route 61
Resurface pavement and shoulders with 3 3/4 inches of asphalt from the Lincoln County line to
I-70.
$6,753
I-70
Resurface pavement and shoulders with an ultra-thin bonded overlay from Route 94 to the
Missouri River. Approved December 2004
$1,073
I-70
Diamond grind pavement from Lake St. Louis Boulevard to Route 94.
$843
Route 94
Mill and resurface pavement and shoulders with 1 3/4 inches of asphalt and resurface
pavement and shoulders with 3 ¾ inches of asphalt from south of I-70 to Lindenwood and Route
N to Route 364 (2 disconnected sections).
$2,709
Route 370
Mill and resurface bridge approaches from I-70 to I-270.
$750
Route 370
Diamond grind pavement and fog seal shoulders from east of Elm Industrial to I-270.
$1,165
I-70
Rehabilitate bridge decks, bridge painting and guardrail at Route 40/61 interchange in
Wentzville. Accelerated from 2007 to 2006
$1,872
Route 79
Resurface pavement, shoulder work and pavement repair from 0.80 mile south of Lincoln
County to I-70. Accelerated from 2007 to 2005
$6,863

St. Louis County

Route N
Mill and resurface pavement and shoulders with 1 3/4 inches of asphalt from I-270 to Darst,
Paul Avenue to Emerling and Walker Lane to Route 115 (3 disconnected sections). - $961
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Route P
Resurface pavement with 1 3/4 inches of asphalt from Route 366 to Route 30.
$383
Route 21
Mill and resurface pavement with 1 3/4 inches of asphalt and resurface pavement with 3 3/4
inches of asphalt from Route 30 to north of Lindbergh and south of Lindbergh to Butler
Spur.
$1,509
Route 40
Diamond grind pavement and fog seal shoulders from Route 340 (Olive Blvd.) to east of Route
JJ (Ballas).
$1,366
I-44
Diamond grind and mill and resurface pavement with 1 3/4 inches of asphalt and fog seal
shoulders from Six Flags Road to I-270.
$4,089
Route 61
Mill and resurface pavement and shoulders with 1 3/4 inches of asphalt from north of Butler
Hill Road to Route M and pavement repair from north of Butler Hill to Route M.
$3,257
I-64
Mill and resurface pavement with 1 3/4 inches of asphalt and fog seal shoulders from east of
Chesterfield Parkway to west of Timberlake Manor and east of Mason to west of I-270.
$323
Route 67
Resurface pavement and shoulders with 3 3/4 inches of asphalt and mill and resurface
pavement and shoulders with 1 3/4 inches of asphalt from Route 367 to Route AC, from north
of I-270 to Missouri Bottom Rd. and from Long Rd. to Old St. Charles Rd.
$3,588
Route 67
Diamond grind pavement and fog seal shoulders from the Missouri River to Route 367 (NB only)
and Elm Grove to I-270.
$156
I-70
Resurface pavement and shoulders with 3 3/4 inches of asphalt from the Missouri River to west
of I-270. Approved December 2004
$2,971
I-70
Diamond grind pavement from west of I-270 to Fee Fee Road.
$137
I-70
Resurface pavement and shoulders with 3 3/4 inches of asphalt from west of I-170 to east of I170.
$570
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Route AC
Resurface pavement with 1 3/4 inches of asphalt from south of Route 67 to Parker Road.
$278
Route 100
Diamond grind eastbound pavement and fog seal shoulders from Route T to Strecker Road.
$292
Route 100
Mill and resurface pavement with 1 3/4 inches of asphalt from Route 61/67 to east of Big Bend.
$1,640
Route 100
Resurface pavement with an ultra thin bonded overlay and fog seal shoulders from west of
Route 141 to east of Mason.
$527
Route 100
Resurface pavement with an ultra thin bonded overlay from Route JJ (Ballas Road) to Route
61/67 (Lindbergh).
$481
Route 100
Resurface pavement and shoulders with 3 3/4 inches of asphalt from west of Route T (begin 4
lane) to West Glen Farms Drive (WB lanes only).
$1,113
Route 141
Diamond grind pavement and fog seal shoulders from south of Ladue Road to south of Clayton
Road.
$360
Route 141
Resurface pavement and shoulders with 1 3/4 inches of asphalt from Route 340 (Olive Blvd.) to
south of Route AB (Ladue Road).
$430
Route 141
Diamond grind pavement from Vance Road to south of I-44.
$123
I-170
Diamond grind pavement and resurface shoulders with 1 3/4 inches of asphalt and fog seal
shoulders from I-270 to south of Route D (Page Avenue).
$1,391
I-170
Resurface pavement and shoulders with an ultra thin bonded overlay from south of Route D
(Page Ave.) to I-64 (exception from north of Route 340 to north of Delmar Blvd.).
$1,347
Route 180
Mill and resurface pavement from west of Route 61/67 to east of San Carlos.
$336
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Route 180
Resurface pavement with an ultra thin bonded overlay from east of San Carlos to Ferguson
Road.
$1,325
I-270
Various treatments from Mississippi River at Chain of Rocks Bridge to Mississippi River at
Jefferson Barracks Bridge. Approved December 2004
$7,152
Route 340
Resurface pavement with an ultra thin bonded overlay and scrub seal shoulders from River
Valley Drive to Woodcrest Executive Drive. Approved December 2004
$719
Route 340
Resurface pavement with 1 3/4 inches of asphalt from Ballas to Route 61/67 (Lindbergh).
$483
Route 340
Mill and resurface pavement with 1 3/4 inches of asphalt from west of I-64 to west of
Appalachian Trial.
$451
Route 340
Resurface pavement with an ultra thin bonded overlay and scrub seal shoulders from Route 100
(Manchester) to west of I-64.
$1,224
Route 364
Diamond grind pavement on Creve Coeur Lake bridge east of Maryland Heights Expressway.
$146
Route 366
Mill and resurface pavement and shoulders with 1 3/4 inches of asphalt from Grant Road to St.
Louis city limits.
$970
Route 30
Coldmill, resurface, pavement repair including the outer road adjacent to the railroad viaduct
from the St. Louis city limits to east of I-270. Accelerated from 2006 to 2005
$7,862
I-55
Pavement repair, coldmill, resurface, rehabilitate 7 bridges, upgrade guardrail and diamond
grind PCCP lanes from Route 61/67 (Lindbergh Blvd.) to 4500 Broadway. Accelerated from
2 0 0 7 to 2 0 0 5
$14,796
Route 61
Coldmill, pavement repair, resurface, replace signal loops and upgrade guardrail from north of
Big Bend Boulevard to Route 21. Accelerated from 2007 to 2005
$4,780
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Route 67
Rehabilitation of the Missouri River bridge at the St Charles St. Louis/St. Charles County line.
Accelerated from 2008 to 2006
$8,712
Route 67
Coldmill, resurface, pavement repair, signals, signing and lighting from Old St. Charles Road to
Swan. Accelerated from 2007 to 2005
$13,966
Route AC
Coldmill and resurface with superpave from I-270 south to end of state maintenance at Cozens.
Accelerated from 2007 to 2006
$4,459
Route 115
Coldmill and resurface with superpave from I-70 (Airflight) to I-170. Accelerated from 2006 to
2005
$2,712
I-170
Bridge rehabilitation at CRIP Railroad, Woodson Road, Ladue Road and Forest Park Parkway.
Accelerated from 2007 to 2006
$3,870
I-270
Coldmill and resurface mainline asphalt lanes and shoulders with superpave plus ramps at
Route 67 from I-70 to Coldwater Creek. Accelerated from 2007 to 2006
$8,240
Route 340
Coldmill and resurface from I-170 to Ferguson Road. Accelerated from 2006 to 2005
$1,648

St. Louis City

Route H
Resurface pavement with 3 3/4 inches and 1 3/4 inches of asphalt from I-270 to 1/4 mile south
of I-270 & Hall Street to Adelaide Street (2 disconnected sections).
$1,258
I-64
Resurface with an ultra-thin bonded overlay, resurface pavement and shoulders with 3 3/4
inches of asphalt and fog seal shoulders from east of Ballas to 20th Street. Approved December
2004
$5,584
I-64
Seal coat and resurface with 1 3/4 inches of asphalt 3 ramps at end of Poplar Street Bridge.
$302
I-70
Mill and resurface pavement and shoulders with 1 3/4 inches of asphalt and fog seal shoulders
from Union Blvd. to Broadway Street (I-70 reversible lanes).
$700
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I-70
Resurface pavement with an ultra thin bonded overlay from Broadway to I-64.
$262
I-70
Mill and resurface pavement with 3 3/4 inches of asphalt and fog seal shoulders from St. Louis
Avenue to Broadway.
$510
I-70
Fog seal shoulders from Bermuda to St. Louis Avenue.
$81
Route 100
Mill and resurface pavement with 1 3/4 inches of asphalt from 39th Street to Tucker and
Broadway to I-55.
$1,038
Route 30
Coldmill, pavement repair and resurfacing from St. Louis city limits to Grand. Accelerated from
2006 to 2005
$5,047

St. Louis Region Total: $172,750
Source: MODOT
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Appendix E
Mississippi River Bridge Expert Panel
Cynthia J. Burbank is a retired Associate Administrator for Planning, Environment, and Realty
for the Federal Highway Administration. Prior to joining FHWA in 1991, she held positions in the
Federal Aviation Administration, FTA, the Office of the Secretary of Transportation, and the
U.S. Navy.
Dr. Ronald F. Kirby is director of transportation planning for the National Capital Region
Transportation Planning Board (TPB) at the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments.
Karen Hedlund is a partner at the firm of Nossaman, Guthner, Knox & Elliott, LLC specializing
in the structuring of public-private partnerships and the creative financing of infrastructure
projects.
Stephen Lockwood is a Principal Consultant with the firm PB Consult. He is a nationally
recognized expert on transport policy, finance and institutions, with extensive experience in
policy and program development and technical applications.
John Barna is executive director of the California Transportation Commission, an
independent state commission that is responsible for programming and funding several billion
dollars annually for transportation projects in California in partnership with regional
transportation agencies and the California Department of Transportation.
Don Camph is President of Aldaron Inc., a consulting firm that has provided political, policy,
financing, and strategy advice on transportation related issues to a variety of private and
public sector clients since 1982. Mr. Camph is an internationally recognized expert in the areas
of transportation policy, funding, and strategy.
Charles J. Nemmers is the Director of the Transportation Infrastructure Center at the
University of Missouri-Columbia, a position he has held since 1999.
Linda Wheeler currently works as a transportation consultant, providing analysis of
transportation issues, particularly funding issues, for a variety of clients. Ms. Wheeler retired
from the Illinois Department of Transportation in 2003 after a 28 year career at the agency.
Wally Kreutzen is currently CEO of the Orange County Great Park Conservancy, the
organization charged with turning the former El Toro Marine Corps Air Station into one of
America’s largest metropolitan parks. Prior to his current job Mr. Kreutzen served as Chief
Executive Officer for the Transportation Corridor Agencies, joint powers agencies charged with
building new urban toll roads in Orange County, CA.
David B. Miller is the President of Metro Transportation Group, Inc., a transportation
consulting firm that specializes in traffic engineering, transportation planning and signal system
design. He has over 36 years experience in traffic engineering and transportation planning.

Source: East-West Gateway Coordinating Council Mississippi River Bridge Expert Panel Report
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Appendix F
Questions for Interviewees

1) How did you get involved with EW Gateway / MARC?
2) What is the process for determining a regional problem?
2a) Air Quality
2b) Transportation
3) What is the process for establishing regional projects?
3a) Page Extension, Mississippi River Bridge, 64/40 project (STL)
3b) Triangle project, Paseo Bridge, Red Bridge (KC)
4) What is the process for determining regional policies?
4a) Unified Planning Work Program
4b) Transportation Improvement Plan
4c) Long Range Transportation Plan
5) How has ISTEA improved local officials’ awareness of regional issues? The
general public’s awareness of regional issues?
6) How has ISTEA increased the consideration of different kinds of issues in the
policy making process? If so, specifically how?
6a) Quality of life issues? Which ones?
6b) Land use and air quality issues?
6c) Equity?
7) How has ISTEA promoted cooperation between regional governments?
8) How has ISTEA promoted cooperation between MPOs and state
Department(s) of Transportation?
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